propessor'shields'  course. 

FIRST  PART. 

THEMES  AND  QUESTIONS 

FROM 


PRIIVTED  FOR  THE   USE    OF    THE   STUDENTS,  AND    SOLD 
ONLY  BY  STELLE  &  SMITH,   PRINCETON,   N.  J. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1868,  by 

CHARLES  W.  SHIELDS, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States,  for  the  District  of 

New  Jersey. 

Stanharp  Office   Print. 


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THE  LOGIC  APPLICABLE  TO  RELIGION. 

(INTRODUCTION. ) 

PROBABILITY. 
I.  The  Nature  of  Probability. 

1.  Probability  distinguishable  from  Demonstration. 

How  is  probable  evidence  distinguished  from  demonstrative  evidence  ? 
Between  wliat  limits  does  it  range  ? 

What  are  the  two  reasons  why  one  slight  presumption  does  not  consti- 
tute certainty  ? 

2.  Probability  susceptible  of  increase  to  Certainty. 

How  may  the  slightest  presumption  amount  to  moral  certainty  ? 
What  example  is  given  ? 

II.  The  Foundation  of  Probabiliit. 

1.  Probability  founded  upon  Livelihood. 

What  word  expresses  that  which  constitutes  probability  ? 
In  what  three  ways  may  one  truth  or  event  be  like  another  ? 
On  what  ground  do  we  determine  that  an  event  will  probably  come  to 
pass  ? 

2.  Probability  measured  by  Recurrence. 

By  what  are  a  presumption,  an  opinion,  or  a  full  conviction  that  an 
event  will  come  to  pass  respectively  produced  ? 

What  examples  are  given  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  likelihood  or  analogy  enters  into  our  whole  expe- 
rience ? 

What  incident  illustrates  the  opposite  conclusions  which  may  be  drawn 
from  analogy  ? 

III.  The  Value  of  Probability. 

1.  Probability  limited  in  its  Information. 

Why  does  probable  evidence  afford  only  an  imperfect  kind  of  informa- 
tion? 
To  what  kind  of  beings  alone  does  it  relate  ? 


Why  cannot  it  relate  to  the  Infinite  Intelligence  ? 

But  to  us,  what  is  Probabilitj^  ? 

2.   Piohahility  decisive  in  Speculatioji  and  Practice. 

What  questions  are  described  as  properlj^  admitting  of*  probable  evi- 
dence ? 

In  matters  of  speculation  what  should  be  the  effect  of  even  the  lowest 
flivorable  presumption  ? 

In  matters  of  practice  what  should  be  its  force  ?  and  why  ? 

In  questions  of  great  consequence  what  should  be  the  effect  of  even  a 
balance  of  probabilities  ? 

How  is  this  shown  in  the  common  actions  of  men  ? 

EELIGIOUS  ANALOGY. 

I.  Analogy  in  General. 

1.  llie  Phihscqihj  of  Analogy. 

What  are  the  three  topics  relating  to  Probability  which  Butler  decl  nes 
further  to  examine  ? 

What  question  relating  to  the  formation  of  our  presumptions,  opinions, 
and  convictions  does  he  also  waive  ? 

2.  The  Logic  of  Analogy. 

To  what  subject  or  science  does  reasoning  from  analogy  belong? 
On  what  grounds  does  Butler  decline  to  treat  of  its  rules? 

3.  Hie  Uses  of  Analogy. 

Notwithstanding  any  ignorance  of  the  intellectual  powers  or  the  exer- 
cise of  them,  what  weight  actually  has  analogy? 

What  class  of  persons  are  most  ai)t  to  object  to  it  ?  and  on  what  grounds? 
What  in  general  is  the  proper  estimate  of  it? 
What  instance  is  given  in  which  its  force  would  be  unquestioned  ? 
II.  Analogy,  as  applied  to  Religion. 

1.  Exampleji  of  Religious  Analogy. 

How  does  Origen  apply  Analogy  to  the  comparative  difficulties  of  Na- 
ture and  Scripture? 

How  may  it  likewise  be  applied  to  the  question  of  the  Divine  Author- 
ship of  Nature  and  Scripture? 

How  far  can  analogy  go  in  proving  that  they  both  have  the  same  author? 

2.  Grounds  of  Religious  Analogy. 

How  does  it  appear  that  the  analogical  method  is  practical  ? 

To  what  extent,  and  in  what  proportion,  is  it  conclusive  ? 

What  other  reason  is  given  for  its  introduction  into  the  subject  of  reli- 


What  is  presuj^posed  or  assumed  in  these  reasonings?  On  what  grounds 
is  this  assumption  made  ? 

What  renders  this  assumption  especially  allowable  ? 
III.  The  Superiority  of  Religious  Analogy. 

1.  Analogy  superior  to  mere  JL/2)othesis. 

What  was  Des  Cartes'  method  of  reasoning  ui)cn  the  constitution  and 
government  of  the  world? 

What  other  kindred  method  of  reasoning  upon  such  subjects  is  adduced 
and  what  example  is  given  ? 

Wherein  do  these  two  methods  differ  and  agree  ? 

How  is  the  analogical  method  distinguished  from  both  these  methods, 
as  applied  to  the  Divine  government  and  the  future  state? 

2.  Analogy  siiperior  to  mere  Speculation. 

In  what  speculations  concerning  the  constitution  of  nature  do  another 
class  indulge  ? 

What  may  be  said  beforehand  of  the  best  speculations  of  the  wisest  men 
upon  such  a  subject  ? 

What  three  plans  of  nature  might  such  a  theorist  imagine  ? 

To  what  extravagant  conclusions  would  such  speculations  lead  in  regard 
to  happiness  and  virtue  and  the  consistency  of  one  with  the  other  ? 

What  is  a  full  direct  answer  to  them  ? 

(1.)    The  Precise  Limits  of  Religious  Speculation. 

What  must  be  admitted  as  to  our  judgment  of  ends  in  general  and  of 
virtue  and  happiness  as  ends  ? 

AVhat  consequently  must  we  conclude  to  be  the  ultimate  ends  designed 
in  Nature  and  Providence  ? 

Why,  however,  are  we  incompetent  to  judge  of  the  means  necessary  to 
such  ends  ? 

What  are  the  a  fortiori  proofs  of  this  incompetency  afforded  by  the 
judgments  of  men  concerning  one  another? 

(2.)    The  True  Grounds  of  Religions  Speculation. 

By  what  are  we  led  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God  ?  . 

To  whom,  and  why,  is  this  a  practical  proof  of  His  moral  character  ? 

How  do  we  thence  reach  the  above  conclusion  as  to  the  true  ends  of  Di- 
vine Providence? 

(3.)     The  greater  Certainty  of  Religious  Analogy. 

What  now  is  recommended  in  i)lace  of  such  idle  speculations  ? 

To  what  other  sure  method  of  scientific  investigation  is  this  likened  ? 

With  what  is  it  proposed  to  compare  the  known  constitution  of  Nature 
and  the  acknowledged  dispensation  of  Providence  ? 

And  what  is  anticipated  as  the  result  of  this  argument  ? 


THE  PllOPOSED  ANALOGY. 

I.    The  Extent  and  Force  of  the  Proposed  Analogy. 
What  will  be  its  extent  and  de.i^'vec  of  exactne.s.^  ? 
What  will  be  its  force  in  different  instances  ? 

What  will  it  undeniably-  show  in  regard  to  the  sj'stem  of  religion,  both 
natural  and  revealed  ? 

What  class  of  objections  will  it  almost  entirely  refute  ? 

What  class  will  it  at  least  measurably  refute  ? 

What  is  the  difference  between  these  two  classes  of  objections ! 

II.  The  Outline  of  the  Proposed  Analogy. 

In  what  two  departments  may  Religion  or  the  Divine  Government  of 
the  world  be  considered  ? 

1.      The  ArgiuneiLt  for  Katural  Religion. 

(1.) .  What  will  be  proved  as  to  a  Future  State  ? 

(2.)     What  will  be  proved  as  to  the  destinies  of  men  in  that  state? 

(3.)  Vriiat  will  be  proved  as  to  the  Divine  Government  in  the  future 
state  ? 

(4.)     What,  as  to  the  relarion  of  the  present  state  to  the  future  state? 

(5.)     What,  as  to  the  design  of  the  present  probation  ? 

(6.)     What  speculative  objections  from  the  constitution  of  Nature  will 

be  refuted  ? 

(7.)  What  speculative  objections  from  the  Divine  Attributes  will  be 
refuted  ? 

'1.      Tlie  Argument  for  Revealed  Religion. 

(1.)  What  will  be  proved  as  to  the  occasion  for  an  additional  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence  ? 

(2. )     What,  as  to  the  character  of  its  evidences? 

(3. )     What,  as  to  our  pre-conceptions  of  its  contents  ? 

(4. )     What,  as  to  its  structure  or  scheme  ? 

(5. )     Wliat,  as  to  the  agency  by  which  it  is  carried  on  ? 

(6.)     What,  as  to  the  prevalence  and  clearness  of  its  evidence  1 

(7.)     What,  as  to  the  evidence  itself? 

III.  The  Design  of  the  Proposed  Analogy. 

What  is  it  designed  to  show  in  respect  to  the  things  principally  objected 
against  in  this  scheme  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion  ? 

What,  as  to  the  chief  objections  themselves  alleged  against  it? 

And  what,  as  to  the  weight  and  validity  of  this  whole  argument  from 
analogy  ? 

With  what  article  of  religion  is  it  proposed  to  begin  ?  and  for  what 
reason  ? 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF   NATURAL  RELIGION, 

AS  SOLVED  BY  AxNALOGY. 

(PART  I.) 
PRELIMINARY. 

AS  TO  THE  EELiaiOUS  CAPACITIES.     (Appendix.) 

THE    QUESTION    OF    PERSONAL    IDENTITY  IN  A  FUTURE  STATE. 
(Dissertation  I.) 

THE  QUESTION  OF  A  MORAL  FACULTY  IN  MAN.     (Dissertation  II.) 

SECTION  I. 

AS  TO  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATURAL  ^^ELIGION.  (Chaps.  I-V.) 

THE    PROBABILITY    OF   A    FUTURE    LIFE.     (Chap.  I.) 
THE    PROBABILITY    OF     A     DIVINE    GOVERNMENT.     (Chap.  II.) 
THE    PROBABILITY    OF   A    FUTURE    PERFECT    MORAL    GOVERN- 
MENT.   (Chap.  III.) 

THE     PROBABILITY     OF     A     PRESENT     STATE     OF     PROBATION. 
(Chap.  IV.) 

THE    PROBABILITY    OF   A  MORAL  EDUCATION  FOR  THE  FUTURE 
LIFE.     (Chap.  V.) 

SECTION  II. 

NATURAL 
AS   TO   THE   EVIDENCE   OF   REVEALED    RELIGION. 

:Cliaps.  V— VII. 

THE  FATALISTIC  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  RELIGION.     (Chap.  VI.) 
THE  MORAL  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  RELIGION.    (Chap.  VII.) 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  REVEALED  RELIGION, 

AS  SOLVED  BY  ANALOGY. 

(PART  II.) 
SECTION    I. 

AS  TO  THE  SYSTEM  OF  REVEALED  RELICrlON.  (Chap«.  I-V.) 

THE  PRESUMPTIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF  BEVEALED  RELIGION. 
(Chap.  I.) 

THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  MIRACULOUS  REVELATION.     (Chap.  II.) 
THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  PARADOXICAL  REVELATION.  (Chap.  III.) 
THE  PROBABLE  WI/S'DOM  AND  GOODNESS  OF   A   REVEALED   S^YS- 
TEM.     (Chap.  IV.) 

THE  PROBABILITY  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  SYSTEM  OF  REDEMP- 
TION.    (Chap.  V.) 

SECTION  n. 

AS    TO   THE    EVIDENCES    OF   REVEALED    RELIGION. 
(Chaps.  VI,  VIII.) 

THE  ALLEGED  DEFICIENCIES  IN  THE  CHRISTIAN  EVIDENCES. 
(Chap.  VL) 

THE  CHRISTIAN  EVIDENCES  ANALOGICXLLY  ESTIMATED.  (Chap. 
VII.) 

THE  OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  ANALOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  (Chap.  VIII.) 


THE  QUESTION  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 

AS  PRELIMINARY  TO  THAT  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 

(dISSEKTATIOX    I,       APPENDIX.) 

To  what  extent  is  the  question  of  a  future  life  important  and  intelligible  ? 
How  has  it  been  perplexed  b}^  the  question  of  personal  identity  ?    And 
how  are  such  difficulties  to  be  estimated  ? 
Personal  Identity  more  readily  ascertained  than  defined. 
How  should  attempts  to  define  personal  identity  be  regarded  1 

1.  ,The  Idea,  simple  and  spontaneous. 

To  what  other  simple  ideas  may  it  be  likened  ?  and  what  illustrations 
show  how  these  ideas  immediately  arise  to  the  mind  ? 

2.  The  Fact,  a  matter  of  consciousness  or  reflection. 
What  corresponding  facts  do  these  lilustrations  show  ? 

And  how  is  the  fact,  as  well  as  the  idea  of  personal  identity  ascertained  ? 

How  is  this  otherwise  described  as  due  to  reflection  ? 

I.  The  Negative  Definition. 

L     Personal  Identity  distinguishahle  frorti  Consciousness. 

Why  is  not  consciousness  necessary  to  personal  identity  ? 

What  renders  this  self-evident,  and  to  what  is  it  analogous  ? 

How  may  the  singular  mistake  of  confounding  consciousness  with  iden- 
tity have  arisen  ? 

How  is  this  mistake  exposed  by  distinguishing  between  present  con- 
sciousness and  past  conduct  ? 

1.     Personal  Identity  distinr/uishahle  from  Organization. 

W^hat  are  the  two  reasons  why  the  question  of  personal  identity  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  that  of  other  organized  substances,  such  as  vegetables  ? 

(1.)     Sameness  of  Organization,  the  loose  popular  sense  of  identity. 

When  a  man  swears  to  the  identity  of  a  tree,  in  what  sense  does  he  use 
the  word  same  ? 

Can  such  identity  of  organization  consist  with  change  of  particles  ? 

(2.)     Sameness  of  Substance,  the  strict  philosophical  sense  of  Identity. 


8 

Why  cannot  a  man  swear  to  the  identity  of  a  tree  in  a  strict,  philo- 
sophical sense  ? 

Why  cannot  8uch  identity  of  substance  consist  either  with  change  of 
imrticles  or  properties  ? 

What  now  is  the  difference  between  the  popular  and  the  philosophica 
sense  of  identity,  and  why  cannot  personal  identity  subsist  with  diver- 
sity of  substance  as  well  as  of  organization  1 

II.    The  Positive  Definition. 

1.  Identity  in  general  cousisfs  in  sameness  of  substance  or  being. 
How  is  the  question  accurately  stated  by  Locke  ? 

2.  Personal  Identity  consiMs  in  the  sameness  of  a  rational  being. 
What  is  Locke's  own  deSnition  of  person,  and  consequently  of  personal 

i  .entity  ? 

Why  does  the  question,  "Whether  the  same  rational  being  is  the  same 
substance,  need  no  answer  ? 

]st  Objection^  That  consciousness  of  one's  existence  in  different  periods 
imphes  different  consciousnesses. 

What  is  said  to  be  the  ground  of  the  doubt,  wdiether  the  same  person 
be  the  some  substance  1 

How  is  this  refuted  by  the  analogy  of  dill^rent  perceptions  of  the  same 
object  ? 

2d  Objection,  That  different  consciousnesses  (or  states  of  consciousness) 
imply  different  personalities. 

What  extreme  views  of  personality  are  taken  by  some  of  Locke's  fol- 
lowers ? 

Upon  their  theory,  why  is  it  immaterial  whether  our  substance  is  con- 
tinually changing  or  not  ? 

What  absurd  consequences  flow  from  their  theory  ? 

And  why  arc  such  consequences  legitimately  deducible  ? 

How  might  they  seek  to  evade  those  conclusions  ? 

By  what  abuse  of  language  do  they  confuse  the  question,  but  what  must 
they  consistently  mean  ? 

What  is  then  the  best  confution  of  their  notion  ? 

(L )     This  notion  opposed  to  all  experience. 

How  is  it  shown  to  be  opposed  to  all  our  natural  convictions  and  daily 
ex]ierience  ? 

How  far  is  it  possible  to  act  upon  it  ? 

In  what  light  would  it  appear,  if  applied  to  temporal  concerns? 

To  what  then  must  any  perverse  application  of  it  to  a  future  life  be  at- 
tributed? 

(2. )     Tliis  notion  opposed  to  the  very  definition  of  an  intelligent  being. 

What  distinction  is  made  between«an  idea  or  quality  and  a  being? 

What  must  be  confessed  as  to  all  beings  during  their  whole  existence  ? 


9 

How  is  this  shown  to  be  true  of  all  living  beings  ? 

(3. )     This  notion  nullified  hy  consciousness  itself. 

How  does  consciousness,  by  the  memory  of  former  actions,  assure  us  of 
our  personal  identity  ? 

Whence  arises  the  most  absolute  assurance  of  an  action  having  been 
done  ? 

If  a  person  be  regarded  as  a  substance,  what  does  consciousness  testify  ? 

If  a  person  be  regarded  as  the  property  of  a  substance,  why  does  con- 
sciousness still  testify  to  the  identity  of  that  substance  ? 

Objection.  That  our  consciousness  or  memory  of  personal  identity  may 
possibly  deceive  iis. 

Why  might  this  objection  be  raised  at  the  end  of  any  demonstration 
whatever  ? 

What  other  kinds  of  perception  would  it  equally  invalidate  ? 

How  is  the  absurdity  of  the  objection  shown  ? 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  FUTURE  LIFE. 

(chap.  I.) 

To  what  is  the  present  argument  restricted,  and  what  is  the  question  to 
be  pioved  ? 

I.  The  Presumption  from  the  Law  of  Developaient  in  favor 
OF  A  Future  Life. 

What  do  we  find  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature  in  our  own  species  ? 
How  do  we  ascertain  the  existence  of  this  law  ? 

How  is  this  law  illustrated  in  other  creatures,  in  worms,  birds,  and  in- 
sects ? 
To  what  extent  are  instances  of  it  afi'orded  ? 
How  does  it  establish  the  probability  of  a  future  life  ? 

II.  The  Presumption  from  the  Law  of  Continuance. 
With  what  powers  or  capacities  do  we  find  ourselves  now  endowed? 
What  is  the  presumption  from  having  these  powers  before  death  ? 
What  is  the  degree  of  this  presumption-,  and  what  alone  could  remove  it  ? 

1.  This  Presmnption  foimded  upon  all  expeiience. 

Upon  what  general  result  of  our  experience  is  it  founded  ? 

What  word  expresses  this  kind  of  presumption,  and  how  does  it  appear 
that  we  act  upon  it  in  regard  to  the  whole  course  of  the  world,  or  indeed 
any  existing  substance  ? 

If  men  were  assured  that  death  would  not  destroy  their  living  powers, 
what  would  they  inevitably  conclude  ? 

How  does  this  state  of  the  question  show  the  high  probability  of  a  fu- 
ture life  ? 

2.  No  Rational  Presumption  to  the  contrary. 

What  must  be  acknowledged,  prior  to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of 
a  future  life  ? 

Yet,  even  prior  to  these  proofs,  what  must  still  be  maintained? 

On  what  two  grounds  alone  can 'the  apprehension  of  annihilation  at 
death  be  argued  ? 


11 

(1.)      No   ADVERSE  PRESUMPTION  FROM  THE  REASON   OF  THE  TlIING. 

Why  cannot  we  argue  the  destruction  of  living  agents  from  the  nature 
or  effects  of  death  ? 

Why  cannot  we  argue  it  from  the  manner  in  which  our  living  powers 
exist  or  are  exercised  ? 

What  does  sleep,  or  a  swoon,  demonstrate  as  to  the  existence  of  these 
powers,  the  capacity  of  exercising  them,  as  well  as  the  actual  exercise  of 
them  ? 

How  then  does  our  ignorance  concerning  them  show  that  there  can  be 
no  rational  probability  that  death  will  destroy  them  ? 

And  what  is  the  effect  of  the  argument  from  the  reason  of  the  thing, 
upon  the  question  ? 

(2.)    No  ADVERSE  Presumption  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature. 

What  is  the  effect  of  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  upon  the  question? 

Why  cannot  we  reason  as  to  what  becomes  of  the  living  powers  of  ani- 
mals after  death  ? 

What  is  the  only  visible  bearing  of  that  event  upon  them  ? 

What  alone  is  destroyed  by  that  event  in  respect  to  them  ? 

What  positive  probability  is  afforded  by  our  knowledge  of  them  as  far 
as  it  can  extend  ? 

How  is  this  probability  confirmed  and  made  credible  by  our  own  experi- 
ence and  observation  ? 

3.      Qnly  Imaginanj  Presumptions  to  the  contrnry. 

How  is  the  imagination  prone  to  influence  the  reason  in  this  case  ? 

How  has  this  influence  been  aggravated  ? 

How  is  that  faculty  characterized? 

Into  what  kind  of  conceptions  does  it  mislead  us  ? 

Whence  do  the  imaginary  presumptions  that  death  will  be  our  destruc- 
tion arise  ? 

And  what  will  the  consideration  of  them  show  ? 

(I.)  The  Imaginary  Presumption  that  Death  will  be  the 
Destruction  of  the  whole  living  Being. 

Upon  what  supposition  must  this  presumption  proceed  ? 

(1.)     This  Presumption  unsupported  by  Consciousness. 

{a.)     The  Divisibility  of  Self  utterly  inconceivable. 

How  does  Consciousness  attest  the  indivisibility  of  Self? 

What  illustration  is  employed  to  show  the  indivisibility  of  consciousness 
and  consequent  indivisibility  of  the  living  being  ? 

[b.)     The  Absolute  Oneness  of  Self  perfectly  Conceivable. 

Is  it  any  more  difficult  to  conceive  the  supposition  just  proved  than  the 
reverse  ?  ' 

That  supposition  being  proved,  what  follows  as  to  our  organized  bodies  ? 


12 

By  what  analogy  is  tliis  absolute  oneness  of  self,  as  contrasted  with  the 
dissoluble  body,  shown  to  be  perfectly  conceivable  ? 

By  what  imaginary  cases  of  past  or  future  bodies,  successively  animated, 
is  this  shown  to  be  perfectly  conceivable  ? 

And  how  is  it  shown  that  the  dissolution  of  such  bodies  would  have  no 
conceivable  tendency  to  destroy  the  living  agent  who  animated  them  ? 

(2. )     This  Presumption  unsupported  by  Experience. 

Why  cannot  the  absolute  oneness  of  self  be  proved  properly  by  experi- 
mental observations  ? 

How  then  do  they  bear  upon  the  supposition  ? 

What  question,  however,  relative  to  the  living  substance,  do  they  leave 
undetermined  1 

What  does  experience  show  as  to  the  loss  of  limbs,  organs,  and  even 
the  greater  part  of  the  body  by  the  living  agent  1 

What  does  it  also  show  as  to  the  bulk  of  the  body  at  different  periods 
of  life? 

And  what  is  certain  as  to  the  state  of  the  particles  in  all  animal  bodies  ? 

What  unavoidable  distinction  are  we  taught  by  such  observations,  and 
how  do  they  affect  the  question  of  personal  identity  ? 

{a.)  No  Experimental  Eoidence  that  Death  could  dissolve  the  whole 
hodij  of  a  Living  Agent. 

Why  cannot  we  determine  what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  agent 
or  self? 

And  yet,  what  must  be  determined  as  to  its  bulk  before  we  can  prove 
it  dissoluble  by  death  ? 

Why  may  the  elementary  particles  or  material  germ  of  the  body  sur" 
vive  the  event  of  death  ? 

How  does  this  argument  affect  the  general  question  of  the  absolute  in- 
dissolubility of  self? 

(5. )  No  Experimental  Evidence  that  the  Dissolution  of  the  lohole  body 
would  he  tfie  destruction  of  the  Living  Agent. 

From  our  having  already  lost  certain  S3'stems  of  matter,  in  which  we 
have  been  interested,  without  losing  our  identity,  what  follows  as  to  any 
other  (internal)  systems  of  matter? 

What  is  the  ground  of  this  inference  respecting  them,  and  what  must 
we  conclude  as  to  any  effect  of  death  upon  them  ? 

From  our  having  already  several  times  over  lost  the  greater  part  or  the 
whole  of  the  body,  without  losing  our  identity,  what  follows  as  to  the  effect 
of  death  upon  ourselves? 

By  what  analogous  means  in  both  cases  is  the  loss  effected  ? 
1st  Objection.     That  the  alienation  of  matter  at  death  is  sudden  rather 
than  gradual  as  in  life. 


13 

How  may  ths  objection  be  answered  from  our  present  experience? 

2d  Objection.  That  the  matter  alienated  at  deatli  is  original  rather 
than  adventitious  as  in  life. 

What  is  the  first  answer  to  this  objection  from  our  present  experience  ? 

If  this  be  not  admitted,  what  answer  then  remains? 

What  is  to  be  maintained  as  to  the  relation  of  such  adventitious  matter 
to  the  living  agent  ? 

And  5'et  what  does  the  relation  itself  amount  to  ? 

In  what  respect  alone  does  it  differ  from  that  subsisting  between  the 
living  agent  and  all  foreign  matter? 

How  far  do  these  observations  nullify  the  imaginary  presumption  that 
the  dissolution  of  the  body  would  be  the  destruction  of  the  living  agent  ? 

(c.)  No  Experimental  Evidence  that  the  Dissolution  of  the  x^esent  Phy- 
sical Organnizm  icoulcl  he  the  Destruction  of  the  Living  Agent. 

In  what  light  is  it  proposed  next  to  consider  the  body  ? 

\st.      Organs  of  Perception. 

By  what  experiments  and  observations  can  it  be  shown  that  our  eycg 
are  mere  instruments  of  perception  ? 

How  may  the  same  thing  be  shown  in  respect  to  the  sense  of  feeling 
or  hearing  ? 

How  are  such  artificial  contrivances  and  tne  bodily  organs  shown  to  be 
analogous  in  their  relation  to  the  perceiving  agent  ? 

How  are  they  shown  to  be  analogous  in  their  relation  to  external  ob- 
jects? . 

Between  what  sense  and  what  mechanical  contrivance  is  this  analogy 
most  evident  ? 

What  may  thence  be  inferred  respecting  the  other  senses  ? 

In  the  above  comparison,  what  is  acknowledged  and  what  alone  is 
maintained  concerning  the  apparatus  of  perception  ? 

How  is  this  view  confirmed  experimentally  by  the  loss  of  the  senses  ? 

How  is  it  also  confirmed  by  the  experience  of  dreams  ? 

2c?.     Instrumsnts  of  3Iotion  or  Volition. 

How  is  it  shown  from  experience  that  the  limbs  are  mere  instniments 
of  voluntary  motion  by  the  living  agent? 

What  artificial  contrivances  illustrate  their  relation  to  the  ^hing  agent? 

How  is  the  analogy  between  such  artificial  and  bodily  instruments  of 
motion  heightened  by  what  appears  in  the  mechanism  of  the  latter  " 

What  illustration  is  used  to  show  r\tht  b  -uh  <ae  S2nres  and  the  I'mbs  are 
mere  instruments  of  perception  and  volition  ? 

In  what  respect  alone  does  our  relation  to  them  differ  from  our  relation 
to  other  foreign  matter,  such  as  a  microscope  or  staff? 

And  what  may  be  inferred  as  to  the  efi"ect  of  their  alienation  or  dis:.olu- 
tion  upon  the  perceiving  and  moving  agent  ? 


14 

Objection.     That  the  Argument  is  equally  applicable  to  Brutes." 

What  insuperable  difficulty  is  thought  to  -arise  from  the  application  of 
this  argment  to  brutes  ? 

\st.      The  Ohjectlnn  iun'di'ons  on  moral  grounds. 

What  invidious  thing  is  designed  in  the  objection  to  the  natural  immor- 
tality of  brutes  1 

If  this  tiling  were  really  implied  in  it,  why  would  it  be  no  difficulty  1 

( I. )     The  Analogy  between  the  Infancy  of  Men  and  Animals. 

Prior  to  experience,  what  presumption  would  hold  equally  in  regard  to 
men  and  brutes  ? 

What  is  the  ground  of  this  presumption  ? 

(2. )     The  Law  of  the  Development  of  Religious  animals. 

What  do  we  find  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature  in  regard  to  creatures 
endued  with  capacities  of  virtue  and  religion  ? 

Under  this  law  whiit  portion  of  the  human  species  go  out  of  the  world 
on  a  par  with  the  animals  ? 

2d.     T'he  Objection  also  iceak  on  7iaturcd  grounds. 

What  false  assumption  is  involved  in  the  objection  to  the  natural  im- 
mortality of  brutes  ? 

Wiiat  is  conceivable  as  to  the  destiny  of  animals? 

In  what  light  are  our  difficulties  as  to  their  destiny  to  be  estimated  ? 

What  is  the  force  and  extent  of  the  objection  under  consideration  ? 

And  how  far  is  it  applicable  to  the  proofs  more  peculiar  to  mankind  ? 

(11.)  The  Imaginary  Presumption  that  Death  will  destroy 
THE  Powers  'of  Reflection  as  well  as  of  Sensation. 

What  are  named  as  our  present  powers  of  reflection  ? 

How  do  they  differ  from  the  powers  of  sensation  in  their  relation  to 
the  body,  and  what  is  to  be  thence  inferred  as  to  the  effect  of  its  dissolu- 
tion upon  them  ? 

(1.)  This  [Presumption  nulhfied  by  our  Experience  in  the  Reflective 
State. 

What  is  said  of  the  two  states  in  which  human  creatures  at  present 
exist  ? 

When  may  we  be  said  to  live  in  a  state  of  sensation  ?  and  when  in  a 
state  of  reflection  ? 

In  this  state  of  reflection,  is  the  body  necessary  to  the  living  being? 

How  far  are  the  senses  necessary  to  the  reflecting  powers,  and  to  what 
are  they  likened  ? 

After  ideas  aare  gained,  what  are  our  reflective  capacities  ?  and  how  are 
they  related  to  the  senses  and  to  the  whole  body  ? 

What  then  is  the  argument  against  the  imaginary  presumption  of  their 
destruction  by  death  ? 

(2. )     This  Presumption  nullified  by  our  Observation  of  Mortal  Diseases. 


15 

In  some  mortal  diseases,  what  proof  is  afforded  of  the  independence  of 
the  intellectual  powers  ? 

How  can  the  previous  reasoning  as  to  the  living  (physical)  powers  be 
here  applied  to  the  reflecting  (intellectual)  powers? 

What  then  is  the  pi'oper  argumentative  force  of  instances  of  mortal  dis- 
eases in  which  the  intellectual  powers  are  not  affected  or  impaired  ? 

How  is  this  shown  a  fortiori,  by  comparing  the  effects  of  sleep  with 
those  of  disease  ? 

What  are  the  evidences  in  mortal  diseases  that  the  intellectual  powers 
are  not  impaired  ?  and  what  do  they  prove  as  to  the  vigor  of  life  ? 

fiow  is  this  especially  shown  in  a  progressive  mortal  disease  ? 

Does  the  same  reasoning  apply  to  death  by  any  other  means  than  dis- 
ease ? 

(III.)    The   Imaginary   Presumption   that   Death   will   even 

SUSPEND  THE  EXERCISE   OF  THE  REFLECTING   PoWERS. 

•How  may  the  argument  be  carried  forward  so  as  to  nullify  this  pre- 
sumption ? 

(1. )     This  Presumption  mdlijied  hy  the  very  Idea  of  Death  ? 

How  does  its  intrinsic  absurdity  appear  from  the  very  idea  of  death  ? 

What  experience  and  observation  suggest  the  contrary  expectation  1 

How  then  may  our  posthumous  life  be  related  to  our  present  life  ? 

(2.)  This  Presumption  nullified  hy  an  analogy  between  Death  aud 
Birth. 

In  what  respect  may  death  answer  to  our  birth  ? 

Into  what  kind  of  a  state  may  death,  like  birth,  immediately  introduce 
us? 

What  renders  us  capable  of  existing  in  our  present  state  of  sensation, 
and  what  may  be  the  only  natural  hinderance  to  our  existing  immediately 
in  a  higher  state  of  reflection  ? 

(3.)  This  Presumption  mdlified  hy  our  Ignorance  of  the  State  after 
Death. 

Why  cannot  we  be  sure  that  Death  will  suspend  all  our  powers  ? 

If  we  were  sure,  why  could  not  we  argue  their  destruction  from  their 
suspension  ? 

Ohjection.  That  this  whole  argument  may  he  overthrown  hy  an  analogy 
between  the  death  of  men  and  plants. 

What  shadow  of  an  analogy  remains  to  favor  the  imaginary  presump- 
tions we  have  been  considering? 

How  does  this  likeness  serve  the  purposes  of  the  poets  ? 

Bub  how  is  it  shown  to  be  wholly  irrelevant  to  the  present  question  ? 

In  place  of  these  imaginary'  presumptions  and  flmciful  analogies,  what 
have  been  laid  down  as  the  proper  premises  from  which  to  argue,  and 
what  will  thence  be  concluded  ? 


16 

What  now  is  the  j^cope  of  the  whole  previous  argument  and  the  general 
conclusion  from  it  ? 

1st  Inference.    The  Probable  Natural  Sequence  and  Character 
OF  THE  Future  State. 

To  what  extent  may  our  entrance  into  another  world  be  natural  ? 

What  may  the  character  of  the  new  state  naturally  be  to  the  individuals 
entering  it  ? 

And  how  may  its  advantages  naturally  be  bestowed  ? 

Objection,     lliat  the  Future  State  may  he  more  Divine  than  the  Present 
State. 

In  what  respect  may  the  bestowment  of  the  advantages  differ  from  that 
jn  the  present  state  ? 

(1.)     The  Objection ^  fully  conceded,  would  not  prove  the  Future  State  to 
he  unnatural. 

Even  allowing  the  common  vague  sense  of  the  word  natural,  how  could 
the  absurdity  of  the  objection  be  shown  ? 

In  connection  with  what  reasoning  does  it  appear  especially  absurd  ? 
and  why  ? 

(2.)     The   Objection  ijroceeds  upon  a  false  apprehension  of  the  word 
Natural. 

What  is  the  only  distinct  meaning  of  the  w^ord  Natural  ? 

Why  does  what  is  natural  imply  an  Intelligent  Agent  as  much  as  what 
js  supernatural  ? 

In  what  proportion,  then,  will  persons'  notion  of  what  is  natm-al  be  en- 
larged 1 

To  what  extent  may  this  expanded  view  of  the  natural  exist  in  some 
beings  in  the  universe  ? 

Id  Inference.    The  Credibility  of  a  Future  Life. 

What  is  the  defect  and  what  the  true  value  of  this  probable  evidence  of 
a  Future  Life  ? 

Why  would  not  a  demonstrative  proof  of  it  serve  any  better  purpose 
with  an  atheist  ? 

Why  then  is  the  question  of  any  importance  to  religion  ? 

xVnd  what  is  the  value  and  relevancy  of  the  foregoing  argument  ? 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  DIVINE  GOVERN- 
MENT IN  THE  FUTURE  STATE. 

(chap.  II.) 

What  makes  the  question  of  a  Future  Life  so  important  1 

What  supposition  makes  the  cons. deration  of  it  so  important  ? 

Without  this  supposition,  how  much  interest  might  we  have  in  it  ? 

But  if  there  is  ground  for  this  supposition,  what  will  be  the  efi'ect  upon 
reasonable  men  ? 

What  should  be  the  effect,  even  though  the  proof  of  a  future  life  and 
interest  were  onl}'  presumptive  ? 

I.  General  Analogy  between  the  Present  and  the  Future 
Government  of  God. 

1.     The  Fact  of  a  Divine  Government  in  the  Present  /:^tate. 

How  does  it  appear  that  the  Author  of  Nature  has  put  our  own  happi- 
ness or  misery  in  our  own  power? 

How  does  experience  teach  us  that  He  does  not  even  preserve  our  lives 
without  our  own  agency  ? 

In  general,  by  what  means  does  He  secure  to  us  our  enjoyments  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  our  miseries  also  greatly  depend  upon  ourselves  ? 

What  exceptions  to  this  general  course  of  things  may  be  allowed  ? 

Is^  Objection.  But  this  view  see/ns  inconsistent  with  our  Ideas  of  Human 
Happiness. 

What  irrelevant  question  concerning  this  constitution  of  nature  by  its 
Author  may  here  be  raised  ? 

What  may  be  the  reason  why  creatures  were  not  made  promiscuously  or 
necessarily  happy  ? 

Were  they  made  happy  by  such  a  method,  what  might  be  the  result  ? 

What  class  alone  may  the  Divine  Goodness  be  disposed  to  make  happy  1 

What  other  pleasure  besides  the  happiness  of  His  creatures  might  be 
peculiar  to  an  Infinitely  Perfect  Mind  ? 


18 

How  groat  may  be  our  ignorance  of  the  present  Divine  government? 

What  certain  fact,  however,  remains  in  respect  to  the  general  method 
of  that  Divine  government  ? 

2c?  Objection.  That  this  vieic  seems  inconsistent  iclth  the  Uniformity  of 
Nature. 

To  what  may  the  foreseen  pains  and  pleasures  of  actions  be  directly 
ascribed  ? 

What  is  conceded  and  what  is  maintained  in  regard  to  this  objection? 

How  i^  its  absurdity  shown  as  applied  to  the  general  course  of  nature  ? 

In  particular,  how  is  it  shown  that  the  uniform,  natural  consequences  of 
our  actions  are  but  Divine  appointments  ? 

And  what  Divine  purpose  is  served  by  our  natural  foresight  of  these 
consequences? 

3f?  Objection.  That  this  view  seems  inconsistent  with  the  interests  of  Mo- 
rality. 

What  wrong  inference  may  be  suggested  as  to  the  design  of  our  pas- 
sions ? 

How  is  the  absurdity  of  this  inference  illustrated? 

2.  The  Rewards  and  Punishments  of  the  Present  Divine  ffovemment. 
From  what  two  premises  is  it  concluded  that  w^e  are  now  actually  under 

a  Divine  government  of  rewards  and  punishments  ? 

Upon  what  supposition  does  this  conclusion  proceed  ?  and  does  it  ensue 
as  a  deduction  of  reason  or  as  a  matter  of  experience? 

Why  is  this  Divine  government  as  real  as  any  civil  government? 

1st  Objection.  That  the  Divine  Agency  in  natural  Rewards  and  Pun- 
ishments is  not  immediate. 

What  two  views  may  be  taken  as  to  the  Divine  Agency  in  our  pains  and 
pleasures  ? 

Why  is  it  necessary  to  decide  between  them  ? 

How  is  the  comparative  perfection  of  the  Divine  government  illustrated 
by  this  very  objection  ? 

2d  Objection.  That  the  Divine  Agency  in  the  lesser  natural  Punishments 
would  appear  absurd. 

How  will  some  persons  be  disposed  to  treat  the  idea  of  Divine  agency  in 
our  lesser  pains  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  this  cannot  be  evaded  without  denying  all  final 
causes  ? 

And  what  illustration  is  given  ? 

3.  The  Consequent  Probability  of  a  similar  Divine  governmenment  in  a 
Future  State. 

What  then  is  the  true  conception  of  the  Author  of  Nature,  even  prior 
to  the  consideration  of  His  Moral  attributes  ? 


19 

What  is  our  actual,  experienced  relation  to  Him,  and  to  what  other 
natural  relations  is  it  likened  ? 

What  is  the  general  doctrine  of  religion  concerning  a  future  state  ? 

What  objection  to  this  docti-ine  does  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  refute, 
and  how  does  it  show  the  doctrine  to  be  credible  1 

II.  Special  Analogy  between  Present  and  Future  Punish- 
ments. 

Why  is  it  proper  to  dwell  upon  this  analogy  ? 

How  are  natural  punishnients  described  ?  And  how  are  they  distin- 
guished from  mere  mi  eries? 

1.  Particulars  of  this  Analogy. 

(1.)  T lie  Punishment  in  both  cases  is  consequent  upon  Pleasurahle  Ac- 
tions. 

What  instances  are  given  of  natural  punishments  consequent  upon  ac- 
tions attended  with  present  advantage  or  pleasure  ? 

(2.)  The  Punishment  in  both  cases  is  disproportionate  to  the  Previous 
Pleasure. 

What  proportion  exists  between  many  punislmients  and  the  pleasure  or 
advantage  of  the  actions  from  wliich  they  flow  ? 

(3.)     The  I  unishment  often  long-delayed. 

How  does  the  very  constitution  of  nature  show  that  the  delay  of  a  nat- 
ural punishment  is  no  presumption  of  impunity  ? 

(4.)     The  Punishment  sometimes  suddady  inflicted. 

How  do  such  long-delayed  punishments  at  length  fall  ? 

(5. )     The  Punishment  seldom  fully  anticipated. 

By  what  examples  is  it  shown  that  they  are  seldom  fully,  and  sometimes 
not  at  all,  anticipated? 

(6.)     The  Punishment^  lohen  incurred.,  inevitable. 

What  examples  show  that  neglected  opportunities  can  never  be  recalled  ? 

(7.)     The  Punishment  at  length  irretrievable. 

How  is  it  shown  that,  in  the  course  of  nature,  after  a  certain  limit, 
neither  reformation  nor  repentance  can  prevent  punishment  ? 

(8. )     The  Punishment  sometimes  due  to  mere  neglect. 

How  do  the  punishments  of  mere  inconsiderateness  sometimes  compare 
with  those  of  active  misconduct  ? 

(9. )     The  Punishment  in  some  cases  fined  and  summary. 

What  examples  are  given  and  why  are  they  to  be  included  in  this  esti- 
mate ? 

Are  such  natural  punishments  as  are  enumerated  above  occasional  ? 

How  do  they  arise  under  the  natural  government  of  God  ? 

2.  Completeness  of  this  Analogy. 

What  conclusive  proof  have  we  that  the  foregoing  description  of  present 


20 

natural  punishment  applies  in  every  particular  to  those  future  punish- 
ments of  which  religion  warns  us  ? 

What  passage  of  Scripture  thus  shows  the  perfection  of  this  analogy? 

What  does  this  analogy  add  to  the  proper  proof  of  future  punishments  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  such  examples  of  natural  punishments  thus  add  to 
the  proper  proof  of  future  punishments  ? 

3.      Value  of  this  AnaJogy. 

What  is  acknowledged  and  what  is  maintained  in  this  argument  ? 

What  two  things  is  it  sufficient  to  prove  ? 

What  speculative  objections  does  it  answer? 

How  is  it  adapted  to  aflfect  even  serious  minds  ? 

To  what  other  class  in  the  present  age  is  it  especially  adapted  ? 

How  does  it  show  that  even  upon  the  most  skeptical  principles  there  is 
no  ground  for  their  feeling  ? 


THE  QUESTION  OF  A  MORAL  FACULTY, 

AS  PRELIMINARY  TO  THAT  OF  A  MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

(dissertation  II.     APPENDIX.) 

What  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  frovernnient  ? 
What  have  we  in  common  with  brute  creatures,  and  what  in  distinction 
from  them  ? 
I.    Evidences  of  the  Moral  Faculty. 

1.  Its  Existence. 

How  do  we  ascertain  the  existence  of  this  faculty  ? 
How  does  it  appear  in  our  judgment  of  characters  ? 
What  words,  qualifying  actions  or  characters,  indicate  it  ? 
What  class  of  treatises  indicates  it  ?  and  why  ? 
How  is  it  implied  in  our  natural  sense  of  gratitude  ? 
How  is  it  implied  in  the  distinction  between  mere  injury  and  harm,  and 
between  injury  and  just  punishment? 

2.  Its  Universality. 

To  what  extent  do  men  speak  and  act  on  the  supposition  of  this  moral 
faculty  ? 

What  different  terms  are  applied  to  it  ? 

Is  it  a  sentiment  of  the  understanding  or  a  perception  of  the  heart  ? 

What  proves  the  universality  of  virtue,  notwithstanding  disputes  about 
its  nature  ? 

What  are  the  evidences  of  a  universally  acknowledged  standard  of  vir- 
tue ?     And  what  particular  virtues  are  embodied  in  it  ? 

H.       OBJF.CTS    OF    THE    MoRAL    FaCULTY. 

What  are  the  objects  of  this  faculty  ? 
What  kind  of  principles  are  also  included  ? 
What  is  character  ? 


22 

How  do  brutes  differ  from  men  in  their  actions  ? 

To  what  other  kind  of  discernment  is  this  moral  discernment  of  actions 
analogous  ? 

How  does  it  ajipear  that  it  is  exercised  independently  of  the  actual  or 
intended  consequence-  of  actions? 

How  is  it  also  shown  in  our  estimate  of  characters? 

And  how  is  it  show  in  our  moral  approbation  or  disapprobation  of  our- 
selves and  others? 

III.  F^ERCEPTIOxVS    OF    THE    MoRAL    FACULTY. 

1 .  Perception  of  Good  or  III  Desert  of  Actions. 

What  is  implied  in  our  discernment  of  actions  as  morally  good  or  evil  ? 

How  far  can  this  perception  be  explained'?  And  wha  tshowsit  to  be  real 
and  general? 

What  illustration  is  used  to  show  that  we  do  not  understand  by  the  ill- 
desert  of  actions  merely  that  the  good  of  society  requires  the  punishment 
of  the  doer? 

Are  innocence  and  ill-desert  consistent  ideas? 

What  does  ill-desert  presuppose,  and  how  are  the  two  ideas  connected  in 
our  minds  ? 

How  is  this  illustrated  by  our  perception  of  ill-desert  in  a  sufferer? 

On  viewing  together  tlie  notions  of  vice  and  misery,  what  third  notion 
results,  and  what  association  of  ideas  thus  arises  in  the  mind  ? 

How  is  this  association  of  ideas  to  be  regarded  ? 

2.  Perception  of  Good  and  Ill-desert  in  some  cases  apparently  dispro- 
prrtioned  to  Virtue  and  Vice. 

Why  is  the  perception  of  good  desert  weak  with  respect  to  common  in- 
stances of  virtue  ? 

What  is  the  effect  of  a  very  weak  regard  to  virtue  in  such  instances  ? 

Why  is  our  perception  of  ill-desert  in  vicious  actions  lessened  by  the 
thought  of  great  temptations  inducing  them  ? 

Why  would  we  judge  differently  between  the  case  of  a  man  overcome 
by  tortures  or  by  a  common  temptation  ? 

3.  Perception  of  Good  and  III  Desert  the  residt  of  a  comparison  of  ac- 
tions ivith  their  agents. 

What  does  our  perception  of  vice  and  ill-desert  arise  and  result  from  ? 
How  is  this  proved  in  the  case  of  a  mere  neglect  of  duty? 
What  illustrations  prove  the  same  in  the  case  of  positive  vices? 
Does  this  difference  between  the  same  actions  by  different  agents  arise 
from  a  difference  in  their  intentions? 
From  whence  does  it  arise,  and  how  is  it  ascertained  ? 
What  epithets  are  used  to  express  this  difference  ? 

IV.  The  Scope  of  the  Moral  Faculty. 
1.     Prudence  a  Species  of  Virtue. 


23 

What  moral  question  arises  in  regard  to  our  own  interest  as  well  as  that 
of  others  ? 

What  is  prudence? 

Wh}^  is  prudence  of  the  nature  of  virtue  1 

How  is  it  distinguished  from  mere  desire  of  our  own  or  others'  happi- 
ness 1 

Objection.  That  our  disapprobation  of  imprudence  is  not  so  sensible  as 
of  falsehood,  injustice,  or  cruelt}-. 

Why  may  such  a  sensible  disapprobation  of  imprudence  be  less  necessary? 

Why  does  it  less  need  the  additional  punishments  inflicted  upon  injustice 
or  fraud  ? 

How  does  compassion  le  sen  our  indignation  against  it  ? 

But  in  greater  instances  of  imprudence,  how  do  men  judge  themselves 
and  others  ? 

What  particular  examples  are  given  1 

What  is  meant  by  foUi/,  and  wdiy  is  the  word  applicable  only  to  human 
creatures? 

If  it  should  be  granted  that  the  words  virfuc  and  vice  are  not  strictly  ap- 
plicable to  prudence  and  folly,  what  must  still  be  maintained  in  regard  to 
them  ? 

What  objection  against  religion  is  met  by  this  view  of  prudence? 

2.     Benevolence  not  the  idiole  of  Virtue. 

What  question  in  regard  to  the  relation  of  virtue  to  benevolence  is 
waived,  and  what  is  the  point  insisted  upon  ? 

(1.)  Tlie  Theory  of  General  Benevolence  apposed  to  our  3Ioral  Consti- 
tution. 

Were  benevolence  the  whole  of  virtue,  how  would  we  then  judge  of  our 
own  and  others'  character  ? 

On  what  account  alone  would  we  then  disapprove  injustice  and  false- 
hood? 

What  illustration,  however  shows  that  one  might  act  benevolently  and 
yet  not  virtuously  ? 

And  what  illustration  shows  that  one  might  act  virtuously  and  yet  not 
benevolently  ? 

What  absurd  consequences,  furthermore,  to  personal  morality  would 
flow  from  such  a  theory  ? 

What,  then,  is  the  actual  constitution  of  our  nature  in  regard  to  this 
matter? 

Objection.    That  Benevolence  may  be  the  whole  of  the  Divine  Character  ? 

Were  this  His  character,  is  it  in  fact  ours  ? 

On  the  supposition  of  such  a  Divine  character,  why  were  we  not  en- 
dowed with  the  same  character? 


24 

Taking,  then,  our  constitution  as  we  find  it,  how  must  we  estimate  false- 
hood, violence,  and  injustice  as  well  as  benevolence  ? 

(2.)     The  Theory  of  General  Benexolence  pernicious  and  vuionary. 

How  have  some  distinguished  advocates  of  this  theory  expressed  them- 
selves ? 

What  terrible  mistakes  might  arise  from  it? 

Whose  concern  is  the  happiness  of  the  world,  and  in  what  waj^  alone  are 
we  called  upon  to  promote  it? 

How  are  supposed  endeavors  to  do  good,  without  regard  to  veracity  and 
justice,  to  be  estimated  1 

Within  what  limits  is  general  benevolence  confessedly  a  duty? 

What  practical  difficulties,  however,  attend  it? 

And  what  are  the  considerations  which  alone  make  it  a  duty  ? 

Objection.     That  the  rule  of  veracity  is  not  invariable. 

What  apparent  exception  to  the  obligation  of  veracity  is  conceded  ? 

In  general,  what  constitutes  falsehood  ? 

Why  may  a  man  even  be  obliged  to  do  what  he  foresees  will  deceive  ? 

Conclusion.  On  the  supposition  of  such  a  Moral  Faculty  in  human 
.creatures,  in  what  must  the  moral  government  of  them  consist? 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  PERFECT  MORAL 
GOVERNMENT  IN  THE'  FUTURE  STATE. 

(chap.  III.)  . 

I.    The  Character  of  GtOd's  Moral  Government. 

1.  xis  dlsti tig uislied  from  God's  Natural  Government. 
What  is  the  proof  of  an  Intelli.i^ent  Maker  of  the  world  ? 

What  is  the  corresponding  proof  of  an  Intelligent  Grovernor  of  the 
world  ? 

What  kind  of  creatures  are  the  subjects  of  such  government  ? 

What  kind  of  authority  is  hnplied  in  such  government  ? 

Does  this  certainl}'  prove  a  moral  as  well  as  natural  government  of  the 
world  ? 

How  is  moral  distinguished  from  natural  government? 

In  what  does  tlie  perfection  of  moral  government  consist  ? 

2.  As  Righteous  ratJter  than  simply  Benevolent. 
What  is  simple  absolute  benevolence  ? 

What  would  veracity  and  justice  become  in  such  a  cliaracter  ? 

Why  ought  not  this  to  be  asserted  unless  it  can  clearly  be  proved  ? 

What  is  the  practical  question  to  be  considered  ? 

Why  is  it  supposable  that  the  Author  of  Nature  may  manifest  himself 
to  some  other  creatures  as  simply  and  absolutely  benevolent  ? 

What,  however,  is  the  character  under  which  He  actually  manifests 
himself  to  us  ? 

What  proof  of  this  has  He  given  us  ? 

What  proofi  may  He  also  have  given  that  His  government  is  righteous 
or  moral  ? 

What  is  the  proper  force  of  such  proofs  1 

3.  As  still  incomplete^  though  actually  hegun. 


26 

What  is  expressly  allowed  in  regard  to  the  present  Divine  government  ? 

Why  does  not  this  hinder  it  from  having  somewhat  of  a  moral  element? 

What  may  be  the  reason  its  perfection  cannot  now  appear  ? 

What  is  included  in  the  proposed  argument  ? 

II.  The  Rudiments  of  God's  Moral  Government  in  the  Pres- 
ent State. 

1st  Preliminary  Proof.  The  Probable  Surpliis  of  Happiness  on  the 
side  of  Virtue. 

What  would  be  the  peculiar  force  of  this  argum.ent  ? 

What  acknowledged  diffiuculty  would  attend  it  ? 

What  makes  it  possible  that  there  may  be  exceptions  to  the  happiness 
of  virtue  even  among  the  blameless  ? 

And  why  much  more  among  persons  reformed  or  reforming  ? 

In  what  respects  may  the  reformed  seem  even  less  happy  than  the  ob- 
durate 1 

Is  such  unhappiness  due  to  former  vices  or  to  the  consequences  of  refor- 
mation ? 

Upon  the  whole,  what  is  the  proper  conclusion  as  to  the  relative  happi- 
ness of  virtue  and  vice  ? 

If  it  were  otherwise,  what  proof  still  remains  1 

2d  Preliminary  Proof.  The  Presumptive  Adaptations  of  God's 
Natural  Government. 

If  there  were  no  natural  government,  could  there  be  any  moral  govern- 
ment? 

What  is  presumable  from  the  certain  fact  of  God's  natural  govern- 
ment? 

According  to  what  rule  is  it  most  presumable  that  God  would  reward 
and  punish  men  ? 

Why.  according  to  this  rule  rather  than  any  other  ? 

Why  cannot  the  doctrine  of  moral  rewards  and  punishments  possibly  be 
regarded  as  absurd  or  chimerical  ? 

1.  The  Natural  Consequences  of  Prudence  and  Rashness. 
What  are  the  natural  consequences  of  prudence  and  imprudence  res- 
pectively ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  these  are  instances  of  a  right  constitution  of  na- 
ture? 

Why  does  the  rewarding  and  punishing  of  prudence  and  rashness  imply 
a  moral  government? 

2.  The  Natural  Consequences  of  Beneficial  and  Mischievous 
Actions. 

On  what  ground  are  vicious  actions  punished  in  society  ? 
Besides  their  legal  punishment,  what  other  penalties  do  they  bring  with 
them? 


How  does  Nature  declare  against  them  ? 

What  vices  are  named  as  destructive  of  the  very  being  of  societ}'  ? 

How  does  the  punishment  of  such  crimes  prove  a  moral  government, 
naturally  established  and  in  action? 

How  is  it  shown  that  this  moral  government,  though  natural  and  hu- 
man, is  also  divine  or  providential,  and  that  men  are  accountable  under  it? 

Objection.  That  good  and  beneficial  actions  are  sometimes  punished, 
or  ill  and  mischievous  actions  rewarded. 

What  is  the  first  answer  to  this  objection  ? 

What  is  the  second  answer  to  it  ? 

How  far,  then,  is  it  true  that  the  Author  of  Nature  has  directed  and 
necessitated  mankind  to  punish  vicious  actions  ? 

3.    The  Natural  Consequences  of  Virtue  and  Vice  as  such. 

Of  what  kind  of  moral  government  do  these  afford  instances  ? 

What  preliminary  distinction  must  be  made  between  actions  and  their 
qualities  or  between  the  results  of  actions  and  the  results  of  their  qualities? 

W^hat,  in  general,  are  the  respective  results  of  virtuousness  and  vicious- 
ness? 

(/.)     Internal  Consequences. 

(1.)     What  immediate  effects  are  first  mentioned? 

With  what  inward  feeling  is  vice  attended  ? 

Through  what  degrees  does  this  feeling  range,  and  from  what  other 
feeling  is  it  be  distinguished  ? 

How  is  this  distinction  illustrated  by  the  common  language  of  men? 

With  what  inward  feelings  is  virtue  attended  ? 

What  special  virtues  are  named  as  attended  with  such  feelings? 

(2. )  Why  should  the  hopes  and  fears  of  a  future  life  be  included  among 
the  inward  effects  of  virtue  and  vice  ? 

How  is  it  intimated  that  they  are  of  the  nature  of  moral  rewards  and 
punishments  ? 

(//. )     Uccternal  Consequences. 

(1.)     What  social  consequences  attend  virtue  and  vice  respectively  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  men  do  this  on  moral  grounds  ? 

(2. )     What  public  consequences  of  virtue  and  vice  are  instanced  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  men  act  thus,  ii^  both  cases,  on  moral  grounds  ? 

(3.)     What  domestic  rewards  and  punishments  are  instanced? 

(4.)     What  civil  rewards  and  punishments  are  instanced  ? 

Why  are  such  instances  not  to  be  esteemed  frivolous  ? 

What  is  the  general  conclusion  as  to  tho  external  consequences  of  virtue 
and  vice  ? 

What  two  proofs  of  a  moral  government  of  God  are  contrasted,  and  what 
is  the  respective  foice  of  them  7 


28 

\st  Objection,  That  the  rule  of  rewarding  virtue  and  punishing  vice  is 
not  invariable. 

What  two* reasons  are  given  for  this  rule? 

How  is  it  shown  that  this  rule  is  never  reversed  ? 

How  are  any  apjiarcnt  instances  of  an  approbation  of  vice,  as  such  and 
for  its  own  sake,  to  be  explained  ? 

What  distinction  between  virtue  and  vice  is  insisted  upon? 

Whj'  must  they  thus  be  distinguished  in  some  degree  ? 

2d  Objection^  That  happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distributed  by 
other  rules  than  this  alone. 

In  what  other  way  is  it  conceded  that  they  may  be  distributed  ? 

How  it!  such  promiscuous  distribution  of  happiness  and  misery  to  be 
accounted  for  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  these  seeming  exceptions  never  amount  to  an  ac- 
tual inversion  of  the  rule  of  punishing  vice  and  rewarding  virtue? 

How  is  it  shown  that  in  such  cases  Providence  does  not  confound  the 
distinction  between  virtue  and  vice  ? 

To  what  alone  must  sucli  disorders  be  attributed  ? 

What  then  is  the  proper  conclusion  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  Supreme 
Author  of  Nature  in  regard  to  virtue  and  vice  ? 

How  may  a  man  ascertain  that  he  is  on  the  same  side  with  the  the  Di- 
vine administration  ?    And  what  will  the  eifect  to  .-uch  a  man  ? 

4.    The  Natural  Tendencies  of  Virtue  and  Vice. 

How  are  these  defined,  and  what  evidence  do  they  afford  of  a  moral 
government  of  God  ? 

What  accidental  causes  arrest  them  in  individuah  ? 

How  is  it  proposed  to  show  their  operation  in  a  society  ? 

{I. )     The  acknowledged  Tendency  of  Reason  to  prevail  over  Force. 

How  is  man  shown  to  be  the  governing  animal  upon  earth  ? 

What  is  acknowledged  to  be  the  ground  of  this  superiority? 

[a.)     Concurrences  neeessai-y  to  the 2)revalence  of  Reason. 

By  what  imaginary  case  is  it  shown  that  there  must  be  some  proportion 
between  the  power  of  rational  and  of  briite  creatures  ? 

By  what  imaginary  case  is  it  shown  that  there  must  be  union  among 
rational  creatures  ?  ^ 

By  what  imaginary  case  is  it  shown  that  there  must  be  a  fair  field  and 
proper  time  and  scope  for  action  ? 

[b.)     Possible  hinderances  to  the  prevalence  of  Reason. 

How  might  the  very  foresight  and  prudence  of  rational  creatures  prove 
disadvantages  in  an  encounter  with  brutal  folly  and  rashness  ? 

How  might  their  conflicting  interests  and  passions  render  them  power- 
less against  an  instinctive  combination  of  brutes? 

What  is  inferred  as  to  tlic  actual  superiority  of  rational  animals  ? 


29 

What  is  inferred  as  to  a  supposed  superiority  of  irrational  animals  in 
some  other  globe  ? 
Why  would  every  one  consider  this  an  inverted  order  of  things  ? 
{II.)     The  Analogus  Ihidcnaj  of  Virtue  to  j^rcvail  over  Vice. 

Under  what  two-fold  view  may  the  power  of  Virtue  be  considered  ? 
In  what  four  waj's  does  Virtue  tend  to  prevalence  in  society  ? 

Why  are  the  virtues  of  veracity  and  justice  especially  endowed  with 
this  tendency  ? 

(1.)     Hypothetical  Prevalence  of  Virtue  thr ok ghout  the  Universe. 

By  what  supposition  is  it  proposed  to  illustrate  the  tendency  of  Virtue 
to  unversal  prevalence  1 

(a.)     What  three  concurrences  arc  as  necessary  to  the  prevalence  of 
virtue  as  of  reason  ? 

Why  cannot  the  power  of  the  good  here  on  earth  prevail  over  that  of 
the  bad? 

Why  cannot  good  men  all  over  the  earth  unite  ? 

Why  cannot  virtue  find  full  scoi)e  in  the  present  state  ? 

{b.)     What  is  supposable  as  to  the  existing  hinderances  of  Virtue? 

To  what  is  her  present  state  likened  ? 

How  may  she  hereafter  acquire  her  normal  power  ? 

How  may  she  hereafter  find  proper  scope  for  action  ? 

How  may  she  hereafter  unite  good  men  among  themselves  and  with 
other  orders  of  virtuous  creatures  ? 

What  would  be  the  moral  effect  of  such  a  universal  combination  of  vir- 
tuous creatures  ? 

How  is  it  shown  thas  these  suppositions  are  not  absurd  or  extravagant  ?  . 

Why  are  they  not  to  be  taken  as  a  literal  delineation  of  the  universe  ? 

What,  however,  do  they  plainly  show  in  regard  to  the  hinderances  of 
virtue  ? 

How  are  its  advantageous  tendencies  to  be  regarded  from  a  religious 
point  of  view  ? 

If  the  foregoing  supposition  seem  too  vast  and  remote,  what,  however, 
will  still  remain  certain  ? 

(2. )     HyijOthetical  Prevalence  of  Virtue  in  some  EartJdy  Society. 

What  is  the  implied  advantage  of  this  over  the  foregoing  supposition  ? 

What  are  the  data  assumed  in  it  ? 

(^■1. )     Internal  Condition  of  a  Virtuous  State. 

In  such  a  State,  what  would  the  governing  class  be? 

How  would  diversities  of  genius  be  adjusted  ? 

How  would  public  laws  be  made  and  executed  1 

How  would  individuals  be  related  to  the  public  good  ? 

How  would  such  a  state  be  secured  against  both  intestine  disorder  and 
foreign  assaults  1 


30 

(B.)     External  Relations  of  a  Virtuous  iState. 

How  would  it  acquire  general  influence  over  the  face  of  the  earth  ? 

How  would  it  acquire  universal  empire  ? 

What  would  its  head  be,  and  how  would  all  nations  be  related  to  him  ? 

How  for  is  such  a  virtuous  society  practicable  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  the  conditional  promises  in  Scripture  to  the  Jews 
proceed  upon  this  view  of  the  natural  tendencies  of  Virtue? 

III.  The  Probable  Completion  of  God's  Moral  Government 
IN  A  Future  State. 

How  is  the  ^'cneral  sj-f-tem  of  religion  defined?  And  how  do  the  fore- 
going observations  enable  us  to  see  its  self-consistenc}'  and  tendency  to- 
wards completion  ? 

How  could  any  one  who  doubts  its  importance  easily  convince  himself 
of  it  ?         * 

Ohjection^  That  the  present  mixed  state  of  Virtue  and  Vice  may  be 
universal  and  perpetual. 

1.  The  Objection  of  no  force  against  the  proper  proof  of  Religion. 
(1.)     Why  is  this  objection  not  strictly  relevant  to  the  previous  argu- 
ment ? 

What  is  admitted  in  regard  to  the  present  distribution  of  pleasure  and 
pain  among  us  ? 

Were  there  nothing  else  to  reason  from,  what  would  be  the  state  of  the 
question  ? 

2.  The  Objection  refuted  hy  four  confirmatory  proof s  from  Nature. 
(2. )     How  then  is  the  contrary  of  the  above  objection  to  be  proved  ? 

1.  The  manifest  inclination  of  the  Author  of  Nature  to 
the  side  of  Virtue. 

How  far  do  the  foregoing  arguments  prove  that  the  Author  of  Nature 
is  not  indifferent  to  A-'irtue  and  Vice? 

Aside  from  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  what  would  be  their  force  as 
to  a  future  perfect  moral  government  ? 

What  then  is  the  value  of  the  proof  furnished  by  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature  ? 

2.  The  apparent  relations  between  the  experienced  and  the  ex- 
pected Government  of  God. 

How  do  the  foregoing  observations  show  that  a  future  perfect  moral 
government  of  God  would  not  differ  from  this  present  government  in  Mnd^ 
but  only  in  degree  ? 

How  do  they  show  that  it  would  be  that  in  effect  towards  which  we  now 
see  a  tendency  ? 

How  do  they  show  that  it  would  be  but  the  completion  of  beginnings 
and  principles  already  discernible  ? 


31 

3.     The  Analogous  Expectation  of  a  future  perfect  natural  Gov- 
ernment OF  God. 

What  is  assumed  in  this  expectation,  and  on  what  is  it  based? 

On  what  ground  may  a  similar  expectation  arise  under  the  present 
moral  government  of  God  ? 

What  would  be  the  proper  degree  of  such   an  expectation  on  such 
grounds  ? 

.■;,4.     The  Essential    Character    of    the  Tendencies   of    Virtue   and 
Vice. 

In  what  important  respect  do  the  tendencies  of  Virtue  and  Vice  differ 
from  their  impediments  or  hinderances  ? 

What  ma}'  be  argued  from  this  difference? 

And  what  will  follow  as  to  the  tendencies  of  virtue  and  yice?  but  what 
can  revelation  alone  teach  us  concerning  them  ? 

What  is  a  summaiy  of  the  whole  argument  for  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment. 

The    Natural  Sequence  and  Character  of  a  Future  Perfect  Moral 
Government. 

Why  is  the  notion  of  a  future  more  perfect  moral  government  natural 
rather  than  fictitious  ?  > 

What  do  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  imply  on  the  part  of 
the  Author  of  Nature? 

What  is  the  presumption  afforded  by  every  natural  tendency,  and  to 
what  is  its  degree  proportioned  ? 

What  is  the  distinctive  force  of  this  proof  as  to  the  completion  of  the 
moral  government  established  in  nature  ? 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  PRESENT  STATE 
OF  PROBATION. 

(chap.  IY.) 

(Section  I.)  The  Nature  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial  and 
Danger. 

What  is  the  general  doctrine  of  religion  as  to  the  relation  of  the  present 
to  the  future  life,  and  what  several  things  are  comprehended  under  it? 

Why  is  this  doctrine  implied  in  that  of  a  moral  government  ? 

What,  then,  is  the  difference  between  being  on  probation  and  being 
subject  to  government  ? 

What  particular  features  or  elements  of  probation  are  now  to  be  consid- 
ered? 

The  General  Analogy  between  Natural  Probation  and  Religious 
Probation. 

What  kind  of  probation  or  trial  is  implied  in  the  moral  government  of 
God? 

What  kind  of  probation  is  implied  in  the  natural  government  of  God? 

How  is  probation  implied  in  the  natural  temptations  which  men  en- 
counter ? 

How  is  it  implied  in  their  common  language  in  regard  to  misconduct 
in  temporal  affairs  ? 

How  is  it  implied  in  their  worldly  errors  and  failures  ? 

How  is  it  implied  in  the  hazards  of  the  young  ? 

How  is  it  implied  in  vices  which  are  contrary  to  our  worldly  interest? 

To  what  is  this  natural  probation  analogous  ? 


33 

I.     The  Analogous  Ocoasioxs  of    Xat'/r.\i>    and    ok    |{kli(5ious   Pro- 

HATIOX, 

Wliat  are  two  constitiicuts  or  occasions  of  trial  in  botli  natural  and  reli- 
gions i)rol)ation  1 

How  is  it  shown  that  temptations  may  arise  from  external  circumstances? 

How  is  it  shown  that  tliey  may  arise  from  internal  passions  or  habits? 

How  is  it  shown  that  such  temptations  i'rom  without  and  from  within 
imply  each  other  ? 

How  does  it  appear  that  we  are  in  a  like  state  of  trial  respecting:  our 
temporal  and  our  eternal  interests  ? 

Wlat  description  is  given  of  our  natural  probation,  and  how  will  it  ap- 
ply to  our  religious  probation  ? 

ir.     The  Analogous  Effkcts  of  Naturai,  and  of  Rkligious   Puoba- 

TION. 

How  is  it  shown  that  some  men  are  as  reckless  of  their  temporal  as  of 
their  eternal  interests  ? 

By  what  are  some  men  as  much  blinded  in  worldly  as  in  religious  con- 
cerns ? 

How  are  some  carried  away,  in  both  cases,  even  against  their  better 
judgment  ? 

How  do  others  seem  even  to  court  their  temporal  as  well  as  eternal 
ruin  ? 

What  in  general  is  the  liability,  and  often  the  actual  conduct,  of  human 
creatures  as  respects  both  interests  ? 

III.  The  Analogous  Aggravations  of  Natural  and  of  Keli- 
Gious  Probation. 

1.  Aggravations  from  tJie  lll-heJiavior  of  others. 

In  "what  ways  are  the  difficulties  of  religious  probation  increased  or 
made  by  the  ill-behavior  of  others  ? 

How  are  the  difficulties  of  natural  probation  increased  in  like  manner  ? 

2.  Aggravations  from  their  own  ill-behavior. 

How  do  some  persons  increase  the  difficulties  of  both  probations  by  their 
own  ill-behavior? 

How  do  they  especially  increase  them  in  youth  ? 

IV.  The  Analogous  Objections  to  Natural  and  to  Religious 
Probation. 

1st  Objection.      That  such  Probation  is  inequitable. 

What  does  our  condition  in  the  creation  seem  to  be  as  respects  both  our 
temporal  and  our  future  interests  ? 

Why  is  this  no  more  to  be  complained  of  in  religious  than  in  natural 
probation  ? 

And  why  have  we  no  reason  to  complain  of  it,  with  regard  to  the  Author 
of  Nature  ? 


34 

How  does  tlie  i^rcvious  ar^Miinent  rctidcr  tlie  doctrine  of  religious  proba- 
tion cnidible  ? 

2(1  Objection.  That  it  is  improhnhU  that  our  future  iiiteirst  should  de- 
pend upon  our  present  hehainor. 

What  changes  supposed  in  our  natural  condition,  or  in  our  natural  char- 
acter, might  give  room  for  this  objection  ? 

Were  there  no  natural  iiro])ation  as  to  tem])0i'al  interests,  how  might 
the  objector  then  argue  ? 

But  what  are  the  evidences  of  natural  probation  wliich  render  religious 
probation  credible? 

3f?  Objection.  That  it  is  improbable  that  there  should  be  caq/thiuff  of 
hazard  in  ths  Divi)ie  ForehiiovJedge. 

In  what  case  might  this  objection  have  been  speciouslj'  urged  ?  and  on 
what  ground  ? 

And  what  must  be  conceded  as  to  the  difficulty  ? 

But  what  are  still  the  facts  in  our  condition  ? 

What  instances  are  named  of  contingencies  left  dependent  upon  our 
conduct  ? 

How  flu-  do  these  observations  refute  objections  to  the  credibility  of  a 
state  of  probation? 

How  do  they  show  our  danger  of  foiling  of  our  future  eternal  mtei'cst? 


THE   PROBABILITY    OF   A  MORAL   EDUCA- 
TION FOR  THE  FUTURE  LIFE. 

(chap.  V.) 

(Section  II.)  The  Design  of  Probation  as  intended  for  the 
FoR:\rATioN  of  Character. 

What  difficult  question  ari.ses  from  the  consideration  of  our  probation- 
state. 

How  might  its  difficulties  be  lessened  ?  But  what  must  be  acknowl- 
edged in  regard  to  it  ? 

What  considerations  may  reconcile  us  to  our  ignorance  1 

How  much  may  be  affirmed  as  certain  concerning  it? 

What  more  important  question  than  the  origin  of  probation  does  tliis 
answer  ? 

What,  then,  is  the  known  object  or  design  of  probation  ? 

Analogy  between  Natural  Education  "and  Religious  Educa- 
tion. 

To  what  is  the  beginning  of  life  in  the  present  world  analogous  ?  and  in 
what  respect  ? 

How  is  it  proposed  to  show  the  extent  and  force  of  this  analogy  ? 

I.     Preliminary  Principles  of  all  Education. 

^4.      The  Necesscu-y  Correspondence  hetwecn  (Jliaracter  and  Condition. 

What  two  constituents  enter  into  every  creature's  way  of  life?  and  how 
are  they  related  to  each  other  ? 

How  are  they  shown  to  be  essential  in  man  ? 

How  is  this  expressed  by  an  ancient  writer  ? 

How  are  human  life  and  happiness  connected  with  this  correspondence  ? 

What  is  the  inference  as  to  the  future  character  and  condition  ? 

B.      The  Cap<d>ility  of  New  Character  corresponding  to  JVeia  Condition. 

What  capability  exists  in  the  constitution  of  man  and  other  creatures? 


36 

What  differently  eoii:<titutcd  species  of  creatures  may  be  imagined  1 
But  what  is  the  constitution  of  every  species  known  to'tks? 
(/.)     Jii/  means  of  the  F((eidty  of  Knoidedge. 

"With  what  capacities  besides  those  of  perception  and  knowledge  are  we 
endued  ? 

( II. )     By  means  of  the  Facultif  of  Hahit. 

What  capabilities  beside   those  of  acting  and  receiving  impressions  have 


we 


How  are  perception  and  knowledge  to  be  distinguished  from  habits? 

But  what  capacities  of  acquiring  knowledge  are  improvable  by  exercise? 
and  how  can  they  be  regarded  as  habits  ? 

And  how  do  perceptions  acquire  a  character  of  habit? 

(1.)     The  Classification  of  Habits  into  [a.)  Active  and  Passive. 

What  instance  is  given  of  a  habit  of  perception  ? 

In  what  light  may  all  other  associations  of  ideas  be  regarded  ?  and  to 
what  are  they  likened  ? 

What  instances  are  given  of  a  habit  of  action  ? 

(6. )     Bodily  and  Metital  or  Moral  H'xhUs. 

What  examples  are  given  of  habits  of  body  and  of  mind  ? 

(2,)     The  Formation  of  Moral  Habits  [a. )  by  outward  moral  acts. 

How  are  moral  as  well  as  bodily  habits  formed  ? 

How  does  their  formation  differ  from  that  of  bodily  habits? 

Why  cannot  they  be  formed  by  any  mere  external  course  of  action  ? 

{b.)     By  inward  moral  acU. 

How  are  habits  of  attention,  industry,  and  self-government  formed  ? 
and  how  are  habits  of  envy  and  revenge  formed  ? 

How  do  good  resolutions  and  virtuous  inculcations  contribute  to  forming 
good  habits  ? 

(c. )     But  not  by  mere  passive  impressions. 

What,  however,  may  be  the  effect  of  mere  theorizing  about  virtue  ? 

How  are  mere  passive  impressions  affected  by  their  repetition,  and  what 
examples  are  given  ? 

What  follows  from  the  combined  influence  of  repeated  acts  and  impres- 
sions ? 

How  does  experience  confiiin  this? 

How  is  it  shown  in  persons  accustomed  to  danger  ? 

How  is  it  shown  in  persons  accustomed  to  relieve  distress? 

How  is  it  shown  in  persons  accustomed  to  scenes  of  death  ? 

[d.)     Except  so  far  as  passive  impressions  induce  corresponding  action. 

What,  therefore,  is  the  precise  efficacy  of  such  passive  impressions  as 
are  made  by  admonition,  experience,  or  example  ? 

But  how  are  real  endeavors  to  enforce  good  impressions  upon  ourselves 
to  be  regarded  ? 


37 

(3. )      The  Xtitim'  luul  Efect  of  Ilahlts. 

Is  it  important  to  know  whether  the  siuiu!  eft'eets  miuht  not  1k'  wrouiilit 
in  us  at  once,  in  some  other  way  than  Ijy  habits? 

What  is  conceded  a-  to  tlieir  progress  and  the  ihiulty  by  which  we  aie 
capable  ot  them  ? 

What  is  still  matter  of  certain  experience  concerning  them  ? 

What  is  the  exjjerienced  effect  of  habit  in  any  course  of  action? 

What  is  its  effect  upon  our  aversions  to  such  course  of  action,  the  diff- 
culties  in  it,  and  the  reasons  lor  it  ? 

What  is  the  effect  of  Hal)it  ui>on  jiractical  i)rii)ciples,  absolutely  as  well 
as  relatively  ? 

And  what  is  the  effect  upon  the  whole  character  and  life  ? 

II.  The  Consequent  1*rinciples  of  Natural  Edkation. 
Why,  in  general,  have  we  these  faculties  of  knowledge  and  ha})it  ? 
IIow^  far  are  they  necessary  to  us  even  in  our  temporal  capacity  ? 

C.  The  Neces^iti/  for  QiuiUfication  for  Mature  Life. 

How  is  it  shown  that  Nature  does  not  <iualily  us  wholly,  or  at  once,  ibr 
mature  life  ? 

By  what  supposition  is  this  illustrated  ? 

What  would  men  in  society  bj  without  experience  and  habit? 

To  what  are  such  deficiencies  compared'? 

In  what  state,  then,  is  mankind  left  by  nature  as  respects  niature  life? 

D.  The  Opportunity  for  Improveinent  in  Earhj  Life. 

How  does  Nature  enable  us  to  supply  these  deficiencies,  and  in  what 
favorable  condition  does  she  place  us? 

How  are  children  qualified  in  knowledge  for  their  part  in  the  scene  of 
mature  Hfe  ? 

How  are  they  trained  in  domestic  life  for  social  and  civil  lile  ? 

What  valuable  experience  are  they  daily  gaining  ;  what  rules  do  they 
learn  ;  and  to  what  may  their  manner  of  learning  them  be  compared  ? 

How  do  the  example,  instruction,  and  care  of  others  enter  into  this 
natural  education  ? 

Of  ourselves,  what  is  in  great  i)art  required  ? 

Without  labor  or  other  sorts  of  application  in  youth,  what  will  follow  in 
after  life  ? 

And  how  do  different  persons  at  length  reach  different  stations  in  so- 
ciety? 

In  what  important  light,  then,  is  the  former  part  of  life  to  be  considered  ? 

III.  The  ANALO(ious  Principles  of  Religious  Education. 
To  what  is  our  discipline  in  childhood  for  mature  age  analogous  ? 
To  what  extent  does  this  analogy  hold  ? 

Why  would  it  still  hold,  though  we  were  unable  to  discern  how  the  pres- 
ent life  could  be  a  preparation  for  the  future  life  1 


38 

How  is  (his  j>ro\e(l  by  tlie  nnconscioiisiiess  and  iuiiorance  of  children 
during  their  development  and  education  ? 

Even  without  considering  God's  moral  government,  what  would  still  be 
Fiui)i)Osahle  iVoni  :inalogy  as  to  the  relation  of  the  present  to  the  future 
life? 

But.  with  that  considoration.  how  can  it  be  explained?  and  in  what 
particulars  will  the  ]>ro])Osed  analogy  hold  ? 

(A.)    Thk.jMokal  CiiARArTER  Proper  TO  our  Future  Condition. 

I      Tmk  Aotivk  Virtltr^  Rkquisitk  in  a  Future  State. 

What  is  the  proof  that  the  future  state  will  not  be  solitary  and  inactive  ? 

What  is  conceded  and  what  is  maintained  with  regard  to  the  Scripture 
representation  of  it  as  under  the  more  immediate  sensible  government 
of  God  ? 

Notwithstanding  our  ignorance  of  this  happy  community,  what  virtues 
prevail  in  it,  and  what  may  be  affirmed  respecting  them  ? 

What  m;iy  al-o  be  true,  there,  of  the  character  formed  by  the  practice 
of  the  same  virtues  here  ? 

What,  in  general,  must  be  held  to  be  the  qualification  for  our  future 
happiness?  and  on  what  ground? 

(B.)  Our  Capability  of  tbk  Moral  Character  proper  to  our  Fu- 
ture Condition. 

How  lias  it  been  already  shown  that  we  are  capable  of  moral  improve- 
ment ? 

{C.)     "i  riE  Necessity  of  Moral  Qualification  for  the  Future  Life. 

How  is  the  necessity  of  moral  improvement  obvious  from  general  obser- 
vation as  well  as  from  the  consciousness  of  the  best  men  ? 

To  what  lu'gher  source,  however,  must  this  necessity  be  traced  ? 

{ /. )  Our  Original  Need  of  Virtuous  Hahits  as  Finite  Creatures. 

(1.)     The  Moral  Constitution  of  all  Finite  Creatures. 

What  constitutional  peril  probably  exists  in  all  finite  creatures  ?  and 
what  is  the  security  against  it? 

(</.)      The  Danger  arising  from  Proi}ensitie.^. 

Beside  the  moral  principle,  what  affections  have  we  in  our  inward  frame  ? 

To  what  extent  are  they  naturally  and  of  right  subject  to  the  moral 
princirle? 

To  what  extent  has  the  moral  principle  no  power  over  men  ? 

How  is  this  shown  by  their  natural  exercise  in  presence  of  their  objects? 

How  is  it  shown  by  the  nature  of  their  objects,  even  when  they  cannot 
be  obtained  innocently  ? 

And  when  they  can  only  be  obtained  by  unlawful  means,  what  tendency 
and  consequent  danger  arises  from  such  innocent  affections  ? 

*{h.)     The  Securiti/ arising  from  Virhie. 


39 

From  whence  ni)d  tVoiu  what  Is  the  geiiei-al  security  against  this  dan^^er 
Of'  actual  deviation  ? 

What  will  Ik;  the  effect  of  strenijitlienin.ii  or  ini|»r(jvini;'  the  moral  i»rin- 
ciplc? 

Ky  what  means  may  it  he  improved? 

On  what  grounds  should  we  accustom  ourselves  to  act  upon  (M(iiity  and 
right  rather  than  tVom  humor  and  mere  inclination  ? 

In  what  proportion  will  such  a  liabit  (jf  virtue  he  a  security  against  the 
danger  of  defection  ? 

What  is  here  supposed  as  to  the  future  state;  ? 

On  tliis  supposition  what  follows  as  to  the  relation  of  virtuous  habits  to 
particular  affections  ?^ 

Without  this  supposition,  howcvei',  how  can  it  be  shown  that  virtuous 
habits  conduce  to  liai)piness? 

(2.)  The  Coitsequext  \eed  of  \  iiiHons  ILfbits,  ccen  in,  Upright  Crea- 
f  fires. 

What  two  questions  respecting  creatures  made  upright  may  be  explained 
upon  these  principles  ? 

{a.)  The  Defect ihilifi/  of  UprifjJrt  Credture.s  fhrrjiic/h  Particular  Affec- 
tions or  Projiejisions. 

Why  c^imiot  their  flill  be  accounted  for  by  the  nature  of  Liberty  ? 

But  what  renders  it  distinctly  conceivable  ? 

In  upright  creatures,  what  besides  i)ropensions  must  be  supi)0sed,  and 
how  would  both  natural  and  moral  pi-inciples  be  combined  in  their  consti- 
tution ? 

How  are  particular  propensions  related  to  their  objects  and  to  the  moral 
principle,  and  what  tendency  arises  from  their  exercise  ? 

How  may  this  tendency,  in  some  one  particular  propension,  be  increased 
by  outward  and  inward  causes,  and  in  what  may  it  terminate? 

From  whence  arises  this  danger  of  deviation,  and  how  far  is  it  avoidaljle  ? 

What  illustration  is  given  ? 

What  might  be  the  effect  of  a  single  irregularity,  and  what  would  be 
the  effect  of  rei)eated  irregularities  ? 

In  what  proportion,  then,  are  upright  creatures  defectible  ? 

[b.)     The  Perfectibility  of  Upright  Creatures  through  Virtuous  Habits. 

How  might  these  creatures,  instead  of  falling,  have  raised  themselves 
to  a  higher  state  of  virtue  ? 

Why  w^ould  they  lessen  their  danger  by  thus  preserving  their  integrity 
for  some  time,  and  what  two  piocesses  arc  therefore  implied  in  the  notion 
of  virtuous  habits  ? 

What,  therefore,  are  the  inward  effect^s,  as  well  as  nature,  of  vicious  in- 
dulgence and  virtuous  self-government  respectively  ? 


40 

On  what  supposition  may  it  be  allowed  that  upright  creatiire.s  must 
ever  remain  defoctible  ? 

Yet  to  what  degree  may  they  still  be  improved  and  perfectible  ? 

To  what,  however,  would  such  higher  perfection  and  security  ever  con- 
tinue to  be  due  ? 

What  follows,  then  as  to  the  essential  holiness  of  the  Creator  and  the 
original  danger  and  security  of  creatures? 

What  may  be  the  ground  of  their  danger,  and  how  may  virtuous  habits 
be  related  to  it  ? 

Of  what  are  they  naturally  capable,  and  in  what  correspondent  circum- 
stances may  it  be  fit  that  they  should  be  placed  1 

{ II.)      Ovr  Increa.sed  jXeed  of  Virtnoiis  JIahifs  ((.s  FaJlcn  Creatures. 

How  does  this  reasoning  apply  to  fallen  creatures? 

What  is  the  difi'erence  between  the  wants  of  upright  creatures  and  those 
of  depraved  creatures  ? 

How  are  education  and  discipline  adapted  to  the  one  as  compared  with 
the  other  1 

For  what  reasons  must  discipline  of  the  severer  sort  be  necessary  in  de- 
praved creatures  ? 

(D.)    The  Opportunity   for   Moral  Discipline  in  the  Present 
Life. 

To  what  class  is  the  present  world  peculiarly  adapted  to  be  a  state  of 
discipline  ? 

(1.)     Present  Opportunitks  of  acquiring  a  Moderate  and  Reasonable 
Temper. 

What  circumstances  in  our  present  life  give  it  a  disciplinary  tendency  ? 

Do  all  of  them  produce  the  same  effects? 

When  duly  reflected  upon,  however,  what  dispositions  do  they  directly 
tend  to  produce  ? 

And  what  contrary  dispositions  may  be  observed  in  udnds  not  thus  dis- 
ciplined ? 

(2. )     Present  Opportunities  of  acquiring  a  Practical  Sense  of  our  Frailty. 

What  does  our  present  experience  teach  us  as  to  our  passions,  our  help- 
lessness, and  our  danger  .of  vice  and  wretchedness? 

What  kind  of  an  impression  of  our  liability  to  vice  and  misery  does  sucH 
experience  tend  to  give  us  ? 

To  what  may  the  security  of  i)erfected  creatures  be  due  ? 

And  how  may  such  impressions  be  made  everlasting  in  our  minds  ? 

(3.)     Present  Opportunities  of  acquiring  Hahits  of  Virtue. 

What  things  are  enumerated  as  atiiong  the  snares  and  temptations  of 
the  present  life  ? 

To  whom  are  they  disciplinary  ?  and  why  ? 


41 

Why  do  recollection,  intention,  and  seU'-goveiiinu  nt  in  ti'^e  i)racLice  of 
virtue  tend  to  form  habits  of  virtue 

How  is  this  illustrated  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  seli'-denial  is  not  essential  to  virtue  and  ].iety  ? 

But  how  does  it  tend  to  form  and  confirm  habits  of  virtue  and  piety  ? 

\st  Objection.  Tliat  in  theory  there  may  be  a  limit  to  Mora!,  as  to 
Bodily  and  Intellectual  Improvement. 

( 1 . )     Such  limitation  cannot  he  proved. 

How  far  are  our  intellectual  or  physical  powers  improvable? 

What  is  conceded  with  respect  to  the  moral  character? 

(2.)     Such  liniitation,  if  }> roved,  only  exceptional. 

How  will  the  concession  airect  the  previous  argument ' 

x\llowing  for  exceptions,  what  is  the  general  view  to  bo  taken  oi"  the 
present  life  ? 

To  what  is  moral  improvement  likened? 

'2d  Ohjection.  That  in  fact  the  present  life  is  :«o  generally  pervertcM.l 
into  a  discipline  of  vice  rather  than  of  virtue. 

What  is  conceded  with  respect  to  the  present  state  ?  and  to  what  extent 
can  it  be  accounted  for  ? 

(1.)  The  Failures  of  the  Vicious  only  increase  the  Discipline  of  the 
Virtuous. 

To  what  class  is  the  viciousness  of  the  world  the  great  temptation? 

Amidst  the  general  corruption,  what  is  their  character  md  conduct  ? 

Why  is  the  present  world  more  disciplinary  to  them  than  a  perfectly 
virtuous  society  would  be  ? 

(2. )  The  Failures  of  the  Vicious  are  sufficiently  in  accordance  icith  the 
analogy  of  nature. 

What  analogous  failures  occur  in  plants  and  animals,  and  in  what  pro., 
portion  ? 

How  may  the  antilogy  be  applied  to  the  mystery  of  the  ruin  of  so  many 
moral  agents  ? 

3d  Ohjection.  That  a  Moral  Discipline  proceeding  from  Hope  and 
Fear  is  only  an  exercise  of  Self-love. 

What  course  of  behavior  may  seem  open  to  this  objection  ? 

(1.)  Proper  iSelf-lov*,  though  subordinate,  not  antagonistic,  to  Religious 
Obedience. 

What  is  religious  obedience  ?  and  how  is  it  affected  by  self-love  ? 

What  will  result  from  a  course  of  such  obedience  ? 

What  will  result  from  a  constant  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  and  charity, 
and  how,  and  to  what  extent  will  it  subordinate  self-love? 

(2. )     Proper  Self-love  an  element  and  motive  of  Religious  Character. 

What  other  moral  principles  besides  self-love  enter  into  our  actions, 


42 

ami  why  is  tlun-e  no  ground  for  nice  distinctions  between  them  ? 

How  will  u  life  begun  in  one  in\H)lve  progress  and  perfection  in  the 
others  ? 

IT.    'J'lii:  Tassive  Virtues  Requisite  in  the  Future  State. 

How  does  tlie  whole  previous  reasoning  apply  to  the  virtue  of  passive 
resignation  as  well  as  to  ac  tive  obedience  ? 

What  difficulty  may  be  imagined  as  to  the  exercise  of  such  virtues  in 
the  future  state,  but  why  must  it  be  treated  as  imaginary  ? 

(C.)  The  Necessity  for  Habits  of  Resignation  in  the  Future 
State. 

What  occasion  may  even  prosperity  give  for  the  passive  virtues  ? 

How  does  imagination  more  than  any  external  condition  give  ground 
for  them  ? 

What  is  conceded  and  Avhat  maintained  with  regard  to  patience  in  a 
state  where  there  is  no  sorrow  ? 

(1.)     The  Need,  of  Resignation  in  all  Creatures. 

Why  is  the  principle  of  self-interest  coincident  with  the  principle  of 
obedience  ? 

But  how  far  may  it  be  questioned  whether  the  mere  desire  of  self-inter- 
est can  be  thus  absolutely  coincident  with  tlie  will  of  God  1 

Why,  then,  may  habits  of  resignation  be  necessary  for  all  creatures  ? 

(2.)     The  Need  of  Resignation  in  Human  Creatures. 

What,  at  least,  are  the  effects  of  mere  passive  self  love  in  human  crea- 
tures, and  of  what  does  it  therefore  stand  in  need^? 

(D.)  The  Opportunity  for  Acquiring  Habits  of  Resignation 
IN  THE  Present  State. 

What  is  the  efl'ect  of  a  long  course  of  active  obedience  upon  the  passive 
affections,  and  how  does  it  tend  to  habituate  the  mind  to  resignation  ? 

What,  however,  is  the  proper  discipline  of  resignation,  and  how  does  it 
tend  to  habituate  the  mind  to  that  virtue  ? 

What  character  results  from  this  combination  of  the  active  and  passive 
habits  of  virtue  ? 

Why  cannot  such  a  character  be  regarded  as  a  blind  submission  to  mere 
power  ? 

What  now  is  the  whole  previous  argument,  and  the  conclusion  from  it  ? 

General  Objection.  That  we  might  have  been  spared  all  this  discipline 
by  being  made  at  once  what  we  are  to  be. 

How  does  experience  show  this  objection  to  be  vain  ? 

And  how  does  the  general  conduct  of  nature  refute  it  ? 

What  qualifications  are  the  natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies  ?  and  why 
is  it  natural  to  us  to  seek  them  ? 

What  general  law  of  nature  plainly  governs  our  temporal  interest 
throughout  our  present  life  ? 


43 

What  alternative  does  it  leave  us  ? 

What,  therefore,  follows  from  analogy  as  to  the  future  life? 

(Section  III.)  The  Effect  of  Probation  as  involving  the 
Manifestation  of  Character. 

In  what  third  light  may  we  regard  the  present  world  as  related  to  the 
future  world  ? 

To  whom  may  it  be  possible  that  such  manifestation  of  character  should 
be  made  ? 

How  may  this  feature  of  probation  be  related  to  the  other  two  features 
already  presented  ? 

1.  This  View  siqiported  hy  sound  conjecture. 

What,  at  least,  is  possible  as  to  the  manifestation  of  persons'  characters 
in  the  present  state  ? 

What  ends  may  it  serve,  both  as  respects  the  persons  themselves  and 
as  respects  the  rest  of  the  creation  ? 

2.  This  Vieiv  supported  hy  Analogy. 

(1.)     The  Manifestation  of  Character  involved  in  Natural  Government. 

How  does  the  manifestation  of  character  now  enter  into  the  general 
course  of  nature  respecting  mankind  ? 

(2.)     The  Manifestation  of  Character  involved  in  Moral  Government. 

In  what  two  senses  has  probation  been  treated  in  this  chapter  ?  and  in 
what  sense  in  the  foregoing  chapter  ? 

Why  are  the  two  former  especially,  as  well  as  the  latter,  implied  in 
moral  government? 


THE  FATALISTIC  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST 
RELIGION. 

(chap.  VI.) 

% 

Throughout  the  foregoing  argument,  what  analogy  has  been  maintained  ? 

What  must  a  fatalist  assert  with  respect  to  our  temporal  condition  ?  and 
what  question,  therefore,  arises  in  the  way  of  analogy  ? 

What  is  meant  by  saying  that  the  question  is  not  absolute  but  hypo- 
thetical ? 

What  will  be  its  bearing  upon  the  fatalist  ? 

What  renders  the  puzzle  and  obscurity  of  arguing  such  a  question  excu' 
sable  1 

I.  Necessitarianism  Reconcilable  with  the  Preliminary  Doc- 
trine OF  Theism. 

What  fundamental  doctrine  of  all  religion  has  been  taken  for  granted 
throughout  tte  previous  argument  ? 

What  objection  may  be  raised  to  it  from  the  opinion  of  universal  neces- 
sity ? 

What  is  to  be  shown  in  opposition  to  this  objection  ?  and  why  is  such 
an  argument  at  this  point  requisite  ? 

1.     Nature,  if  Necesitated,  might  still  have  been  Designed. 

What  does  the  fatalist  or  necessitarian  affirm  respecting  the  whole  con- 
stitution of  nature? 

What  analogical  proof  have  we  that  such  necessity  does  not  exclude 
intelligence  or  design  ? 

What  circumstance  alone  does  necessity  explain  with  regard  to  the  origin 
and  continuance  of  nature  ? 

AVhat  question  does  it  leave  untouched,  and  what  is  the  real  question 
which  it  answers? 


45 

2.     Nature,  if  Necessitated,  might  still  have  had  an  Author. 
Wherein  would  a  Libertarian  and  a  Necessitarian  agree,  and  wherein 
would  they  differ,  as  to  the  construction  of  a  house? 

How  might  they  also  express  themselves  with  regard  to  the  constitution 
of  nature  1     But  what  musi  they  really  mean  ? 

Why  is  the  Necessitarian  obliged  to  imply  an  agent  acting  necessarily  ? 

Objection.     Tiiat  we  may  ascribe  to  Nature  the  peculiar  necessary  exist- 
ence ascribed  to  God 

What  kind  of  necessary  ex'stence  do  we  ascribe  to  God  ? 

(1. )     Dii/)i)/iitr  Ui)ii  of  th:i  Neccsmrtj  Existence  of  God. 

What  is  that  idea  of  Infinity  which  we  find  within  ourselves? 

What  do  we  intuitively  discern  respecting  it  external  to  ourselves,  and 
why  cannot  it  be  a  mere  abstract  in  our  minds  ? 

What,  tlerefore,  must  be  the  concrete  or  archetype  of  our  idea  of  in- 
finity ? 

For  what  reason,  then,  and  in  what  sense  do  we  attribute  the  word  ne- 
cessity to  God  1 

(2.)     Ahsurdity  of  attriLn^ing  such  Necessary  Existence  to  Nature. 

How  is  this  kind  of  Divine  Necessity  distinguished  from  that  of  the  fa- 
talist before  defined  ? 

Why  cannot  such  necessity  be  attributed  to  Nature,  or  everything  that 
exists  ? 

3.     Necessitariatmm,  therefore,  no  Letter  theory  than  Libertarian  ism. 

What  are  the  two  conclusions  from  the  previous  reasoning  respecting 
Necessity,  which  the  fatalist  is  obliged  to  accept  ? 

Why,  then,  would  the  theory  of  Necessity  account  for  the  formation  of 
the  world  no  better  than  the  theory  of  Liberty  1 

And  what  proof  of  an  Litelligent  Author  of  Nature  would  remain  as 
real  on  the  theory  of  Necessity  as  on  the  theory  of  Liberty  ? 

11.    Necessitarianism  Reconcilable  with  the  System  of  Eeli 

GION. 

What  is  the  mair>  question  ensuing  upon  the  previous  argument  ? 

On  what  supposition  will  it  be  argued  that  the  opinion  of  necessity  is 
reconcilable  with  religion?  and  to  what  extent? 

(I.)  HuAL\N  Conduct,  if  Necessitated,  might  still  involve 
Moral  Accountability. 

(1.)     Manifest  Absurdity  of  Eatalism  in  Common  Life. 

What  case  is  supposed  to  illustrate  the  practical  absurdity  of  fatalism  ? 

How  does  this  illustration  serve  to  show  the  lack  of  common  sense  in 
such  speculations,  their  disastrous  tendency  in  practice,  and  their  final 
issue  in  utter  failure  ? 

What  other  illustration  is  given  of  the  absurdity  of  acting  on  the  theory 
of  necessity  ? 


46 

On  tiie  contrary,  what  are  the  efi^cts  of  acting  on  the  theory  of  freedom  ? 

What  may,  therefore,  be  inferred  as  to  the  opinion  of  necessity  practi- 
cally considered  ?  and  what,  perhaps,  also  as  to  the  opinion  of  freedom, 
speculatively  considered  ? 

(± )     Aaalogona  Absurdity  of  Fatalism  in  Religion. 

What  is  the  precise  point  insisted  upon  in  the  previous  argument,  with 
regard  to  our  present  worldly  interest? 

What  may  now  be  inferred  as  to  the  ])ractical  application  of  fatalistic 
opinions  to  the  more  general  interest  of  religion  ? 

Why  cannot  we  conclude  from  such  opinions  that  we  are  free  from  the 
obligations  of  religion  ? 

To  what  is  the  fallacy  of  such  conclusions  likened  ? 

Why.  then,  is  the  evidence  of  religion  as  conclusive  on  the  theory  of  ne- 
cessity as  of  freedom  ? 

And  why  is  this  no  reflection  upon  reason  ? 

(II.)  Divine  G-oyernment,  if  Necessitated,  might  still  in- 
volve Moral  Character. 

(1.)     Necesni.f.i/  Reconcilable  wiili  sonic  Cliaractcr  in  God. 

What  is  the  analogical  proof  of  this  afforded  by  our  own  consciousness? 

What  is  the  in-oof  afforded  by  natural  government  and  final  causes? 

[N'ote.    In  what  sense  are  the  terms  iciU  and  character  here  em].)loyed  ?J 

(2.)     Necessity  Reconcildhle  icith  AToral  Character  in  God. 

With  what  particular  Divine  attributes,  fundamental  to  religion,  is  ne- 
ces.«ity  reconcilable  ? 

What  is  the  analogical  proof  of  this  aflorded  by  our  own  experience 
and  observation  ? 

1.9^  Ohjection.  That  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  such  a  Moral  Char- 
acter in  God  to  punish  necessary  agents 

1.      The  Ohjection  ahsurd  on  its  oicn  terms. 

On  what  supposition  does  this  objection  proceed,  and  what  plausible 
reason  is  dven  for  it? 


How  is  its  absurdity  exposed  on  its  own  ter 


ms 


2.      The  Ohjection  recoils  into  a  Proof. 

What  proof  does  it  incidentally  afford  of  those  very  moral  qualities  at 
which  it  is  aimed  ? 

2(7  Ohjection.  That  the  proof  of  such  a  Moral  Character  in  God  would 
be  invalidated  by  Necessitarianism. 

How  is  the  Moral  Character  of  God  related  to  religion,  and  what  ques- 
tion may  here  be  raised  as  to  the  proof  of  that  character  ? 

1.  The  Ohjection  refuted  hy  our  oxen  experience- 

How  does  our  experience  of  happiness  and  misery  refute  all  fatalistic 
theories  % 

2.  The  Objection  refuted  by  the  necessity  of  the  case. 


47 

Wliat  is  the  experienced  natural  government  of  God,  and  what  makes 
it  plain,  in  spite  of  fatalistic  theories,  that  it  must  be  exercised  on  moral 
principles  ? 

III.     Necessitarianism  Reconcilable  avith  the  Proof  of  Ee- 

LIGION. 

What  two  reasons  are  given  for  showing  more  particularly'  that  the  proof 
of  religion  is  not  destroyed  by  the  theory  of  necessity  ? 

(I.)     'VuK  Internal  P^vidkxoe  not  Invalidated. 

( 1. )     Thr  Pioof  of  an  Intdligcut  Author  of  Kature. 
■    On  what  supposition  of  the  necessitarian  will  this  proof  remain  un- 
affected? and  why? 

(2. )     The  Proof  of  a  Divine  Government  hif  Rewards  and  1  inu'shnents. 

Why  does  this  proof  also  remain  unimpaired? 

(3.)     The  Proof  of  a  Moral  Government  of  God. 

[a.)      The  Direet  Proof  of  a  Moral  Facvlty  ivithin  ?/.<?. 

What  is  the  moral  faculty  God  has  given  us  ? 

How  is  an  authoritative  rule  of  action  implied  in  it? 

How  does  consciousness  prove  its  dictates  to  be  the  law  of  God  ? 

How  is  the  same  proved  from  the  nature  of  a  divine  command,  as  re- 
lated to  the  perceptions  of  the  moral  faculty  ? 

[h. )     The  Consequent  Proof  of  Moral  Rewards  aneJ  Punishments. 

What  purposes  do  the  perceptions  of  the  moral  faculty  serve  in  the 
government  of  God  ?  and  why  must  He  have  given  them  to  us  ? 

What  may  thence  be  concluded  as  to  the  relation  of  the  government  of 
God  to  our  moral  nature,  and  the  consequent  relation  of  misery  to  vice 
and  happiness  to  virtue  ? 

What  argument  might  also  be  deduced  for  the  obligations  of  religious 
worship  ? 

(c. )  This  Experimental  Proof  of  God's  Morcd  Government  not  Invali- 
dated by  Necessitarianism. 

Why  can  no  objection  from  necessity  be  against  the  existence  of  the 
moral  faculty  ? 

Why  can  none  be  brought  against  the  conclusion  from  it,  that  God  will 
finally  reward  the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked  ? 

How  is  it  shown  to  be  a  reasoning  from  fact  rather  than  from  the  mere 
fitness  of  things  ? 

[Xote.  Does  Butler  here  deny  that  the  will  of  God  may  be  determined 
by  the  fitness  of  things  ? 

How  are  such  expressions  u.^  fitness  of  action.,  or  right  and  reason  of  the 
case  shown  to  be  intelligible  ? 

How  is  it  conceivable  that  God's  will  may  be  as  much  determined  by  the 
nature  of»  things  in  reference  to  moral  right  as  His  judgment  is  so  deter- 
mined in  reference  to  abstract  truth  ?] 


48 

[d.)  The  Covfirnuifon/  Proof  of  GoiTs  Monti  Government  not  Invali- 
dated. 

What  three  confirmatory  proofs  from  other  facts  are  also  unaifected  by 
fatahsm  ? 

(II.)     TiiK  External   Kvidencr  not  Invalidated.  ; 

How  is  the  nature  of  this  evidence  ilhistrated  ? 

How  is  the  evidence  fron\  history  rehited  to  the  evidence  from  reason  ? 

Under  what  three  heads  is  this  evidence  summed  up  ?     • 

(1)     General  Consent  of  Mankind. 

What  is  shown  by  the  general  consent  of  mankind  in  respect  to  this  sy.s- 
tem  of  religion  ? 

(2. )     Early  Belief  in  Religion. 

Were  there  any  superstitious  additions  to  religion  in  the  first  ages  of  the 

worldi? 

What  is  the  alternative  to  be  inferred  from  the  early  prevalence  of  u 
system  of  pure  religion  ? 

To  which  opinion  do  learned  men  incHne  ? 

What  renders  it  probable  that  religion  was  not  simply  reasoned  out  in 
primitive  times? 

Is  there  such  a  presumption  against  a  primitive  revelation  as  against  a 
modern  one  ? 

What  would  be  the  most  probable  account  a  skeptic  himself  could  give 
of  the  early  pretences  to  religion. 

(3.)     Historical  Testimony. 

Why  should  ancient  tradition  and  history  be  admitted  as  additional  proof 
of  a  primitive  revelation  ? 

What  is  the  precise  weight  of  such  proof  at  this  stage  of  the  argument  ? 

What  is  the  extent  of  the  external  evidence  of  religion  ? 

The  Need  of  Caution  in  judging  the  Proofs  of  Religion. 

To  what  dangers  is  the  speculative  reason  liable  ?  and  the  moral  under- 
standing ? 

Why  does  this  prove  nothing  against  the  reality  of  our  speculative  and 
practical  faculties  ? 

But  of  what  does  it  admonish  us,  and  what  are  we  in  danger  ot  substi- 
tuting in  place  of  the  true  moral  rule  ? 

What  is  the  proper  eff"ect  of  the  internal  and  external  evidence  of  reli- 
.  gion  taken  together? 

What  might  weaken  this  positive  proof? 
.     General  Objection.     That  all  this  Proof  rests  upon  contradictory 
assumptions  by  involving  Libertarian  as  opposed   to  Necessitarian  princi- 
ples. 

(1.)     Logical  Terms  of  the  Objection. 


49 

How  may  probabilities,  wliicli  cannot  thoniselvcs  be  confuted,  be  over- 
balanced ? 

In  what  case  would  there  be  no  need  even  of  tlius  repelling  such  argu- 
ments? 

On  what  supposition  does  the  method  of  government  by  rewards  and 
punishments  proceed,  and  what  absurdity  is  there  alleged  ? 

(2.)     Aliicrnativc  Refatatinns  of  the  Objection. 

What  shows  the  conclusion   from  the  reasoning  to  be  false  on  either 
theory  ? 

On  the  theory  of  freedom,  where  does  the  fallacy  lie  ? 

On  the  theory  of  necessity,  where  does  the  fallacy  lie  ? 

How  is  thi ;  latter  fallacy  disproved  in  the  case  of  brutes  ? 

How  is  it  disproved  in  the  case  of  men  in  natural  society  ? 

How  is  it  disproved  by  the  natural  rewards  and  punishments  of  grati- 
tude, resentment,  etc.  ? 

What,  then,  is  the  dilemma  into  which  the  objector  may  be  driven? 

General  Conclusions. 

What  is  the  general  conclusion  from  the  whole  previous  reasoning  in  re 
lation  to  the  .theory  of  necessity,  and  how  does  it  apply  to  Revealed,  as 
well  as  Natural  Religion  ? 

In  what  two  senses  alone  may  necessitarianism  be  said  to  be  the  destruc- 
tion of  all  religion  1 

But  in  what  sense  may  it  be  said  to  be  perfectly  reconcilable  with  reli- 
gion ? 


THE   MORAL  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST 
RELIGION. 

(CIIAP.   VII.) 

What  is  the  argumentative  force  of  Analogy  upon  the  doctrines  of  reli- 
gion, and  upon  fatalistic  objections  to  them  ? 

What  class  of  objections  reniaiU)  to  which  Analogy  is  no  direct  answer? 

Why  cannot  Analogy  be  a  direct  answer  to  the:-e  objections,  but  how 
may  it  indirectly  suggest  an  answer  to  them  ? 

What  are  the  two  heads  of  the  proj^osed  argument? 

1.  The  General  Analogy  between  the  Schemes  of  Nature  and 
Religion  in  respect  to  their  Incomprehensibility. 

How  is  the  incomprehensibility  of  the  moral  government  of  God  to  be 
proved  ? 

].      The  Incomprehensihllity  of  the  Scliemc  of  Natme. 

(1.)     Nature  ti  Scheme^  or  Spstem  of  Things. 

How  is  the  scheme  or  system  of  nature  described  ? 

In  this  scheme,  how  are  creatures  related  to  each  other,  and  how  far  do 
these  relations  extend  ? 

In  this  scheme,  how  are  actions  an  1  events  related  to  each  other? 

(2.)     The  Scheme  of  Nature  Incomprehensible. 

Why  cannot  we  affirm  that  all  creatures  and  events  throughout  nature 
are  related  together  ? 

But  what  is  certain  in  regar-I  to  the  connections  of  all  events? 

Why  cannot  we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing? 

To  what  extent  do  the  unkown  connections  of  things  exist  ? 

How  are  we  convinced  that  almost  any  one  thing  may  be  a  necessary 
condition  to  any  other. 


51 

2.  Anahgoufi  Licomprelirni<ihilit\i  of  the  Scliome  of  Brlir/ion. 

How  far,  then,  is  the  natural  world  inconijirehensible,  and  what  maj' 
thence  be  inferred  as  to  the  moral  world  ? 

(1.)     Providence  a  Scheme  as  well  as  Nature. 

How.  indeed,  are  the  two  probably  connected  toj^ether  ? 

But  what  is  the  g:eneral  analog}'  here  insisted  upon  ? 

How  is  the  scheme  of  Ood's  moral  administration  described?  and  what 
are  some  of  its  features  ? 

(2.)     The  Scheme  of  Providence  Incomprehensihlc. 

Why  are  we  not  competent  judges  of  this  moral  scheme,  and  what  fol- 
lows as  to  the  objections  against  it  ? 

3.  The  Consequent  Folly  of  Ohjcctions  against  the  Scheme  of  Religion. 
What  two  reasons  are  given  for  showing  more  distinctly  that  our  igno- 
rance is  a  just  answer  to  objections  against  the  scheme  of  Providence? 

(1.)      Oiir  Ignorance  is  a  just  answer  to  such  Objections. 

What  two  alternative  objections  are  supposed  by  way  of  argument  ? 

Were* -either  of  these  suppositions  true,  why  might  the  government  of 
the  world  be  just  and  good  notwithstanding? 

But  wb.y  are  they  mere  arbitrary  assertions  ? 

How  is  this  shown  in  things  much  less  out  of  our  reach  than  the  scheme 
of  Providence? 

(2. )     Our  Ignorance  a  satisfactory  answer  to  such  Objections. 

If  Providence  were  not  a  scheme,  would  our  ignorance  of  some  dispen- 
sations be  any  answer  to  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness  of 
others? 

But  whe^i  it  is  viewed  as  made  up  of  related  parts,  why  is  our  ignorance 
a  satisfactory  answer  ? 

n.  Particulars  in  which  the  Schemes  of  Nature  and  Religion 
ARE  Analogously  wise  and  good. 

1.      The  Analogy  between  Xatural  and  Moral  Means  and  Ends. 

In  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  how  do  ends  appear  to  be  accom- 
plished ? 

(1.)     The  Wwdom  and  Goodness  of  Natural  Means  and  Ends. 

What  kind  of  means  and  ends  are  often  connected? 

How  do  we  learn  this  connection  ? 

What  does  experience  teach  us  in  regard  to  the  tendency  or  fitness  of 
some  means? 

(2.)     The  Wisdom  and  Goodness  of  Moral  Means  and  Ends. 

In  the  analogous  scheme  of  the  moral  world,  what  objectionable  things 
may  serve  as  means  to  wise  and  good  ends  ? 

What  does  the  analogy  teach  as  to  fitness  of  such  means  to  such  ends  ? 

How  do  even  such  things  as  we  call  irregularities  enter  into  this  system  ? 


Objection.  If  J'^vil  he  tlie  means  of  Good,  why  not  do  evil  that  good 
ma}'  come  ? 

(I. )     Tlie  Permission  of  evil  coiifessedli/  better  than  its  Prevention. 

To  what  good  ends  is  it  conceded  that  the  mere  capacity  of  evil  may 
contribute  ? 

In  what  sense,  also,  may  the  actual  peimission  of  evil  contribute  to  such 
ends  ? 

(2.)     The  Commission  of  Efil  infinitehj  icorse  than  its  Avoidance. 

How,  thcTi,  can  we  obviate  the  absurd  and  naked  conclusion  that  evil  is 
better  than  good? 

Why  would  not  this  follow,  even  though  it  were  conceded  that  the  very 
commission  of  wickedness  may  be  l)eneticial  to  the  world  ? 

How  may  this  be  illustrated  by  the  analogy  of  diseases  which  are  them- 
selves remedies  ? 

2.      The  Analogy  between  I^atvral  and  Moral  Laws. 

How  is  the  natural  government  of  the  world  carried  on? 

(1.)  The  Wisdom  and  Goodness  of  Gerieral  Laws  in  the  'Natural 
WorJd. 

y\liy  may  there  be  the  wisest  and  best  reasons  for  such  general  laws  ? 

How  is  it  shown  to  us  that  there  are  such  reasons  for  them  ? 

How  do  we  procure  our  enjoyments  by  means  of  them  ? 

How  may  we  account  for  irregularities  under  these  general  laws  ? 

Objection.     That  Irregularities  might  be  prevented  by  Interpositions. 

How  is  it  supposed  that  such  interpositions  might  be  consistent  with 
general  laws  ? 

On  what  supposition  is  it  conceded  that  such  interpositions  would  be 
desirable  ? 

But  what  immediate  bad  effects  would  they  plainly  have  ? 

And  what  distant  bad  effects  would  they  also  have? 

If  it  is  replied  that  such  bad  effects  might  be  prevented  by  further  in- 
terpositions, what  is  the  proper  rejoinder  ? 

(2.)     The  Wisdom  and  Goodness  of  General  Laws  in  the  Moral  World. 

What  may  we  now  conclude  as  to  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  general 
laws? 

What  may  we  conclude  as  to  the  occurrence  of  irregularities  under  them  ? 

Why  may  the  withholding  of  interpositions  be  an  instance  of  goodness 
and  wisdom  rather  than  a  ground  of  complaint? 

What  may  reconcile  us  to  this  view  of  Providence  ? 

General  Objection.  That  arguing  thus  upon  our  Ignorance  is  invalidat- 
ing the  proof  of  Religion  as  well  as  the  objections  against  it. 

How  is  this  objection  plausibly  stated  ? 

1.      Our  ignorance  of  the  Scheme  of  Religion  not  total  but  partial. 


53 

What  is  conceded  as  to  the  eftcct  of  total  ignorance  on  the  proof  of 
anj'thing  ?  « 

What  is  tlie  proof  of  roHgion  here  insisted  upon,  and  wliat  illustration  is 
used  to  show  that  partial  ignorance  has  no  such  bearing  upon  the  proof  of 
religion  as  it  has  ui)on  the  objections  against  it? 

2.  Oar  Ignorance  consistent  at  least  witli  the  moral  ohllgations  of  Reli- 
gion. 

Even  if  our  ignorance  could  render  the  proof  of  religion  doubtful,  yet 
what  would  still  remain  ?    and   what  alone  would  be  uncertain  as  to  our 
moral  obligations  ? 
How  would  our  own  consciousness  render  these  obligations  certain  1 
And  how  would  considerations  of  interest  render  them  certain  ? 

3.  Our  Ignorance^  as  previously  defined^  not  as  ajyplicable  to  the  proof 
of  religion  as  to  the  objections  against  it. 

How  has  it  been  shown,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  that  objections 
against  religion  are  delusive  ? 

If  we  were  as  cognizant  of  the  scheme  of  religion  as  we  are  ignorant  of 
it,  how  might  the  things  objected  against  then  appear  1 

And  why,  then,  is  the  argument  from  ignorance  not  applicable  to  the 
peculiar  proof  of  religion  ? 

4.  Our  Ignorance  not  so  much  the  ground  of  this  arguDient  as  our  in- 
competency. 

What  else,  together  with  oui  ignorance,  serves  to  answer  objections 
against  the  system  of  religion  "? 

How  does  analogy  show  us  to  be  incompetent  judges  of  rehgion? 

How  far,  then,  have  we  been  arguing  from  our  experience  as  well  as 
from  our  ignorance  ? 


CONCLUSION  OF  PART    I. 

I.    Inferences  from  the  Previous  Argument. 

1.     That  we  are  involved  in  a  vast,  Progressive,  though  Incomprehensible, 
System  of  Nature  and  Providence. 

What  may  now  be  inferred  as  to  the  present  scene  of  human  life  ? 

What  is  uncertain,  and  what  is  evident,  as  to  our  relations  in  the  uni- 
verse ? 

What  may  be  inferred  as  to  the  character  of  that  system  in  which  we 
find  ourselves? 

•  How  is  it  shown  that  the  system  of  nature  is  as  wonderful  as  that  of 
religion  ?   and,  indeed,  that  the  former  is  wholly  inexplicable  without  the 
latter  ? 

What  is  the  proper  proof,  pre-supposed  in  this  whole  Analogy,   of  an 
Intelligent  Author  and  Moral  Governor  of  the  world  ? 


54 

2.  That  we  are  ourselves  highh/  hdercsted  in  the  development  of  this  Di- 
vine System  of  the  Universe. 

Whether  this  Divine  System  be  moral  or  not,  what  is  certain  respecting 
it  and  our  relations  to  it  ? 

How  do  irrational  animals  act  their  part  in  this  system  ? 

But  to  rational  creatures,  what  reflections  would  seem  unavoidable  res- 
pecting it  and  their  relations  and  interest  in  it? 

II.  Summary  of  the  Previous  Argument. 

What  are  the  proofs,  before  given,  of  our  future  life  and  intere^st? 

What  are  the  proofs,  before  given,  of  our  interest  in  both  the  natural 
and  moral  government  of  God? 

What  are  the  proofs,  before  given,  of  our  future  interest  being  de 
pendent  upon  our  present  conduct  ? 

What  are  the  proofs,  before  given,  that  our  present  state  is  intended  to 
qualify  us  for  the  future  state  ? 

What  two  classes  of  objections  have  been  refuted  ?  and  in  what  way? 

III.  Application  of  the  Previous  Argument. 

1.  The  Credibility  of  Religion  sufficient  to  .induce  Earnest  Considera- 
tion. 

What  is  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  previous  arguments,  and  what  efi'ect 
should  they  have  upon  men  of  common  sense  1 

How  does  immoral  thoughtlessness  appear,  in  view  of  them  ? 

2.  The  Credibility  of  Religion  sufficient  to  induce  a  Life  of  Virtue  and 
Piety. 

How  should  they  induce  men  to  live  ?  under  what  apprehension  ?  ^ 

What  prudential  considerations  will  counterbalance  any  doubt  as  to  the 
future  judgment  ? 

(1.)     No  Reason  for  Irreligion  in  the  Passions. 

In  the  view  of  reason,  hQw  are  the  passions  to  be  regarded  ?  and  how 
are  cool  expectations  of  vicious  pleasure  to  be  estimated  ? 

(2. )     No  Excuse  for  Irreligion  in  the  Passions. 

How  is  it  shown  that  the  government  of  the  passions  enters  into  natural 
prudence  as  well  as  into  religion  ? 

In  distinction  from  the  mere  passions,  what  are  the  proper  motives  of 
religion  afforded  by  its  proofs  from  reason  as  confirmed  by  revelation  ? 


THE  PRESUMPTIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF  RE- 
VEALED RELIGION. 


PART  11.      CHAP.    I. 


1.    '  ReveaUd  Religion  not  whoJhj  ITiiimportant 

On  what  pretence  do  some  persons  reject  all  revelation  ? 

Would  this  be  adequate  ground,  if  tenable  ? 

(1.)     The  Insiifficienci/ of  Heathenism. 

How  is  it  disproved  by  the  state  of  the  world  before,  and  without,  the 

christian  revelation  ?  u  ^'    *t.,* 

What  is  the  condition  by  nature  of  the  greatest  men,  and  what  is  that 

of  the  mass  of  mankind  ? 

(2.)     The  Insufficiency  of  Deism. 

What  is  doubtful,  and  what  is  certain,  as  to  the  ability  and  disposition 
of  men  to  reason  out  a  system  of  natural  relfgon  ?  _ 

Were  such  a  system  attainable,  what  supernatural  admonition  and  in- 
struction would  still  be  needed  ? 

On  the  best  view  of  our  condition,  why  would  a  revelation  still  be  tar 
from  superfluous  ? 

2      Revealed  Religion  of  no  small  importance. 

On  what  pretence  do  certain  other  persons  neglect  revelation  . 

How  do  such  persons  regard  its  evidence  or  truth  1    and  what  do  they 

say  must  be  its  design  ?  ,  ,       w    nu  •  ^     •*   9 

.   How  are  natural  piety  and  virtue,  in  their  view,  related  to  Christianity  i 

(1)     Its  Miwrtance  worth  considering. 

How  far  is  the  view  of  those  who  reject,  and  those  who  neglect,  revela- 
tion :distinguishable  ?  And  why  should  it  be  considered  with  reference  to 
both  classes  ? 


56 

What  renders  an  iiKjuiry  into  the  importance  of  Christianity  proper  at 
this  point  ? 

( 2. )     Its  Importance  cleaiiy  presmnaUe. 

On  the  very  supposition  of  such  a  revelation  as  that  of  Christianity, 
what  is  evident  at  first  sight  ? 

On  what  grounds  alone  could  v/e  hold  it  to  be  unimportant? 

Why  cannot  we  take  such  grounds  ? 

1.  Kevealed  Religion  important  as  a  Confirmation  of  Nat- 
ural Religion. 

What  is  the  'first  of  the  two  i)articulars  in  which  Christianity  is  to  be 
held  important? 

How  is  natural  religion  related  to  Christianity  ? 

(/. )     Christianity  a  repuhlication  of  JSlatural  Religion. 

In  what  articles  of  natural  religion  does  Christianity  instruct  mankind  ? 

( 1. )     Natural  Religion  purified  hy  Revelation. 

How  does  it  appear  that  Christianity  teaches  natural  religion  in  its  gen- 
uine simplicity  ? 

(2. )     Natural  Religion  authenticated  hy  Revelation. 

What  renders  Christianity  an  authoritative  publication  of  natural  reli- 
gion? 

What  part  of  revealed  religion  were  miracles  and  prophecy  designed  to 
prove  ? 

But  what  part  of  natural  religion  may  they  also  prove  ?  and  why  do 
they  prove  it? 

How  far  is  natural  religion  thus  proved  by  Scripture  ? 

Ohjection.  That  any  supernatural  evidence  for  a  natural  religion  is 
(juestionable. 

How  are  such  objections  to  be  estimated  practically  ? 

How  is  the  value  of  such  miraculous  evidence  to  those  totally  ignorant 
of  natural  religion  illustrated  ? 

How,  then,  do  the  law  of  Moses  and  the  gospel  of  Christ  serve  as  au- 
thoritative publications  of  natural  religion  ? 

How  is  the  value  of  miraculous  evidence  to  one  thoroughly  versed  in 
natural  religion  illustrated  ? 

(3.)     Natural  Religion  elucidated  hy  Revelation. 

What  doctrines  of  natural  religion  are  eminently  brought  to  light  by  the 
gospel  ? 

(77.)     Christianity  an  External  Institution  of  Natural  Religion. 

How  did  Christianity  at  first  serve  to  purify,  authenticate,  and  elucidate 
natural  religion,  and  how  was  it  intended  to  serve  the  same  purposes  in 
after  ages  ? 

How  is  the  visible  church  distinguishable  from  other  societies? 


57 

(1.)     Natural  Religion  perpetuated  hi  the  Visible  Church. 

What  purpose  does  the  visible  clmrch  now  serve  in  distinction  from  tliat 
of  tlie  first  preachers  of  Cliristianity  ? 

What  would  have  become  of  Christianity,  but  for  the  institution  of  the 
visible  church,  and  how  did  it  prevent  such  a  result? 

How  does  this  view  of  Christianity  show  its  iniportaiice  to  natural  reli- 
gion ? 

(2.)     Natural  Religion  cultivated  by  the  Visible  Church. 

How  does  tlie  visible  church,  as  an  educational  institution,   i)roniote 
natural  religion  ? 

In  what  does  the  visibility  of  the  church  consist,  and  how  docs  it  appear 
that  positive  institutions  are  important? 

By  what  comparison  may  these  advantages  of  Christianity  to  natural  re- 
ligion be  made  obvious  to  any  that  are  slow  in  apprehending  them  ? 

Objection.     That  Christianity  has  been  perverted,  or  had  but  little  good 
influence. 

{ 1 . )     The  objection  not  properly  founded  on  fact. 

How  are  the  good  effects  of  Christianity,  and  its  supposed  ill  effects,  to 
be  properly  estimated  ? 

How  may  the  alleged  evils  be  palliated  ? 

What,  however,  must  be  conceded  and  what  maintained  as  to  the  cor- 
ruptions and  abuses  of  it  ? 

(2.)     Tlie  Objection  inconclusive  upon  any  but  atheistical  principles. 

Why  do  such  objections  lead  to  downright  atheism  ? 

On  what  principle  must  the  theist,  as  well  as  the  Christian,  proceed  in 
judging  of  any  dispensation  of  Providence  ? 

How  is  it  expressed  in  Scripture  language  ? 

How  is  it  confirmed  by  the  light  of  reason  and  by  experience  ? 

(///.)      Christianity  a  moral  enforcement  of  Natural  Religion. 

What  express  command  is  laid  upon  all  Christians  ? 

Why  is  the  command  obligatory  upon  them,  and  in  what  ways  may  it  be 
performed  ? 

How  does  this  show  the  great  practical  importance  of  Christianity  to 
natural  religion  ? 

II.    Revealed  Religion  important  as  the  complement  of  Nat 
URAL  Religion.; 

How  is  Christianity  to  be  considered  in  distinction  from  natural  religion  ? 

(/.)     Christianity  a  Revelation  of  New  Doctrines. 

What  doctrines  besides  those  of  natural  religion  has  Christianity  re- 
vealed ? 

(//.)     Christianity  a  Revelation  of  New  Duties. 

What  consequent  duties,  otherwise  unknown,  are  also  revealed  ? 

How  may  the  importance  of  these  revealed  duties  be  seen  ? 


58 

How  is  the  relation  of  God  the  Father  to  us  ascertained,  and  how  arc 
the  relations  of  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  ascertained? 

^Y\mt  are  the  relations  respectively  sustained  by  the  three  Sacred  Per- 
sons, and  why  are  duties  to  the  Son  and  Spirit  as  unquestionable  as  duties 
to  the  Father? 

1.      The  Classification  of  Rccealcd  Duties. 

(1.)     Internal  Duties. 

Under  what  two  aspects  is  true  religion  to  be  considered  ?  and  what  is 
it  according  to  the  first  of  these  notions? 

Under  the  first  view,  in  what  does  the  essence  of  natural  religion  consist, 
and  in  what  consists  the  essence  of  revealed  religion,  as  distinguished  from 
natural  ' 

Why  is  it  not  material  to  the  obligation  of  those  respective  classes  of 
duties  that  the  one  is  made  known  by  reason  and  the  other  by  revelation? 

What  are  the  revealed  ofiices  of  the  Son  and  Spirit,  and  how  do  our 
consequent  duties  immediately  arise  to  the  mind  of  reason? 

What  are  some  of  the  revealed  internal  duties  thus  due  to  the  Son  and 
Holy  Spirit  ? 

(2. )     External  Duties. 

How  do  we  determine  the  external  manner  in  which  this  internal  wor- 
ship of  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  is  to  be  expressed  ? 

But  how  far  is  the  internal  worship  itself  to  be  so  determined  ? 

Why  is  there  this  difference  between  the  internal  and  the  external  du- 
ties ? 

How  far  is  this  shown  in  the  history  of  the  gospel  itself? 

1.      The  Moral  Lnjyortance  of  Revealed  Duties. 

What  is  now  to  be  inferred  as  to  the  importance  of  Christianity,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  natural  religion  ? 

How  does  it  appear  that  the  obligation  of  Christian  duties  is  as  plainly 
moral  as  charity  to  mankind  ? 

What  is  overlooked  by  deists  in  their  estimate  of  the  obligations  of  Chris- 
tianity ? 

Why  may  it  be  as  perilous  to  neglect  revealed  or  Christian  duties  as 
any  natural  duties  made  known  by  reason  ? 

How  far  is  ignorance  an  excuse  for  neglecting  either  ? 

(1.)     The  Moral  Importance  of  Duties  to  Christ. 

What  high  relations  are  revealed  between  Christ  and  us  ? 

What  peculiar  consequences  may  follow  the  neglect  of  these  relations, 
and  why  is  it  as  important  to  regard  them  as  any  other  relations  ? 

(2.)     The  Moral  Importance  of  Duties  to  the  Holy  Ghost. 

What  is  the  revealed  dfiice  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  what  text  expresses 
our  need  of  it  ? 


59 

How  does  all  analog.y  show  tlic  importance  of  uslnc^  the  proper  means 
to  obtain  His  assistance  ? 

How  is  this  importance  enhanced  bj-  their  revelation  ? 

Conclusion.  Revealed  Religion^  therefore^  presumptively  of  the  ven/ 
Itujhest  imjyortance. 

On  supposition  that  Christianity  is  either  true  or  credible,  what  would 
it  argue  in  us  to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter  ? 

On  what  supposition  alone  could  it  be  justly  esteemed  of  little  conse- 
quence ? 

On  supposition  of  its  credibility,  what  obligations  rests  upon  us  ?  and 
what  is  the  degree  of  this  obligation  1 

And  on  supposition  of  its  truth,  what  obligation  rests  upon  us? 

1st  Deduction.    REVEALED  Precepts  31  oral  as  well  as  Positive. 

"What  is  the  design  of  here  adding  two  deductions  ? 

1.  DeJi)dtion  of  both  classes  of  Precepts. 

How  are  moral  and  positive  precepts  distinguishable  in  the  view  of 
reason  ? 

How  are  they  distinguishable  in  the  view  of  revelation,  or  as  related  to 
external  command  ? 

[Note.     How  far  does  this  distinction  hold  ? 

When  may  positive  precepts  be  also  moral,  and  how  are  they  then  dis- 
tinguishable ?] 

Why  doth  not  mere  revelation  itself  denominate  any  duty,  whether 
positive  or  moral  ? 

2.  Examples  of  both  from  Revelation. 

What  example  is  given  of  a  positive  duty  which  is  partly  rational  and 
partly  revealed  ? 

What  example  is  given  of  a  moral  duty  which  is  partly  revealed  and 
partly  rational  1 

And  how  may  positive  institutions  be  classified  ? 

2d  Deduction.    REVEALED  Precepts  more  Moral  than  Positive. 

What  do  the  Scriptures  teach  concerning  moral  as  compared  with  posi- 
tive precepts  ? 

1.  Moral  and  Positive  Precepts  to  be  cantioiishj  compared. 

Why  do  positive  precepts  themselves  in  general  have  a  moral  element, 
and  what  example  is  given  ? 

How  far,  then,  should  the  two  classes  of  duties  be  compared,  and  why 
is  this  caution  needed  ? 

2.  Moral  PrecejDts  to  be  preferred  to  Positive  Precepts. 

What  case  is  supposed  in  order  to  test  their  comparative  importance  ? 

(1.)     Logical  Grounds  of  this  Preference. 

What  is  the  first  reason  given  for  this  preference  ? 


60 

What  reason  for  it  is  aiforded  by  the  design  of  positive  institutions  ? 

And  what  reason,  by  the  nature  of  religious  obedience  ? 

Is  this  reasoning  practical  as  well  as  logical  ? 

(2.)     Practical  Grounds  of  this  Preference. 

[a. )     III  the  constitution  of  our  moral  nature. 

In  what  respect  are  moral  and  positive  precepts  on  a  level  ?  and  how 
does  this  appear  ? 

But  how  has  the  Author  of  our  nature  so  constituted  us  as  to  prefer  the 
former  ? ! 

[h. )     In  the  nature  of  the  thing. 

How  have  mankind  been  prone  to  estimate  positive  rites  in  comparison 
wirli  moral  precepts  ? 

But  without  any  comparison  between  them,  what  does  the  nature  of  the 
thing  abundantly  show  ? 

(3.)     Scriptural  Grounds  of  this  Preference. 

Is  it  absolutely  necessary  to  determine  this  question  ? 

And  what  are  our  means  of  determining  it  ? 

[a.)     In  the  general  tenor  of  Scripture. 

What  is  the  tenor  of  Scripture  respecting  it  ? 

(6.)     In  particular  declarations  of  Scripture. 

When  positive  and  moral  precepts  are  mentioned  together,  how  does 
Scripture  treat  the  former? 

In  case  the  two  interfere,  what  is  thus  intimated  respecting  the  former 
and  the  latter  ? 

(c.)     In  the  express  teaching  of  our  Lord. 

What  considerations  make  our  Lord's  teaching  upon  this  question  espe- 
cially needful  and  decisive  ? 

In  what  two  instances  did  He  compare  positive  and  moral  precepts  and 
expressly  determine  which  is  to  have  the  preference  ? 

[a. )     As  delivered  in  the  form  of  a  proverb  of  general  application. 

In  what  proverbial  expression  was  this  determination  delivered  ? 

What  was  the  effect  of  this  manner  of  speaking  upon  the  decision  ? 

Had  the  decision  been  applied  only  to  the  single  instance  of  Sabbath  ob- 
servance, what  might  still  have  been  argued? 

As  run  up  into  a  proverb,  however,  what  is  its  applicability? 

Why  is  justice,  also,  as  well  as  mercy,  to  be  preferred  to  positive  insti- 
tutions ? 

[h.)     As  enforced  hy  its  quotation  from  the  Old  Testament. 

How  it  it  argued  that  the  original  text,  as  quoted  and  applied  by  our 
Lord,  inculcated  the  preference  of  moral  to  positive  precepts  ? 

If  this  be  not  granted,  how  else  may  we  certainly  learn  it  ? 

3.     Positive  Precepts,  however,  remain  obligatory. 


61 

What  weakness  of  human  nature  arises  on  comparison  of  two  things  of 
unequal  importance  ?  and  what,  therefore,  would  it  argue  in  us  to  make 
light  of  even  positive  inistitutions  ? 

What  general  and  particular  grounds  of  their  obligation  are  given  ? 

General  Caution.    Kevealed  Religion  not  to  be  prejudged  from 

THE  GROUNDS   OF   NATURAL  KeLIGION. 

What  may  now  be  inferred  as  to  the  duty  of  reason  towards  revelation  ? 

In  our  human  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures,  what  may  be  conceded 
to  natural  religion  ? 

But  what  must  still  be  maintained  as  to  any  doctrine  or  precept  of  re- 
vealed religion  ? 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF   A  MIRACULOUS 
REVELATION. 

(part  II.     CHAP.   II.) 

After  the  positive  argument  before  given,  what  two  classes  of  objections 
are  next  to  be  considered  ?  And  what  reason  is  given  for  observing  this 
order? 

What  presumption  is  commonly  supposed  to  lay  against  the  Christian 
miracles  as  compared  with  other  events  ? 

How  is  this  presumption  to  be  estimated,  and  why  should  it  here  be 
considered  ? 

I.  No  Rational  Presumptions  against  a  Revealed  Religion. 

What  is  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity? 

How  is  the  question,  whether  such  a  system  is  miraculous  or  not,  to  be 
regarded  ? 

In  this  view,  on  what  two  grounds  alone  could  the  analogy  of  nature 
raise  any  presumption  against  it  ? 

{!.)     No  Presumption  agaitist  it  as  Undiscoverahle. 

What  two  faculties  are  named  as  means  of  discovery  ? 

(1.)     The  Natural  System  hut  partially  discovered. 

What  case  is  supposed  to  show  the  limitation  of  reason  and  experience  ? 

How  would  such  a  person  be  likely  to  estimate  his  ignorance  and  need 
of  a  revelation  ? 

(2.)     The  Natural  System  notfidly  discoverable. 

What  is  evident  as  to  the  actual  extent  of  the  scheme  of  nature  ? 

And  what  is  probable  as  to  the  comparative  extent  of  that  part  of  it 
which  is  open  to  our  view  ? 


63 

How  does  this  reasoning  refute  tlie  alleged  presumption  against  the 
truth  and  reaHty  of  the  revealed  system'? 

(//.)     Ko  Presumption  against  it  as  Unanalogovs. 

What  is  the  second  of  the  two  presumi>tions  to  be  considered? 

(1.)     A  Recealed  iSi/sfem  might  he  ivhoJhj  Unanalogous. 

Why  cannot  we  presume  that  things  revealable  must  be  like  things 
known. 

(2.)     The  Natural  System  itself  contains  things  Unanalogous. 

Why  ought  w^e  not  to  wonder  at  any  unlikeness  between  things  visible 
and  invisible  ? 

(3. )     The  Revealed  System  will  he  found  suj/lciently  Analogous. 

What  v/ill  appear  on  comparison  of  the  Scheme  of  Christianity  with  the 
Scheme  of  Nature  ? 

II.     No  Rational  Presumptions  against  a  Miraculous  Revela- 
tion OF  Religion. 

What  is  the  notion  of  a  miracle,  as  stated  by  divines? 

What  other,  and  different,  class  of  miracles  is  mentioned  ? 

Is  a  revealed  system,  like  Christianity,  necessarily  miraculous  ? 

But  how  is  revelation  itself  to  be  regarded  ? 

(/.)     iVo  Presumption  against  a  Primitive  Revelation.,  prior  to  the  pres- 
ent order  of  nature. 

What  is  the  first  of  the  two  presumptions  wdiich  may  be  brought  against 
a  miraculous  revelation  ? 

(1.)     A  Revelation  at  Creation  not  strictly  Miraculous, 

What  is  implied  in  the  very  notion  of  a  miracle  relative  to  a  course  of 
nature  ? 

Why,  then,  could  there  have  been  no  miracle  at  the  beginning  of  the 
world  ?  or,  at  least,  why  cannot  we  tell  if  there  could  have  been  one  ? 

What  follows  as  to  the  nature  of  the  question  of  a  primitive  revelation  • 

And  how  does  it  compare  with  the  other  facts  of  antiquity  ?     What  ex- 
ample is  given  ? 

(2.)     A  Revelation  at  Creation  no  more  incredihle  than  Creation  itself. 

What  was  the  power  exerted  in  creation  as  related  to  the  present  course 
of  nature? 

If  we  suppose  that  power  was  exerted  still  further  in  giving  a  revelation, 
what  will  be  the  nature  of  the  question  ? 

If  we  suppose  that  power  to  have  been   miraculous,  why  will  not  the 
question  be  any  different  ? 

How  is  this  illustrated  by  the  miraculous  power  of  our  Saviour  ? 

(3.)     A  Revelation  at  Creation  a  fully  attested  fact. 

What  evidence  of  a  primitive  revelation  is  afforded  by  tradition  and 
history  ? 

What  evidence  of  it  is  afforded  by  the  first  ages  ? 


64 

Is  tins  evidence  sufficient,  without  that  of  the  Scriptures  ? 

How  does  it  bear  upon  the  question  of  a  subsequent  revelation? 

(77.)  No  Prcsiuni^tion  against  a  Subsequent  Revelation^  interrupting 
the  joresent  order  of  nature. 

What  presumption  remains  to  be  considered  ? 

General  Proof.     A  Revelation  since  Creation  not  Impossible. 

What  is  needed,  before  we  can  even  argue  the  question  of  a  revelation 
miraculously  introduced  into  our  world  ? 

What  alone  would  be  a  i)arallel  case  from  which  to  reason  ? 

What  would  be  the  value  of  the  presumptive  proof  aiforded  by  one  such 
case? 

Particular  Proof.     A  Revelation  since  Creation  not  Incredible. 

( 1 . )      Ordinary  facts  before  jyroof  are  only  less  incrediblt  than  miracles. 

How  is  the  presumption  against  common  truths  or  facts  overcome? 

What  is  the  degree  of  the  presumption  against  the  story  of  Caesar  or  of 
any  other  man  ? 

What  supposition  is  made  to  show  that  unproved  common  facts  are  al- 
most as  readily  doubted  as  miracles  ? 

What  is  the  only  material  question  as  to  the  matter  before  us  ? 

(2.)  TJiere  might  be  natural  reasons  for  miracles  ivhich  do  not  exist  for 
ordinary  facts. 

Apart  from  religion,  how  far  are  we  acquainted  with  the  causes  or  rea- 
sons of  the  present  course  of  nature  ? 

What  is  supposable  in  regard  to  it  during  the  lapse  of  six  thousand 
years  ? 

Prior  to  evidence,  which  would  he  the  more  credible,  such  needed  mira- 
cles or  mere  ordinary  facts  ? 

(3. )  There  certainly  are  moral  or  religious  reasons  for  miracles  ivhich  do 
not  exist  for  ordinal^  facts. 

What  particular  reasons  for  miracles  are  afforded  by  the  moral  or  reli- 
gious system  of  the  world  ? 

How  does  this  render  the  supposition  of  miraculous  interpositions  cred- 
ible? 

(4. )  Some  natural  facts,  before  proof  are  really  more  incredihle  than 
any  miracles. 

With  what  class  of  natural  phenomena  ought  miracles  to  be  compared, 
and  what  examples  are  given  ? 

How  could  we  determine  that  miracles  are  no  more  incredible  than  the 
marvels  of  magnetism  or  electricity  ? 

What  are  the  three  conclusions  as  to  the  credibility  of  miracles,  from 
the  foregoing  argument  ? 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  PARADOXICAL 
REVELATION. 

(PART  II.     CHAP.   III.) 

What  two  classes  oi' objections  are  brought  against  Christianity? 

What  examples  are  given  of  objections  against  its  substance  or  system  1 

What  particular  objections  are  brought  against  the  style  of  the  Scrip- 
tures ? 

Why  are  the  prophetical  Scriptures  especially  so  scornfully  treated  ? 

What  is  the  general  sweeping  answer  to  all  such  objections,  and  how 
are  they  to  be  estimated  comparatively  ? 

Preliminaiiy  Cautions. 

1.  Recisoii  not  to  he  villi  fled. 

Why  should  we  be  cautious  how  we  villify  reason  ? 
How  can  a  supposed  revelation  be  proved  false  by  a  reason  ? 
Might  anything  else  than  the  two  things  specified  prove  it  false  ? 
Allowing  this  province  of  reason,  what  is  still  to  be  maintained? 

2.  Reason  herself  not  to  villify. 

What  two  reasons  are  given  why  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  cavil  at 
the  proposed  argument  on  account  of  any  unacceptable  consequences  ? 

I.  The  Incompetency  of  Heason  to  Prejudge  a  Eevealed 
Keligion. 

What  is  the  scheme  ol' nature,  and  how  is  it  made  known  to  us? 

What  is  the  corresponding  scheme  of  Providence,  and  how  is  it  made 
known  to  us? 

What  5ire  tlie  points  of  resemblance  between  the  two  schemes,  and  what 
is  the  analogical  argument  to  be  drawn  from  them  ? 

1.  An  A\Priori  Philosophy  of  Religion  as  impossible  as  an  A  Priori 
Philosophy  of  Nature. 


66 

What  is  the  experienced  course  of  nature  as  compared  with  what  might 
have  been  expected,  before  experience  ? 

And  what  may  thence  be  inferred  as  to  the  revealed  dispensation  ? 

Whj'  is  it  supposable  beforehand  that  in  our  preconceptions  of  it  we 
shouhi  fall  into  infinite  follies  and  mistakes  ? 

Is  there  any  ground  to  expect  that  it  should  appear  to  us  clear  of  ob- 
jections ? 

2.  An  A  Priori  Philosophy  of  Revelation  as  impossible  as  an  A  Priori 
Philosophy  of  Science. 

How  is  it  to  be  shown  that  this  incompetency  of  reason  to  prejudge 
Christianity  in  general  extends  to  inspiration  or  revelation  in  particular  ? 

In  what  several  respects  are  we  incompetent  to  prejudge  anything  re- 
specting natural  knowledge  ? 

( 1 . )     As  to  the  Amount  of  Knowledge  given. 

Why  could  we  not  tell  beforehand  anything  as  to  the  amount  of  revealed 
knowledge  1 

(2.)     As  to  its  Transmission  to  Posterity. 

Why  cannot  we  prejudge  anything  as  to  the  qualifications  of  the  sacred 
writers  ? 

(3. )     As  to  the  Extent  of  its  Evidence. 

Why  cannot  we  tell  whether  its  evidence  would  be  certain  or  doubtful, 
universal  or  local  ? 

(4. )     As  to  its  Historic  Development. 

Why  could  we  not  tell  whether  it  would  be  unfolded  at  once  or  grad- 
ually ? 

But  could  not  we  tell  whether  it  should  be  WTitten  or  oral,  kept  pure 
from  age  to  age,  or  for  a  time  corrupted  ? 

Objection.  That  we  are  at  least  competent  to  judge  of  the  fitness  of  a 
revelation  to  its  own  purpose. 

On  which  of  these  points,  especially,  do  we  seem  competent  to  prejudge 
a  revelation  ? 

Would  a  different  revelation  from  the  present  necessarily  have  been  a 
failure  ? 

Why  could  we  not  determine  beforehand  anything  as  to  the  divine  pur- 
poses of  a  revelation  ? 

Why,  then,  are  all  a  priori  objections  against  a  revelation  frivolous  ? 

1st  Inference.     The  Paramount  Authority  of  a  Real  Revelation. 

What  is,  and  what  is  not,  the  question  to  be  decided  concerning  Chris- 
tianity, and  concerning  the  Scriptures  ? 

In  what  case  alone  would  obscurity,  ambiguity,  or  diverse  interpreta- 
tions of  the  Scriptures  be  valid  objections  against  them  ? 

What  are  the  only  valid  objections  which  could  be  brought  against 
them? 


While  any  proof  of  miracles  and  proi)liecies  remains  can  tlieir  i)ractical 
authority  be  overthrown  ? 

2d  Inference,     The  Paramount  Authority  of  the  Language  of  Scripture. 

What  follows,  also,  as  to  the  Scriptures  as  compared  with  other  writ- 
ings ? 

Why  cannot  we  argue  that  the  language  is  obscure  or  figurative,  be- 
cause difficult  of  comprehension  ? 

What  is  the  reason  of  this  diiference  ? 

And  what  is  the  only  proper  question  as  to  the  language  of  Scripture  ? 

Ohjection.     That  Internal  Improbabilities  weaken  External  Proof 

How  is  this  objection  shown  to  be  impractical  and  founded  on  our  igno- 
rance ? 

II.  The  Liability  of  a  Revealed  Religion  to  Objections 
FROM  Reason.  • 

What  has  become  self  evident  in  respect  to  all  a  jrriori  objections  from 
reason  ? 

Yet  what  does  analogy  teach  in  respect  to  revelation,  however  really  un- 
exceptionable it  may  be  ? 

L     Natural  Knowledge  as  Paradoxical  as  Re:vealed  Knowledge. 

Prior  to  experience,  in  what  respects  would  men  probably  object  to 
natural  knowledge  ? 

( L )     As  to  its  Disproportions. 

How  is  it  illustrated  by  our  astronomical  as  compared  with  our  medical 
knowledge  ? 

(2.)     As  to  the  Faculty  of  its  Acquisition. 

How  is  it  illustrated  by  the  faculty  of  invention  ? 

(3.)     As  to  the  Method  of  its  Communication. 

How  is  it  shown  by  the  imperfections  of  language  ? 

(4.)     As  to  its  Certitude. 

How  is  it  shown  by  the  comparative  sagacity  of  men  and  brutes? 

What  is  to  be  inferred  as  to  revealed  knowledge  ? 

Are  the  objections  against  it  at  all  greater  than  might  have  been  ex- 
pected ? 

Example.  Natural  Endowments  as  Paradoxical  as  Supernatural  En- 
dowments. 

What  is  the  general  objection  brought  against  the  manner  in  which  the 
miraculous  gifts  of  the  apostolic  age  were  exercised,  and  by  what  supposed 
analogy  is  it  to  be  refuted  ? 

What  are  the  more  particular  objections  brought  against  the  miraculous 
endowments  themselves  ? 

How  are  such  objections  refuted  by  the  incompetency  of  reason,  by  the 
ordinary  conferments  of  Providence,  and  by  the  analogy  of  our  natural 
education  ? 


G8 

2.     Scietitijic  Kaoidc(hje  aud  Theological  Knowledge  Analogous. 

What  is  practical  Christianity  as  distinguished  from  theology,  and  to 
what  is  it  likened  ? 

(1.)     ^4.?  to  thr/'r  Processes. 

What  is  required  in  the  study  of  the  doctrinal  and  prophetical  Scrip- 
tures as  well  as  in  natural  an  1  civil  science  ? 

(2. )     As  to  their  Hinderances. 

What  is  said  of  the  hinderances  of  both  kinds  of  knowledge  ? 

(3. )     As  to  their  Imperfect  Development. 

What  must  be  owned  as  to  our  knowledge  of  the  Scriptures  1 

How  might  it  be  instantly  completed  ?  and  when  ? 

(4. )     As  to  their  Means  of  Increase- 

What  are  the  means  of  increase  for  both  ? 

(5.)     As  to  their  Prospect  of  Increase* 

Why  is  it  not  incredible  that  our  knowledge  of  the  Scriptures  should  be 
so  limited  ? 

How  may  it  have  been  intended  that  new  light  should  be  shed  upon  the 
Scriptures  ? 

\st  Objection.     That  Science  is  of  little  Consequence. 

(1.)     The  Objection  Irrelevant. 

What  is  the  exact  point  of  the  analogy  ? 

In  what  respect  must  natural  knowledge  be  admitted  to  be  important? 

(2.)     The  Objection  refuted  by  the  Analogy  of  Providential  Gifts. 

If  the  analogy  fails  on  this  point,  how  can  it  be  supplied? 

2c?  Objection.  That  Revelation,  as  a  great  Spiritual  Eemedy,  is  largely 
a  failure. 

In  what  respects  does  Christianity,  as  a  spiritual  remedy,  seem  objec- 
tionable ? 

(1.)     The  Objection  refuted  by  the  analogy  of  Natural  RemedieJi. 

How  ps  it  shown  that  natural  remedies  are  neither  universal  in  their 
prevalence,  nor  perfect  in  their  nature,  nor  certain  in  their  application? 

(2.)     The  Objection  reducible  to  an  Absurdity. 

To  what  absurdity  would  the  objection  lead  ? 

And  how  does  our  experience  expose  this  absurdity  ? 

III.  The  True  Province  of  Reason  in  judging  of  a  Revela- 
tion. 

Why  cannot  we  then  infer  that  reason  is  in  no  respect  to  judge  of  a 
revelation  ? 

1.  Reason  a  Proper  Critic  of  its  Meaning. 
Should  reason  judge  of  its  meaning  ? 

Of  what  else  can,  and  should  it  judge  ? 

2.  Reason  a  Proper  Critic  of  its  Morality. 

What  is,  and  what  is  not,  meant  by  judging  of  the  morality  of  Scripture  ? 


(39 

On  wluit  iiToiiiid   may  the   i^encral   molality   ui'  Scrii)turc  be  vinclicatcd 
against  objections? 

Kcccptiou.     The  Su[)posed  Immorality  of  some  Particular  Precei^ts. 

What  precepts  in  Scripture  seem  to  be  of  this  nature  'i 

(1.)     Such  Precepts  not  Contran/  to  Immutahle  Morality. 

How  do  such  precepts  affect  the  nature  of  the  action  ? 

In  what  case  would  this  be  otherwise  ? 

How  is  this  illustrated  ? 

(2.)     Such  Precepts  too  exceptioual  to  he  of  an  Immoral  Tcjulenci/.  | 

What  would  be  the  effect  of  a  course  of  apparently  imujoral  acts  with 
out  such  precepts,  and  why  do  not  such  precepts  have  this  effect  ? 

(3.)     Such  Precepts  Dijjicult  only  to  the  Weak  or  Wicked. 

What  is  the  only  difficulty  in  tlieni  ? 

Wliy  are  objections  on  this  ground  not  tenable[? 

3.     Reason  a   Proper  Critic  of  its  Evidence. 

How  far  is  reason  a  proper  judge  of  the  evidence  of  revealed  religion? 

1st  Conolusion.     Ree'ison,  therefore,  no   Proper  Critic  of  a  Receah.d 
System  of  Religion  as  distinguished  from  its  Evidence. 

What  is  the  question  upon  which  the  truth  of  Christianity  de])ends  ? 

How  are  objections  against  its  system,  as  distinguished  from  objections 
against  its  evidence,  to  be  estimated  ?  and  why  ? 

(1.)     Rationalistic    Criticism,   when  applied   to    the  natural  system,   is 
found  inconclusive. 

How  does  this  way  of  objecting  appear  when  applied  to  the  constitution 
of  nature  ? 

Into  what  misleading  princii)les  and  suppositions  is  it  resolvable  ? 

(2.)     Ratiomdistic   Criticism,    when  ajJplied  to  the   Christian   System, 
will  he  found  inconclusive. 

How  will  this  way  of  objecting  appear  when  ap])lied  to  the  Christian 
System,  in  detail  ?  and  by  what  means  will  it  be  refuted  ? 

2d  Conclusion.     Reason,   however,   a,   Proper    Critic  of  the  Intermd 
Evidence  aj^'orded  hy  a  Revealed  System  of  Religion. 

How  might  a  supposed  revelation  contain  within  itself  presum])tive  evi- 
dence of  its  truth  ? 

And  why  are  we  competent  judges  of  such  evidence  ? 


THE    PROBABLE    WISDOM   AND   GOODNESS 
OF  A  REVEALED  SYSTEM  OF  RELIGION. 

(part  It.     CHAP.   lY.) 

What  has  been  shown  as  to  all  ax>i'iori  objections  to  revelation? 

Why,  however,  may  it  be  paid  that  this  is  but  a  partial  or  unsatisfactory 
answer  to  them  ? 

How  is  it  proposed  to  meet  all  objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice, 
and  .iroodness  of  the  Christian  System  ? 

What  are  the  three  heads  of  the  analogical  argument  for  the  perfection 
of  the  Christiam  Sj'^stem  ? 

T.     The  Revealed  System,  like  the  Natural,  is  IncomprehEx\sible. 

How  is  the  general  moral  government  of  God  exercised,  and  to  what 
ends  ? 

How  is  Christianity  related  to  it? 

1.      Christianity  a  System  or  Scheme. 

What  are  the  nature,  object,  and  extent  of  Christianity  V 

What  are  the  parts  of  this  scheme  as  related  to  Christ  ? 

What  are  the  parts  of  it  as  respects  the  Holy  Grhost  ? 

How  is  it  to  be  completed  in  the  final  judgment  ? 

(2.)      The  Christian  Scheme  TncomprehensiUe. 

What  do  the  Scriptures  expressly  assert  respecting  this  scheme  ? 

What  is  the  effect  of  reading  any  passage  relating  to  it  ? 

How  does  the  extent  of  it,  as  far  as  revealed,  compare  with  the  known 
extent  of  nature  ? 

And  what  follows  as  to  all  objections  against  either  the  perfection  of 
Christianity  or  of  Nature  ? 

n.  The  Revealed  System,  like  the  Natural,  is  one  in  which 
Ends  are  accomplished  through  Means. 


How  arc  ends  accoiiiplislied  jiotli  in  Nature  and  in  I'rovidence? 

What  class  of"  olyections  against  either  are  refuted  hj' this  view?  and 
how  does  it  refute  them  ? 

Why  is  the  ap])arent  f'ooli.-hness  of  some  means  no  ])resumption  against 
them  ? 

Ill,  i  UE  Rkvkaled  System,  t.ikk  tud  Natural,  is  one  in  WHirn 
End-!  are  accomplisued  by  Means  of  Laws.  o 

1.  Uiiu'ersalit}/  of  Lair  in  Nature. 

How  is  the  whole  common  course  of  natiu-e  said  to  be  carried  on  ? 

How  far  does  our  actual  knowledge  of  natural  laws  extend? 

What  meteorological  and  geological  })henomena  have  not  .yet  been  re- 
duced to  laws  ? 

What  psychological  and  social  jihenomena  have  not  yet  been  reduced 
to  laws  ? 

How  do  we  show  our  ignorance  of  such  phenomena  in  our  manner  of 
speaking  of  them  ? 

What,  liowever,  do  all  reasonable  men  conclude  respecting  them  ?  and 
on  what  ground  do  they  thus  conclude  ? 

2.  Correspondhig  Universality  of  Law  in  Providence 

On  the  same  ground,  what  may  we  conclude  as  to  God's  miraculous  in- 
terpositions ? 

What  examples  are  instanced?  and  how  is  it  shown  that  our  ignorance 
of  the  laws  regulating  such  cases  is  no  objection  against  the  existence  of 
such  laws  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  unprovided  exigencies  might  arise  under  such  a 
supernatural  system,  and  yet  be  no  objection  to  its  wisdom  and  goodness  ? 

Conchision.  That  the  Scheme  of  Christianity  is  as  Unobjectionable  as 
the  Scheme  of  Nature. 

To  what  is  the  a]ipeai'ance  of  deficiencies  and  irregularities  in  nature 
owing  1 

Is  there  any  more  reason  why  Nature  should  be  a  scheme  than  why 
Christianity  should? 

What  makes  it  credible  that  Christianity  should  be  a  scheme  carried  on 
by  general  laws  ? 

How  does  this  repel  all  objections  to  its  wisdom  and  goodness? 

GENERAL  OBJECTION.  That  in  the  Christian  Scheme,  the 
Enps  are  accomplished  by  tardy  and  intricate  Means. 

What  two  classes  of  general  objections  against  Christianity  have  now 
been  obviated  ? 

How  are  the  particular  objections  to  be  answered  ? 

How  does  the  first  of  them  partake  of  a  general  character? 

What  kind  of  means  does  this  objection  attribute  to  the  Christian 
scheme  ? 


72 

1.  The  Ohjcction  proceeds  from  ignoreince  hi  regard  to  the  whole  subject 
of  Means  and  Ends. 

What  is  certain  in  this  matter,  both  as  to  Nature  and  Christianity? 
What  alone  do  we  know  respecting  it,  and  of  what  are  we  greatl}'  igno- 
rant ? 

What  may  be  the  character  of  all  our  conceptions  of  it?  and  why? 

2.  Tlie  Objection  is  refuted  by  the  whole  Analogy  of  Nature. 

What  kind  of  a  scheme  or  system  is  the  whole  natural  world,  and  what 
kind  of  means  are  used  to  accomplish  its  ends  ? 

What  examples  of  this  are  brought  from  the  material  world  ? 
What  examples  are  brought  from  human  experience  ? 

3.  The  Objection  only  illustrates  the  Infinite  Wisdom  of  the  Author  of 
Nature  and  Christianity. 

Wherein  does  the  Author  of  Nature  appear  to  differ  from  men  in  His 
mode  of  procedure  ? 

How  does  the  plan  of  nature  require  such  a  mode  of  procedure '? 

How  is  it  shown  that  gradation  and  progression  characterize  the  whole 
universe  ^  * 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF  THE  REVEALED  SYS- 
TEM OF  REDEMPTION. 

(part  II.     CHAP.   V.) 

How  is  the  Mediation  of  Christ  commonlj'  viewed  by  objectors  ? 

I.  Thr  Analogy  between  Religious  and   Natural  Mediation. 
What  is  the  eifect  of  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  as  to  the  general  no- 
tion of  a  Mediator  ? 

How  does  this  principle  appear  in  the  birth  and  nurture  of  all  living 
creatures  ? 

How  far  does  it  prevail  in  the  visible  government  of  Grod? 

What  is  supposable,  also,  as  to  its  prevalence  in  the  invisible  govern- 
ment of  God  ? 

How.  then,  does  our  experience  show  that  there  is  no  natural  objection 
to  the  Christian  doctrine  of  a  Mediator  ? 

II.  The  Analogy  between  Religious  and  Natural  Punishment 
AS  to  Mode  of  Sequence. 

What  article  of  natural  religion  is  presupposed  in  the  doctrine  of  the 
world's  redemption  ? 

What  is  necessarily  implied  as  to  future  punishments  under  the  Divine 
government? 

Is  it  supposable  that  we  should  know  precisely  how  or  why  such  punish- 
ments shall  follow  ? 

In  what  way  may  we,  without  absurdity,  suppose  them  to  follow  ?  ac- 
cording to  the  analogy  of  what  exani})les  1 

What  may  lead  to  such  natural  seiiuence  of  future  punishment,  and  how 
is  it  illustrated  ? 


74 

Objection.  That  this  is  taking  the  execution  of  justice  out  of  the  hands 
of  God  and  giving  it  to  Nature. 

Why  are  such  natural  punishments  to 'be  regarded  as  due  to  the  Author 
of  Nature,  and  to  what  are  the.y  ascribed  in  the  Scriptures? 

What  must  be  admitted  in  regard  to  the  sequence  of  future  punishments, 
and  what  is  it  allowable  to  supi)o.se  respecting  it  ior  the  sake  of  illustration  ? 

III.  The  Possibility  of  some  Divine  Prevention  of  Future 
Punishment. 

What  provision  do  we  find  in  Nature  and  Providence  as  to  the  bad  nat- 
ural consequences  of  men's  actions? 

1.  Such  a  Prohahility  favored  hy  the  actual  constitution  of  Nature^ 
(1.)      Goodness  as  well  as  ISeverity  in  Nature. 

How  are  we  apt  to  imagine  the  world  might  have  been  constituted  ? 

What,  however,  is  its  actual  constitution,  and  how  are  both  severity 
and  goodness  displayed  in  it  ? 

How  can  a  former  illustration  be  used  to  show  this  ? 

What  two  means  does  the  general  constitution  cf  the  world  afford  for 
preventing  the  natural  consequences  of  men's  follies? 

(2.)     Comjoassion  as  ivedl  as  Goodness  in  Nature. 

What  different  constitution  of  the  world  may  be  supposed  ?  and  would 
it  have  been  really  evil  or  good  ? 

What,  then,  besides  mere  general  goodness  does  its  actual  constitution 
display  ? 

What  hope  as  to  the  ruinous  consequences  of  vice  does  analogy  warrant? 
and  to  what  extent? 

2.  Such  a  Prohahility,  however,  coidd  not  amount  to  a  Certainty. 
How  will  many  regard  this  question,  and  to  what  is  their  feeling  to  be 

attributed  ? 

(1.)     Evil  Consequences  of  mere  Irregularity. 

How  can  it  be  shown  that  mere  rashness,  neglect,  or  wilfulness  will  be 
attended  with  bad  consequences  ? 

To  what  are  such  consequences  proportioned  ? 

(2.)     Greater  Evil  Consequences  of  Irreligion. 

How  is  it  shown  that  there  is  no  comparison  between  mere  irregularity 
and  irreligion  as  to  their  evil  consequences  ? 

Do  such  consequences  issue  only  in  the  future  world? 

Why,  then,  is  it  by  no  means  intuitively  certain  that  they  could  be  pre- 
vented ? 

What,  however,  would  there  be  large  ground  to  hope? 

IV.  The  Improbability  of  any  Human  Prevention  of  Future 
Punishjient. 

Yet  could  anything  we  might  do  prevent  punishment  ? 
1.     Siich  Human  Prevention  at  least  not  Certain. 


75 

Why  cannot  this  be  thoiiirlit  certain  ? 

Why  cannot  we  know  whether  anytliinsz'  wc  miiilit  do  woiikl  make  it  fit 
to  remit  punishment  ? 

Why  cannot  we  know  whether  nnytliinir  we  niiglitdo  would  be  sufficient 
to  prevent  punishment  ? 

2.  /S'»c/i  Ilinnan  Prevention  contrary  to  the  Analogy  of  Providence. 
How  far  will  analogy  go  in  settling  this  question? 

What  examples  are  given  to  show  that  mere  sorrow  and  reformation 
will  not  prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  misconduct? 

How  does  the  misconduct  of  men  affect  their  natural  abilities  or  their 
need  of  the  assistance  of  others? 

What,  then,  is  the  argument  a  fortiori  iigiimat  the  sufficiency  of  mere 
repentance  or  reformation  to  prevent  future  punishment? 

But  does  misbehavior  in  the  higher  capacity  render  repentance  or  refor- 
mation useless  ? 

3.  Such  Human  Prevention  contrary  to  all  our  notions  of  Government. 
How  ought  we  to  reason  concerning  the  Divine  conduct  ? 

Yet  why  cannot  we  suppose  that  reformation  might  i)revent  judicial 
punishments? 

If  we  suppose  it  could  in  some  cases,  could  we  determine  in  what  cases, 
or  in  what  degree  ? 

By  whom  is  the  efficacy  of  mere  repentance  to  prevent  such  punishment 
insisted  on.  and  what  custom  shows  this  notion  to  be  contrary  to  the  gen- 
eral sense  of  mankind  ? 

What,  then,  must  be  our  general  conclusion  as  the  future  punishment  ? 

Y.  The  Revealed  System  of  Prevention  through  the  3Iedia- 
TioN  OF  Christ. 

In  this  state  of  the  question,  what  recourse  have  we  ? 

1.  Ths  Revealed  System  complrmentary  to  the  Natural  System. 
AYhat  natural  fear  does  revelation  confirm  ? 

How  does  it  confirm  the  teaching  of  nature  as  to  tlie  state  of  the  world, 
and  the  efficacy  of  repentance  ? 

What  just  hope  of  nature  does  it  also  confirm  ? 

How  does  it  complete  the  lessons  of  God  s  experienced  government,  and 
what  merciful  provision  in  His  more  general  goveinment  does  it  disclose? 

2.  This  Revealed  System  Analogous  to  the  Natural  System. 
What  does  Scripture  teach  as  to  the  Love  of  God  for  the  world? 

To  what  in  His  natural  Providence  is  this  analogous?  but  in  what  res 
pect  does  the  analogy  fail?    x 

What  docs  Scripture  teach  as  to  Christ's  love  for  us,  and  to  what  does 
He  himself  compare  it  ? 

Are  such  comparisons  complete? 


76 

What  was  the  real  object  of  Christ's  interposition  as  related  to  the  di- 
vine appointments  or  the  general  laws  of  the  divine  government  ? 

[Note]     This  Revealed  Ibystem.   however,  far  transcends  the  Natural 
System. 
^  What  question  is  left  untouched  by  this  discussion  ? 

What  two  questions  are  cited  from  a  class  of  questions  which  ought 
carefully  to  be  kept  out  of  it  ? 

What  is  the  answer  to  the  first,  and  the  general  answer  to  both  of  them? 

How  should  the  inquiry,  What  would  have  followed  if  Grod  had  not 
done  as  he  has,  be  regarded  ? 

\st  Objection.  That  this  system  seems  inconsistent  with  the  Divine 
Goodness. 

By  what  a  fortiori  argument  is  this  objection  refuted  ? 

2d  Objection.  That  this  system  supposes  mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a 
very  strange  state. 

Granting  the  fact,  why  is  it  no  argument  against  Christianity  ? 

What  particular  considerations  prove  it  to  be  a  fict,  even  if  unaccount- 
able ? 

What  is  the  Scripture  account  of  the  origin  of  the  fact,  and  to  what 
ether  fact  is  it  analogous  in  nature  and  revelation  ? 

yi.  The  Office  of  Christ  as  Mediator  in  the  Redemption  of 
THE  World. 

In  what , particular  manner  did  Christ  interpose,  and  between  what 
parties  ? 

1.  The  Scriptural  Account  of  Christ's  Mediatorial  Office. 

What  Scripture  phrases  severally  represent  Him  as  a  Revealer  of  the 
Divine  Will,  a  Propitious  Sacrifice,  and  a  Voluntary  Offering? 

What  is  the  Scriptural  proof  of  the  two  latter  characters  especially  ? 

Objection  That  Christ  s  Sacrificial  Character  is  merely  figurative  or 
typical. 

(1.)     The  Mosaic  Sacrifices  are  described  as  mere  types  of  the  Atonement. 

What  texts  prove  the  ancient  sacrifices  typical  rather  than  real  ? 

What  texts  prove  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  real  rather  than  typical? 

(2.)  The  Atonement  is  desa'ibed  variously  a^  having  an  efficacy  [beyond 
mere  instruction  or  example. 

What  texts  prove  the  efiicacy  of  Christ's  death  and  sufi"ering  ? 

What  are  the  texts  which  describe  Him  as  our  Ransom,  Advocate,  and 
Propitiation  ? 

What  texts  describe  His  Humiliation,  ©xaltation,  and  Worship  in 
Heaven  1 

2.  The  Theological  Definition  of  Christ's  Mediatorial  Office. 
Under  what  three  heads  is  Christ's  Mediatorial  office  usually  treated  by 

divines  ? 


77 

(1.)     The  Office  of  Christ  as  Prophet. 

How  is  Christ  pre-eminently  the  Prophet  ? 

How  does  He  execute  this  office  in  respect  to  truths  of  natural  religion  ? 

In  respect  to  what  truths  of  revealed  religion  was  He  a  proi>het  as  no 
other  ever  was  1 

And  how  did  He  practically  illustrate  His  teachings? 

(2.)     The  Office  of  ChrUt  as  King. 

What  is  the  nature  of  Christ's  Kingdom  ? 

With  what  design  did  He  found  a  Church  ? 

What  kind  of  government  does  he  exercise  over  that  part  of  it  which  is 
militant  here  on  earth  ? 

Who  are  the  members  of  this  church  ? 

What  are  His  purposes  respecting  it  and  its  enemies  ? 

3.     The  Office  of  Christ  as  Priest. 

How  did  Christ  execute  the  office  of  a  Priest? 

How  did  Expiatory  Sacrifices  arise  among  the  Jews  and  other  nations  ? 

What  part  have  they  fulfilled  in  the  religion  of  mankind  ? 

How  did  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  differ  from  them,  and  in  what  may  it  be 
compared  with  them  ? 

(1. )     The  Efficacy  of  Christ  s  Sacrifice  inexplicable. 

Do  we  know  how  the  ancients  understood  sacrifices  to  become  effica- 
cious. 

How  have  the  Scriptures  rendered  all  conjectures  about  it  uncertain  ? 

Why  has  no  one  any  reason  to  complain  of  this  ? 

(2)     The  Efficacy  of  Christ's  Sacrifice  nevertheless  Unquestionable. 

What  opposite  extremes  have  been  pursued  in  this  question  ? 

Besides  teaching  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  how  did  Christ  render  it 
efficacious  ? 

Besides  revealing  salvation,  how  did  he  put  us  in   a  capacity  of  salva- 
tion ? 

What  is  the  part  of  wisdom  in  practically  dealing  with  the  question  ? 

VII.     The  Futility  of    A   Priori  Objections  against  the  Christian 
System  of  Redemption. 

(/.)     Such  Objections  proceed  from  our  own  Ignorance. 

By  what  considerations  is  it  shown  that  we  are  not  competent  judges, 
before  revelation,  of  the  necessity  of  a  Mediator  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  we  are  no  better  judges  of  the  office  of  a  Mediator? 

What  follows  as  to  any  objections  urged  against  the  expediency  or  use- 
fulness of  particular  parts  of  His  office  ? 

In  what  case  alone  might  such  objections  have  a  show  of  reason  ? 
Exception.     That  the  Doctrine  of  Vicarious  Punishment  appears  to  be 
neither  requisite  nor  suitable. 


78 

What  objection  appears  to  be  of  this  positive  kind?  And  how  is  it 
stated  ? 

(1.)  Vkariovs  Finu'shne^its  occur  in  Natural  Providence  as  well  as  m 
Christianity. 

How  is  it  shown  that  the  objection  to  them  concludes  as  much  against 
natural  providence  as  against  Christianity  ? 

Does  their  infinitely  greater  importance  in  Christianity  vitiate  this 
analogy  ? 

Why  is  the  objection  even  stronger  against  Natural  Providence  than 
against  Christianity  1 

(2.)  Vicarious  Punishments  may  he  necessary  to  the  comjjietioji  of  the 
Divine  Government. 

How  may  vicarious  punishments  be  consistent  with  the  doctrine  that 
every  one  shall  finally  receive  according  to  his  personal  deserts  1 

a.      llieir  Usefulness  in  Natural  Providence. 

How  does  the  neces'  ity  or  occasion  fiDr  them  arise  ? 

What  provision  has  God  made  for  their  occurrence'? 

Why  are  not  men  shocked  by  them,  as  they  appear  in  daily  life,  and 
why  do  they  object  to  them  as  they  appear  in  Christ  ? 

What  do  they  ignorantly  conclude  must  be  the  only  manner  in  which 
the  sufferings  of  Christ  could  contribute  to  the  redemption  of  the  world  ? 

h.     T  heir  Tendency  to  Vindicate  Divine  Justice. 

What  apparent  natural  tendency  in  vicarious  punishments  has  been 
urged  in  defence  of  the  doctrine  ? 

How  is  this  argument  to  be  estimated  ? 

(3).  Vicarious  Punishments.,  efven  if  inscrutahJe,  might  he  requisite  and 
suitahle. 

Is  this  an  objection  against  Christianity,  or  against  the  whole  constitu- 
tion of  nature  ? 

How  is  its  futility  shown  from  our  ignorance? 

(//.)     S^ich  Ohjections  end  m  Presumption  and  Folly. 

How  are  objections  of  this  kind  viewed  by  reasonable  men? 

How  far  is  such  reasoning  legitimate,  and  when  is  it  infinitely  absurd  ? 

How  does  our  own  experience  increase  the  folly  of  such  objections? 

What  issue  is  made  between  reason  and  revelation  in  regard  to  them? 

What  heightens  the  absurdity  of  them  in  the  present  case? 

(III.)     Such  Ohjections  are  wholly  Irrelevant  and  Inexcusable. 

What  should  reason  and  analogy  teach  us  not  to  expect  in  regard  to  the 
divine  conduct  as  compared  with  our  own  duty  ? 

(1.)     Natural  Providence  as  Mysterious  as  the  Christian  Dispensation. 

How,  and  what,  does  God  teach  us  concerning  our  conduct? 

In  what  respect  is  such  instruction  sufficient  ? 

How  much  of  natural  providence  does  it  disclose  ? 


79 

How  is  it  shown  that  the  same  is  the  case  with  regard  to  the  Christian 
Dispensation  ? 

In  what,  then,  are  the  Natural  and  Christian  Dispensations  analogous, 
and  wliat  information  has  been  given  under  tliem  respective!}' ? 

(2.)     Tlic  Chn'stnoi  Precepts  are  sitjficiently  Evldoit. 

If  there  were  anything  unaccountable  in  the  Christian  precepts,  why 
would  they  still  be  obligatory  ? 

What,  Jiowever,  is  the  fact  respecting  them  ? 

What  reasons  exist  for  positive  institutions? 

What  reasons  exist  for  our  duties  to  Christ  ? 


THE  ALLEGED  DEFICIENCIES  IN  THE  CHRIS- 
TIAN EVIDENCES. 

(part  II.      CHAP.    VI.) 

What  objection  has  been  brought  against  the  evidence  of  religion,  and 
upon  what  supposition  ? 

What  kindred  objection  as  to  the  diffusion  of  religion  has  also  been  in- 
sisted on  ? 

I.     The  Alleged  Deficiencies  are  objected  to  on  absurd  grounds. 

How  may  the  weakness  of  these  opinions  be  shown  ? 

On  what  absurd  propositions  are  they  respectively  founded  ? 

How,  and  to  what  extent,  are  these  suppositions  contradicted  ? 

n.     The  Alleged  Deficikncies  are  not  without  Analogy. 

1.     Such  Deficiencies  exist  aromid  its  under  present  Providence. 

(Z )     Natural  Evidence  as  douhtfid  as  Religious  Evidence. 

How  are  those  who  object  to  the  evidence  of  religion  as  doubtful  to  be 
answered  ? 

a.     Doubtfulness  as  to  ivhat  is  our  true  temporal  interest. 

What  makes  it  difficult  to  decide  in  regard  to  many  an  object  of  tem- 
poral pursuit  ? 

What  renders  it  doubtful  whether  we  could  enjoy  it  if  obtained  ? 

h.     Doidjtfulness  as  to  the  most  probable  means  of  attaining  our  true 
temporal  interest. 

How  may  our  best  concerted  schemes  be  disappointed  ? 

What  kind  of  objections  often  render  them  extremely  doubtful  ? 

c.     Douhtfidness  as  to  Eventtial  Success. 


81 

To  what  (leceit.s  are  we  liable,  both  from  without  and  iVoiu  witliin  ? 

Yet  how  do  men  act  in  view  of  .such  doubtful  evidence  ? 

(77.)     Ndtinnl  BrnefltH  as  nncqunlly  distrihutcd  (is  Rrliyious  Bciujits. 

How  are  those  wlio  object  to  the  lack  of  univ^Tsality  in  revelation  to  ))e 
answered  ? 

How  does  the  Author  of  Nature  appear  to  bestow  his  gifts  among  his 
creatures  1  and  what  examples  are  given  ? 

To  what  is  the  variety  of  human  characters  and  conditions  likened? 

Yet  ^oes  this  disprove  a  divine  government  or  affect  human  conduct 
under  it  ? 

2.  Such  Deficiencies^  in  different  degrees,  have  existed  under  jxist  Provi- 
dence. 

(1.)     Revelation  has  hith  rto  had  different  degrees  of  diffusion. 

How  is  it  shown  that  neither  the  Jewish  nor  the  Chilstian  revelation 
has  been  universal  ? 

(2.)     Revelation  lias  hitherto  had  different  degrej^  of  evidence. 

What  different  degrees  of  evidence  have  existed  under  the  Jewish  reve- 
lation V 

What  diflferent  degrees  of  evidence  have  existed  under  (lie  Christian 
revelation  ? 

^\'hat  different  degrees  may  still  arise  "? 

3.  Such  Deficiencies.,  in  any  su}yposahle  degrees,  icould  not  he  beyond  the 
Analogy  of  Providence. 

(1.)  Any  supposahle  degrees  of  evidence  of  revelation  would  not  he  be- 
yond this  Analogy. 

What  varieties  of  religious  conviction  are  supposed  to  prevail  ? 

What  varieties  of  religious  enlightennient  are  supposed  to  have  been 
intended  1 

To  what  would  all  this  be  analogous  ? 

(2.)  Any  sup2)0sahle  degrees  of  diffusion  of  revelation  would  not  he  be- 
yond this  Analogy. 

What  portions  of  mankind  may  be  supi)0sed  to  have  been  wholly  with- 
out revelation  ? 

AVhat  portions  may  be  supposed  to  have  had  natural  religion,  without  a 
genuine  complete  revelation  ? 

What  portions  may  be  supi)osed  to  have  had  the  true  revelation  inter- 
polated and  corrupted  ? 

What  portions  may  be  supposed  to  be  in  some  ignorance,  even  under  a 
true,  full,  and  pure  revelation  ? 

To  what  would  all  this  be  analogous  ? 

HI.     The  Allegro  Deficiencies  are  -xot  Inequitable. 

Why  is  there  nothing  shocking  or  unjust  in  all  this  various  economy  of 
Providence  ? 


82 

To  wliat  ;iro  our  s('n^i»]es  <>ii  tliis  i-oint  due? 

How  unicli  will  1)0  expoeted  of  every  one.  and  how  is  tliis  expressed  in 
Scripture  lantiUdpre? 

What  wr(~>nir  inference,  however,  shonld  l>e  avoided? 

What  siiows  the  absurdity  of  refnsin<r  to  nir.ke  efforts  to  better  our  reli- 
gions condition  ? 

TV.     '^'ni^.  Allkgkd  DkfioiencTks  akf.  not  peculiarly  UxArcor.vTABLE. 

1.      77/r  Gotpral  Expldnntion  of  siir/i  Drfciciioicx. 

Uj)on  Avhat  ])rinciple  is  it  reasonable  to  suppose  the  Anthor  of  Nature 
was  led  tlms  to  place  the  same  kind  of  creatures  in  different  situations  ? 

How  may  we  also  explain  His  having  placed  creatures  of  like  moral  ca- 
pacities in  different  religious  situations  ? 

A))d  to  what  is  the  various  religious  conditions,  at  different  periods,  of 
the  same  creatures  analogous? 

1^.      The  PnrfiniJar  Expl<tii(itIonj)f  svch  Drficiencies. 

^A  hy  is  it  difficult  to  exi^lain  in  particular  these  religious  diversities? 

How  are  they  implied  in  the  constitution  ef  this  world  *? 

Were  revelation  universal,  what  might  still  give  rise  to  tliem  ? 

Is  it  any  more  difficult  to  account  for  thorn  than  to  account  for  our  igno 
ranee  respecting  them  ? 

V.     TuK  Allkgkd    Drficikxcik^,  so  far  as  thky  ark  xot  men's  own 

FAULT.    MAY    BR    ONLY    INCIDENT    TO    A    STATE    OF    PROBATI^^N. 

(1.)  Wdiit  of  Ohvwusnrfss  in  tlip  ChriMian  Evidences  hefore  examiud' 
f.ioti,  mn}i  afford  Prohntion. 

How  may  the  lack  of  self-evidence  in  religion  constitute  a  moral  trial  of 
the  understanding  ? 

(a.)  S^icli  IiiteVechial  Prohntion  is  as  ])rohahJe  as  any  wore  Practical 
Probation.  • 

What  renders  this  antecedently  probable  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  intellectual  probation  is  as  possible  before  convic- 
tion as  more  practical  probation  after  conviction  ? 

What  intellectual  vices  or  virtues  may  be  practical  before  conviction  ? 
and  to  what  may  they  be  compared  1 

(h.)  Such  IntclJcctnal  Prohation  is  as  decisive  as  any  more  Practical 
1  rohation. 

What  is  there  in  the  evidence  of  religion  that  constitutes  probation  ? 
and  to  what  extent? 

(2.)  Supposed  Doid)t fulness  in  the  Christian  Evidences  after  cxamvia' 
tioji,  mety  afford  prohation. 

What  is  the  effect  of  even  doubtful  evidence  upon  an  infpiirer  into  reli- 
gion? 

{A.)  Sncli  Donhtfulness  wvolres  accovntahiiity proportioned  to  the  im- 
portance of  religion. 


H<^w  "s  the  obligjitioii  iiuixjscd  ])y  tloiil)!  illustrated? 

How  is  the  alisurdity  of  any  contrary  view  sliown  ? 

{(I.)      Doiildf ulnars  in  ntlicr  trldfiuns  Jot'.s  iiof  frcr  from  tircnn,itnl,ij//ii. 

How  is  the  ol)liiration  inii)Osed  }\v  doidit  ilhi  trated? 

H(nv  is  tlie  alisurdity  of  any  eojjtrary  view  sliown  ? 

(i'^.)      Douhf/uiiU'ss.  ill  rr/if/ion.  i/ii'fJn's  pcciiJidr  (tccoiiiifnhi/ifi/. 

If  Christianity  should  seem  oniy  su))posal)le  or  credil)l(>,  what  ougjit  to 
b<j  the  effect  on  the  mind? 

What  moral  tempers  does  an  aiJpreliension  of  its  truth  oldiire  men  to 
cultivate? 

How  should  it  affect  their  outward  hehavior  toward  religion  ? 

In  what  res])ect  would  su(  h  hehavior  of  douliting  persons  l)e  like  that  of 
fully  convinced  persons? 

AVhat  consideration  makes  the  rule  of  life  very  much  the  same  for  l)ot]i  ? 

How  far  do  they  difier  and  agree  in  this  regard  ? 

{d.)  Doiihtf Illness  in  injbientidl persons  involn's  marc  (iccorintdlnlitii  thin 
common  hehtcior. 

What  class  *of  persons  have  it  in  their  power  to  do  more  liarm  or 
good  by  their  religious  opinions  than  hy  their  common  intercourse  ? 

Why  are  tliey  doubly  accountable  for  their  behavior  under  the  supposed 
doubtfulness  of  religious  evidence  ? 

{B.)  Such  Do uJ>f fulness  involves  nccoiinfiihilifii  pro}>ortionnl  to  the  evi- 
dence of  religion. 

[a.)  Degrees  of  Evidence  are  necessoril)/  iiiiplicd  in  doubt  as  v:ell  as  in 
belief 

How  is  it  shown  that  where  there  i-  no  evidence  there  is  no  doubt  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  the  case  of  an  even  chance  involves  evidence  a> 
w^ell  as  doubt  ? 

Relatively,  what  degrees  of  evidence  are  implied  in  doubt,  belief  and 
certainty  ? 

What  degrees  exist  in  the  scale  of  evidence  below  as  well  as  above  the 
point  of  doubt  ? 

[b.)  Degrees  of  Evidence,  in  proportion  ds  tlu'ii  ore  discirned,  should  in- 
fluence conduct. 

Can  we  distinguish  the  (hfferent  degrees  of  evidence? 

Why  should  they  influence  practice  in  proportion  as  they  are  discerned? 

In  what  proportion  are  men  enabled  to  discern  evidence  ?  and  in  what 
proportion  to  act  upon  it  ? 

How  is  their  treatment  of  evidence  shown  to  involve  practical  as  well  as 
intellectual  pro))ation  ? 

Considering,  then,  both  the  importance  and  the  evidence  of  religion. 
what  does  doubting  concerning  it  involve? 


84 

(3.)  SpecuJatice  Difficulties  in  the  Christian  Evidences  nutji  promote  the 
disciplinary  or  educational  ends  of  xwohation. 

By  what  atuilogy  is  it  to  be  shown  that  difficulties  in  the  evidence  of  re- 
hgion  afford  no  just  ground  of  complaint  ? 

{A.)  Such  Speculative  Difficulties  are  of  like  disciplinary  tendency  with 
External  Temptations. 

How  do  temptations  affi^rd  moral  discipline  and  improvement? 

How  may  want  of  obviousness  in  the  evidence  of  religion  serve  as  a 
temptation  ? 

How  may  supposed  doubtfulness  in  the  evidence  of  religion  serve  as  a 
temptation,  practically  as  well  as  intellectually,  and  to  what  common 
temi)tation  is  it  likened  ? 

How  may  such  supposed  doubtfulness  discipline  the  virtuous  principle  ? 

{B.)  Such  Speculative  Difficulties  are  no  more  unaccountahle  than  Ex- 
ternal Difficulties. 

^^What,  in  general,  is  meant  by  temptation,  and  what  purposes  does  it 
serve  V 

How  may  we  account  analogically  for  the  difficulty  of  a  want  of  obvious- 
ness in  the  evidence  of  religion  ? 

How  may  we  account  for  the  difficulty  of  an  appearing  doubtfulness  in 
that  evidence  ? 

How  may  we  account  lor  the  combination  of  external  with  internal 
temptations  in  some  persons  ? 

( C. )  Such  Speculative  Difficulties  may  affiord  the  peculiar  discipline 
required  by  speculative  natures. 

What  are  the  chief  temptations  of  the  generality  of  mankind  in  respect 
to  morality  and  religion  ? 

What  class  of  persons  are  described  as  not  liable  to  such  gross  tempta- 
tions 1 

(a.)     Speculative  natures  could  not  othericise  he  fully  disciplined. 

Why  would  religion,  if  self-evident,  fail  to  be  a  discipline  to  such  per- 
sons ? 

Yet  how  far  might  they  stand  in  need  of  moral  discipline "? 

Or  what  further  design  of  probation  might  it  be  requisite  for  them  to 
meet  ? 

What,  then,  may  be  the  peculiar  and  distinguishing  trial  of  such  persons? 

{h. )     Speculative  natures  are  so  disciplined  in  common  life. 
How  are  some  persons,  in  their  temporal  capacity,  situated  with  regard 
to  prudent  conduct  ? 

What  is  the  principal  exercise  of  some  persons  in  regard  to  conduct  ? 
VI.    The  Alleged   Deficiencies   may  be   largely   men's  own 

FAULT,   AS  WELL  AS  PART  OE  THEIR  PROBATION. 


85 

What  has  hitherto  been  conceded  in  rci^ard  to  men's  dissatisfaction  witli 
the  e\idence  ot'rehj^ion,  but  on  what  ground  may  (lie  o])posite  b(;  maiii- 
.tained  ? 
.  (1.)      Want  of  Conviction  In/ the.   Christidu  Erick'ncca  nioij  be  oicing  to 
neglect  and  levity. 

What  i)ersons  are  not  likely  to   see  the   evidence  of  religion,  however 
certain  and  demonstrable  ? 

What  persons  are  not  likely  to   see   that  evidence  of  religion   whicli 
reall}^  is  seen  by  others  ? 

(a.)     Neglect  and  levity  have  thin  effect  naturally. 

What  is  the  natural  efiect  of  neglect  and  levity  in  matters  of  common 
speculation  and  practice,  as  well  as  in  religion? 

Will  the  eiiect  be  the  same  if  the  neglect  of  evidence  proceed  from 
mere  carelessness  as  from  grosser  vices  ? 

Does  it  necessarily  imply  anything  ludicrous  in  the  truth  itself? 

[b.)     Neglect  and  levity  may  also  have  this  effect  providentially. 

In  what  further  manner  may  neglect  and  levity  prevent  knowledge  and 
cjnviciion  of  moral  and  lelig^oas  sdbjects? 

What  does  fc'eiiplLue  decla'-e  on  this  point? 

[Note.     How  is  the  same  idea  expressed  in  other  Scriptures  and  by 
Grotius  ?j 

Does  it  make  any  difference  by  what  providential  conduct  this  comes  to 
pass  ? 

(2. )      Want  of  Conviction  cannot  be  owing  to  any  jjractical  insuj/iciency  in 
the  Christian  Evidences  themselves. 

[a.)     They  are  snffcientfor  common  minds. 

To  what  class  of  common  men  is  the  general  proof  of  natural  and  re- 
vealed religion  level  ? 

What  only  is  required  on  their  part  ? 

How  much  of  natural  religion  can  they  be  convinced  of? 

How  is  Christianity  related  to  their  natural  sense  of  things,  and  what 
supernatural  evidences  of  it  are  they  capable  of  seeing  ? 

(6.)     They  appear  insufficient  only  to  superficial  objectors. 

How  far  are  objections  to  this  proof  answerable,  and  who  are  capable  of 
answering  them  ? 

What,  however,  does  a  thorough  examination  into  such  objections  re- 
(luire  ? 

If  any,  without  such  examination  of  them,  take  tliem  at  second  hand, 
what  must  be  the  result  ?  and  to  what  will  it  be  analogous  ? 

Objection.     That  the  Author  of  religion  would  make  its  evidences  as 
indubitable  as  the  directions  of  a  master  to  a  servant. 

Why  is  it  supposed  that  a  prince  or  master  would  take  care  that  his 
directions  should  be  well  attested  and  plain  ? 


86 

(1.)  The  alleged  analogy  is  imicarrantahlc  and  contrary  to  experience- 
Wow  is  this  objection  shown  to  be  unwarrantable  and  contrarj^  to  expe- 
rience ? 

From  whence  is  a  full  answer  to  the  objection  to  be  taken  ? 

[a. )     Religion  concerns  the  motives  as  well  as  externals  of  an  action. 

Wiiy  would  a  prince  give  his  directions  so  plainly  ?  and  in  what  respect 
is  tin's  no  parallel  case  to  that  of  morality  and  religion  ? 

What  must  be  supposed  in  order  to  make  the  cases  parallel  ? 

(/>. )     Religion  may  expre^  the  conditional  as  well  as  absolute  will  of  God. 

When  may  God's  will  respecting  morality  and  religion  be  said  to  be  ab- 
solute, and  how,  then,  would  we  stand  related  to  that  will? 

When  may  His  will  be  considered  as  conditional,  and  to  what  extent 
are  instances  of  it  to  be  found  ? 

Conclusion.  That  Doubtful  Evidence  may  be  only  part  of  our  Reli- 
gious Probation  is  not  incredible. 

What  is  necessarily  implied  in  a  state  of  religion,  and  why,  then,  is 
there  no  peculiar  incredibility  in  supposing  the  evidence  of  religion 
doubtful  ? 

{ 1  )     Reason  favors  this  Conclusion. 

If  probation  involved  certain  information  and  full  conviction,  what 
would  be  the  only  danger  of  miscarriage  ? 

But  is  this  the  only  equitable  probation  which,  from  the  reason  of  the 
case,  is  possible  ? 

If  probation,  then,  involves  ignorance  and  doubt,  what  is  the  peculiar 
danger  of  failure  ? 

(2.)     Experience  favors  this  Conclusion. 

How  is  it  shown  that  in  our  temporal  capacity  probation  involves  igno- 
rance and  doubt,  both  as  to  our  interest  and  our  conduct? 

And  how  does  our  experience  prove  such  ju-obation  to  be  as  decisive  as 
one  involving  certain  information  and  conviction  ? 

How  is  the  whole  argument  practically  applied  to  such  exceptions  as 
disregard  religion  under  pretence  of  insufficient  evidence  ? 


THE  PARTICULAR  EVIDENCES  OF  CHRISTI- 
ANITY ANALOGICALLY  ESTIMATED. 

(part  II.    CHAP.  VII.) 

With  what  argumentative  design  is  it  proposed  now  to  consider  the 
positive  evidences  of  Christianity  1 

Division  of  the  Christian  Evidences  into  Direct  and  Col- 
lateral. 

AV'hat  are  the  two  direct  and  fundamental  proofs  of  Christianitj'  ? 

How  are  other  and  collateral  proofs  to  be  treated  ? 

What  kind  of  an  argument  for  Christianity  do  they  afford,  and  to  what 
may  the  conviction  arising  from  it  be  compared  '^ 

How  is  it  proposed  to  divide  and  treat  the  Evidence  of  Christianity  ? 

SECTION  I.      DIRECT  EVIDENCE. 
I.    MIRACLES. 

I.     Historical  Evidence  of  Miracles. 

1.     Historical  Evidence  from  the  Holy  Scrij'ttvres. 

For  what  pur])0.se  were  miracles  wrought,  and  what  kind  of  evidence  of 
them  is  to  be  adduced  ? 

(1.)  The  Scriptural  accounts  of  Miracles,  as  of  natural  events,  are 
plain,  unadorned  narratives. 

What  sort  of  evidence  does  the  Old  Testament  afford  of  the  miracles  of 
Moses  and  the  Prophets? 

What  sort  of  evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  and  the  Apostles  do  the 
Gospels  and  Acts  afford  ? 


^88 

How  might  other  historians  have  treated  miracles,  and  how  would  we 
then  naturally  account  for  the  introduction  of  them  into  a  narrative  ? 

But  how  arc  both  miraculous  and  natural  facts  related  in  Scripture  ? 

(2.)  The  Scripture  accounts  of  Miracles  are  quoted  as  c/enuine  down  to 
the  x>rese)it  day. 

How  is  the  genuineness  of  the  Scripture  accounts  of  miracles  proved 
by  quotations  from  them  ? 

(3.)  The  Scripture  accounts  of  Miracles  are  confirmed  by  subsequent 
events. 

How  may  common  history,  and  the  common  Scrii)ture  history  be  greatly 
confirmed  1 

To  what  extent  may  the  miraculous  history  in  ScriDture  be  thus  con- 
firmed, and  by  what  events  ? 

What  is  the  .only  satisfactory  account  of  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish 
and  Christian  Religions? 

(4. )  The  Scripture  accounts  of  Miracles  are  themselves  most  easily  ex- 
plained on  supposition  of  their  truthfulness. 

What  is  the  most  obvious  and  direct  way  of  accounting  for  the  existence 
and  general  reception  of  this  miraculous  history  itself? 

What  may  be  conceded  in  regard  to  a  less  obvious  and  direct  explana- 
tion, but  what  cannot  be  conceded  ? 

How  far  will  mere  supposition  and  possibility  go  as  proof  against  his 
torical  evidence  ? 

(5.)  The  Scripture  accounts  of  Miracles  are  .^therefore.,  to  be  accepted  wt 
til  positively  disproved. 

Though  all  this  histoilcal  evidence  were  but  doubtful,  yet  how  should  it 
be  treated  ? 

What  three  kinds  of  counter  proof  would  alone  be  sufficient  to  invali- 
date it? 

2,     Historical  Evidence  of  Miracles  from  St.  Paul's  E2)istles. 

What  are  the  proofs  of  the  genuineness  of  St.  Paul's  wiltiugs,  and  how 
are  they  to  be  estimated  ? 

What  particular  proof  of  the  genuineness  of  his  Epistle  to  the  Corinth- 
ians is  mentioned? 

( 1. )     They  afford' detached  a?id  independent  evidence. 

How  is  it  shown  from  the  Apostle's  own  declaration,  and  the  history  in 
the  Acts,  that  his  testimony  is  to  be  considered  as  independent  of  the  othcj. 
Apostles  ? 

(2. )     They  afford  peculiarly  credible  evidence. 

How  do  his  Epistles  show  that  miraculous  works  and  gifts  were  pub- 
licly known  among  his  readers  ? 

What  was  his  design  in  bringing  forward  the  subject  of  miraculous  gifts  ? 


89 

How  does  bis  manner  of  speaking  of  those  gifts  prove  tlieir  actual  ex- 
istence at  the  time  ? 

3.  Iliaton'cal  Evidence  of  Mirddes  from  the  success  of  Chrisddulh/  us  a 
Miraailous  Religion . 

On  what  allegation  or  pretence  did  Christianity  offer  itself  to  the  world, 
and  on  what  belief  was  it  actually  received  ? 

(1.)     Miracles  were  the  peculiar  Credentials  of  Christianity. 

How  far  was  Christianity  distinguishable  from  other  religions  in  this 
respect  ? 

To  what  extent  can  it  be  said  that  Mahometanism  was  not  at  first  ])roi)- 
agated  by  miracles  ? 

How  is  it  shown  that  tiie  alleged  miracles  of  Paganism  and  l-'oi)ery  are 
not  parallel  cases?  , 

How  did  Christianity  differ  from  them  in  the  manner  of  its  rise  and 
progress  1 

(2.)     Miracles  ice  re  universally  credited  hy  the  first  Christian  converts. 

What  fiict  is  allowed  in  regard  to  the  introduction  of  Christianity  into 
the  world  ?  and  what  would  its  first  converts  have  alleged  as  their  reason 
for  embracing  it  ? 

What  were  the  diflSculties  in  the  way  of  their  conversion  ?  and  what  did 
their  conversion  show  as  to  their  own  belief  and  testimony  in  regard  to 
miracles  ? 

(3. )  Miracles  are  thus  x>roved  hy  circumstantial  as  iccU  as  direct  histori- 
cal evidence. 

How  does  this  testimony  of  their  conduct  compare  with  written  testi- 
mony ?  ^ 

Why  is  it  to  be  accepted  as  real  evidence  ? 

How  is  it  shown  to  be,  at  the  same  time,  distinct  from  the  direct  his- 
torical evidence  of  the  sacred  writers  ? 

Why  cannot  this  general  belief  in  the  Christian  miracles  be  attributed 
0  the  credulity  of  mankind  ? 

What  difficulties  then  stood  in  the  way  of  belief  in  Christianity? 

What  is  the  presumption  from  the  immediate  conversion  of  such  num- 
bers, and  how  is  it  to  be  valued  ? 

II.  The  FuTiLiTi'  of  IxNfidel  Objections  against  this  Histori- 
cal Evidence  of  Miracles. 

Upon  whom  does  it  lie  to  bring  olijections  against  this  evidence? 

What,  however,  is  the  proper  question  in  regard  to  it  ? 

What  course  have  unbelievers  taken  ? 

1st  Infidel  Objection.  That  the  primitive  Christians  might  have 
been  mere  enthusiasts  deceived  into  a  belief  in  Miracles.    . 

How  is  it  alleged  that  enthusiasts  often  act  in  regard  to  the  most  idle 
follies  imaginable  ? 


90 

(1.)     The  Ohjection  assumes  that  miracles  are  matters  of  jojiinion  rather 
than  of  fact. 

What  distinction  is  overlooked  in  this  objection  ? 

Hov7  do  facts  differ  from  opinions  in  respect  to  testimony? 

What  is  the  strongest  proof  any  one  could  give  of  his  believing  factn  or 
opinions  ? 

How  did  the  Apostles  show  their  belief  in  miracles,  and  why  must  their 
belief  be  admitted  as  proof  of  them  ? 

Wliat  was  the  peculiar  proof  of  them  oiven  by  the  martjTs  of  the  next 
age? 

(2.)     The  Ohjection  assumes  that  entlmsiasm  could  destroy  testimony  to 
matters  of  fact. 

What  is  alleged  to  be  the  effect  of  enthutiasm  upon  testimony  even  for 
facts  in  religion? 

[a. )     En  thusiasm  migh  t  destroy  testimony  to  things  incredible  or  wq^roved. 

What  kind  of  testimony  is  the  strongest  evidence  we  can  have  for  any 
matter  of  fact  ? 

In  what  two  ways  might  such  testimony  be  overcome? 

And  in  that  case  how  alone  could  such  testimony  be  accounted  for? 

But  in  the  absence  of  intrinsic  incredibility  or  counter  testimony,  how 
is  such  an  explanation  to  be  regarded  ? 
^  [h.)     Enthusiasm  coidd  not  destroy  testimony  to  the  Christian  Religion. 

How  is  such  an  explanation  of  testimony  to  be  regarded  when  the 
things  attested  are  credible  and  fully  proved  ? 

How  has  it  been  shown  that  the  testimony  to  Christian  revelation  can- 
not thus  be  explained? 

(c.)  E)dhvsiasni  and  other  like  influences  do  not  destroy  testimony  in 
common  matters. 

To  what  influence  is  religion  supposed  to  be  peculiarly  liable  ? 

What  influences  akin  to  enthusiasm  affect  men  in  common  matters  ? 

Why  are  they  to  be  considered  as  of  a  like  kind  to  enthusiasm  ? 

Yet  what  is  the  effect  of  human  testimony,  notwithstanding? 

2d  Infidel  Objection.  TJiat  the  jn-imitite  Christians  might  have 
heen  enthusiastic  impostors^  deceiving  others  as  well  as  themselves  into  a  helief 
in  miracles. 

How  is  it  supposed  that  the  Apostles  might  have  deceived  themselve  s 
as  well  as  others  ?  and  why  is  this  thought  to  be  credible  ? 

(1.)     Such  imjyostures  are  confessedly  not  imjiossihle. 

What  is  conceded  to  be  the  testimony  of  observation  and  Scripture  in 
regard  to  the  possibility  of  such  enthusiastic  impostures  ? 

But  what  is  the  inconsistency  of  the  objector  1 

(2.)     ^Sueh  impostures  do  not  destroy  actual  testimony. 


91 

How  is  it  sliown  that  men  are  naturally  protected  against  ini posture:^-, 
and  yet  at  the  same  time  liable  to  countenance  them? 

But  what  is  the  natural  effect  of  human  testimony  iiotwithstandinL'- ? 

(3.)      SiicJi  i'mposfurm  are  not  in  fact pfciJifir  to  religion. 

If  it  is  objected  farther  that  in  point  of  fact  mankind  has  been  strangely 
deluded  by  pretences  to  miracles,  what  may  be  replied  ? 

(4. )  Sncli  impoKtnres.  hoiccrrr  stronr/h/  !^iq)portc(l  In/  Jiisftn-icaJ  n-idcncf\ 
cannot  invaJiilate  the  Christian  Religion. 

What  further  objection  is  added  to  ])rove  the  Christian  miracles  impos- 
tures ? 

Is  it  to  be  admitted  that  the  historical  evidence  for  fabulous  miracles  is 
like  that  for  the  Christian  ? 

If  this  were  allowed,  why  would  it  be  absurd  to  bring  it  as  an  objection 
against  the  Christian  miracles  ? 

How  is.  this  absurdity  illustrated  ? 

Is^  General  Ansioer  to  both  Infidel  Objections.  Enthusiasm  and  Impos- 
ture at  worst  could  only  weaken  the  miraculous  evidence  of  Christianity. 

In  what  proportionable  degrees  will  these  tilings  confessedly  weaken  the 
evidence  of  testimony  ? 

But  what  two  things  alone  could  destroy  such  evidence  1 

In  the  absence  of  such  counter  proof,  why  must  that  evidence  be  ad- 
mitted ? 

How  do  those  who  bring  forward  the  mere  general  fiillibility  of  human 
nature  against  this  historical  evidence  expose  the  weakness  of  their  own 
position  ? 

2d  General  Answer.  .  Enthusiasm  and  Imposture  are  largely  precludeil 
by  the  very  nature  of  Christianity. 

How  does  the  importance  of  Christianity  heighten  the  testimony  of  its 
first  converts  ? 

How  also  do  the  moral  obligations  it  imposed  upon  them  make  a  pecu- 
liar presumption  in  favor  of  their  testimony  ? 

Conclusion.  Even  Infidels  must  admit  the  Miraculous  Evidence  of 
Christianity  to  be  considerable. 

What  is  the  value  of  assertions  in  an  argument  like  this? 

What,  then,  must  be  concluded  as  proved  by  the  foregoing  discussion 
with  unbelievers  ? 

In  what  cases  would  infidels  admit  the  evidence  of  such  testimony  as  we 
have  been  considering  ? 

But  v;hat  makes  the  case  still  stronger  for  Christianity  ? 


92 

II.    PROPHECIES. 

How  is  it  proposed  to  treat  the  evidence  from  proi)hecy  ? 

I.  Partial  Obscurity  in  the  Prophecies  does  not  destroy 
THE  Proof  of  Foresight. 

(1.)     Tlie  ichoJe  sense  might  not  he  understood. 

Why  does  not  the  obscurity  of  unfulfilled  prophecies  invalidate  the  proof 
afforded  by  fidfilled  prophecies? 

How  is  the  absurdity  of  such  an  objection  illustrated? 

"What,  indee'd,  would  be  the  only  proper  inference  from  obscure  prophe- 
cies ? 

(2. )      The  2vhoIe /(dJiJment  might  not  he  understood. 

How  might  common  men  be  incapable  of  judging  of  fulfilled  prophecies 
and  yet  be  convinced  of  a  divine  foresight  in  them  ? 

How  might  the  same  be  true  even  of  the  most  learned  men  ? 

What  was  the  probable  intention  of  the  fulfilled  prophecies  ? 

II.  Partial  Inapplicability  in  the  Prophecies  does  not  de- 
stroy the  Proof  op  Foresight. 

When  a  course  of  prophecy  is  applicable  to  a  course  of  events,  what  is 
the  fair  inference  1  and  how  is  this  to  be  proved  ? 

What  objection  does  this  principle  refute  ? 

(1.)  General  Applicahility  in  Human  writings  is  a  proof  of  their  In- 
tention. 

What  two  kinds  of  writing  resemble  prophecy  in  this  respect? 

How  might  one  learn  the  intention  of  a  flible  or  a  parable,  though  the 
author  had  left  it  without  a  moral  or  application  ? 

How  might  one  learn  the  intention  of  a  satire,  though  but  partially  ac- 
quainted with  the  persons  or  events  intended  ?  and  what  would  be  the 
measure  of  his  satisfaction  in  reading  it  ? 

(2.)  General  Applicahility  in  the  Prophecies  is  a.  Proof  of  their  Inten- 
tion. 

On  the  same  principle  may  we  prove  the  intention  of  the  prophecies 
concerning  the  church,  civil  affairs,  and  the  Messiah  ? 

What  further  proof  of  their  intention  is  afforded  by  the  manner  in  which 
ancient  Jews  and  modern  Christians  understand  them  ? 

III.  Occasional  Misapplication  of  the  Prophecies,  by  the 
Prophets  themselves  or  their  interpreters,  does  not  destroy 
the  Proof  of  Divine  Foresight. 

If  it  could  be  shown  that  the  prophets  in  their  predictions  thought  of 
other  events  than  those  of  which  Christians  now  think,  or  that  their  pre- 
dictions were  applicable  to  other  events  than  those  to  which  Christians 
now  apply  them,  what  would  be  state  of  the  argument? 

(1.)     True  Propliecies  might  he  misapplied  hy  the  Projjhets  themselves. 


93 

AVhat  illustration  is  used  to  show  that  the  Scriptures  uiight  have  other 
or  further  uieaning  than  those  persons  had  wlio  first  recited  or  wrote  tlieni  ? 

How  is  the  absurdity  of  the  contrary  view  shown  ? 

Why  does  the  actual  fulfihncnt  of  j)rophecies  in  a  sense  different  from 
that  of  the  projjliets  prove  such  fulfilment  to  have  been  divinely  intended? 

What,  then,  is  the  only  question  to  be  decided  respecting  prophecies, 
and  what  (juestion  resi)ecting  the  prophets  themselves  may  be  left  unde- 
cided ? 

(2.)      True.  Prop] ICC ica  )ni<jlit  be  misdj-ipJird  hi/  (heir  iiiteyprctcrs. 

In  what  case  might  it  have  availed  an  objector  to  jirove  that  a  jjro- 
phecy  was  applicable  to  contemporary  or  previous  events?  and  for  what 
reason  ? 

How  is  this  illustrated  by  Porphyry's  misapplication  of  the  Book  of 
©aniel  ? 

Are  the  prophecies  applicable  to  Christ  and  the  Church  c:ii)able  of  any 
other  application  ?  and  if  thoy  were,  how  would  this  aifeet  tiie  question  of 
divine  foresight  in    tlieni  ? 

Conclusion.  The  Prophetical  Evidence  is  of  great  weight  when  fairly 
considered. 

What  class  of  persons  may  hesitate  to  receive  this  prophetical  evidence? 

What  moral  qualifications  are  requisite  in  order  to  appreciate  it? 

What  will  be  the  temptation  to  the  majority,  and  why  is  it  vain  to  argue 
against  their  i)rejudices  ? 

sp:ction  ii.   collateral  evidence. 

What  is  included  under  the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christi- 
anity ? 

How  is  th^s  kind  of  evidence  in  regard  to  common  matters  estimated? 

What  two  reasons  are  given  for  introducing  it  here  ? 

What  is  the  proposition  asserted  and  to  be  proved  in  respect  to  the  sys- 
tem of  natural  and  revealed  rt  ligion  ? 

How  can  natural  religion  be  said  to  be  revealed  ? 

I.       (jrKXKRAL     RkLIGIOUS     IJiSTORY    IN    SCRIPTURE,    WITH    ITS    COLLATKRAI, 

EvrD?:NCK. 

Why  may  revelation  be  considered  as  historical  ?     . 

(1.)      General  Jielt//iom  IJi.storij  contcdned  in  Scripture. 

Thus  considered,  what  is  the  general  design  of  Scripture,  as  distinguished 
from  all  other  books  ? 

Consistently  with  this  design,  how  does  the  Old  Testament  begin  1  and 
what  purpose  does  this  introduction  serve  with  regard  to  Heathenism  as 
well  as  the  true  revealed  rel 


IglOIl 


How  does  St.  John,  in  like  manner,  begin  his  Gosi)el  ' 

What,  then,  is  the  general  character  of  the  Scripture  History  ? 


94 

How  far  does  this  general  rolinious  history  include  iiolitical  or  civil 
history? 

In  what  light  does  revelation  consider  the  common  aifairH  of  this  world 
and  its  successive  empire-  ? 

And  yet  wdiat  general  account  of  its  chief  governments  does  it  contain  ? 
during  Avhat  period  ?  and  to  what  final  condition  of  mankind  ? 

2.    Collateral  Evidence  of  this  General  History. 

What  are  the  features  of  this  history  which,  taken  together,  afford  the 
largest  scope  for  criticism  ? 

Ffoui  wh;it  sources  might  if,  if  spurious,  be  confuted? 

Why  does  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence,  taken  in  connec- 
tion with  the  fact  that  it  has  hitherto  survived  all  criticism,  imi)ly  a  posi- 
tive argument  for  its  truth  ? 

How  far  must  that  fact  be  accepted  as  an  actual  proof  of  its  truth? 

Is  it  even  pretended  that  it  has  ever  been  actually  disproved  ? 

II.      I^ARTICULAR    EeLIGIOUS    HiSTORY     COJsTATNED     IN     ScRIPTl'RE. 

WITH  ITS  Collateral  Evidence. 

What  does  the  Old  Testament,  as  distinguishable  from  all  common  his- 
tory, contain  ? 

1.  Particular  History  contained  in  Scripture. 
(1.)      Of  the  Jeicish  Religion. 

,  What  accou.nt  does  it  give  of  the  origin,  progress.'  and  peculiar  position 
of  a  particular  nation  the  Jews  ? 

What  conditional  and  absolute  promises  were  made  in  it  to  this  people  ? 

What  does  it  predict  concerning  the  fulfillment  of  these  promises? 
and  what  was  the  effect  of  these  predictions  upon  the  whole  Jewish  peo- 
ple? 

And  what  does  it  further  predict  as  to  the  reception  of  Messiah  by  the 
Jews,  his  consequent  relation  to  the  Gentiles,  and  the  glory  of  his  universal 
dominion  ? 

(2.)      Of  the  Christian  RfUgioii. 

What  account  does  it  give  of  the  appearance  of  Messiah,  of  his  life,  of 
the  commission  and  credentials  of  his  disciples,  of  the  establishment  and 
progress  of  Christianity,  and  of  its  prophets  ? 

2.  Collateral  Evidence  of  this  History. 

What  case  is  supposed  in  order  to  show  the  strength  of  the  collateral 
evidence  of  this  history? 

(1.)  The  Establishment  of  Natural  Religion  in  the  world  is  due  to  the 
Scrij^turcs. 

How  might  this  be  shown  to  the  sujiposed  inquirer  ? 

What  place  does  divine  revelation  fill  in  the  world's  history?  and  what 
kind  of  a  hearing  does  it  consequently  deserve? 


95 

H  w  18  it  sliowii  that  the  establishmeut  of  luiturnl  leliLnoii  In-  revolution 
does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  it  from  reason  ? 

(2.)     The  Antiquiti/,  ClirojioJoqi/,  and  EthiKtl()</ti  nf  Scripture  a, r  co)i 
firmed  hij  tradition  and  modern  science. 

^y  what  external  evidenee  are  the  first  ])arts  of  Scri))tnr(^  confirmed  ? 

(3.)  TJie  Domeatic  Ifistory  (tiid  Political  J/iatfrrf/  nf  Scripture  are  con- 
firmed by  Profane  llistorij  as  well  as  hij  their  ouii  inherent  credihility. 

How  far  is  the  common  Scripture  history  confirmed  by  profane  history  1 

As  distinguished  from  the  miraculous  or  prophetic  history  of  Scripture, 
how  does  it  agree  with  ]iiofane  history  in  representing  the  succession  of 
events  and  of  diff'erent  ages  and  in  the  mode  of  delineating  human  char 
acters  ? 

What  features  in  the  narrative  carry  with  them  a  prcsum])tion  of  ve- 
racity ? 

How  may  the  strange  incidents  in  Scrii)ture  he  explained? 

How  may  tlie  mistakes  of  transcribers  be  accounted  for  ? 

What  features  in  the  extent  and  contents  of  this  history  heighten  its 
appearance  of  truth  ? 

How  does  this  argument  apply  to  the  common  history  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament ?  and  with  what  further  external  evidence  ? 

And  why  does  it  give  credibility  also  to  its  miraculous  history  ? 

(4.)  7^ he  Scrij^f  lire  account  of  the  Jewish  Nation  is  confirmed  I ni  thiir 
acknoiiAedged  h istory. 

What  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fact  in  respect  to  the  antiijuity  and 
polity  of  the  Jews?  in  resi)ect  to  their  religion?  and  in  respect  to  the 
fundamental  principle  of  their  nationality  ? 

How  is  it  proved  from  their  own  history  that  such  was  the  principle  of 
their  nationality,  in  distinction  from  that  of  surrounding  nations? 

Why  does  this  remarkable  preservation  of  natural  religi  n  among  them 
render  the  miracUis  of  Moses  and  the  Proplets  credible? 

(5.)  The  Mesm in ic  Prophecies  of  Scripture  have  been  acfii(dly  fnlfjllrd 
in  the  rise  of  Christianity  and  decline  of  Judaism. 

What  circumstances  in  the  life  of  J^  i  of  Nazareth  among  the  Jews 
would  convince  our  supposed  inquirer  of    .le  truth  of  the  prophecies  ? 

Upon  what  kind  of  evidence  was  he  si  jn  received  })y  the  Gentiles  as  the 
promised  Messiah  ?  and  how  is  this  eviuence  corroborated  ? 

U])on  what  further  internal  evidence  did  Christianity  spread  through 
the  world?  in  the  face  of  what  difficulties?  and  to  what  extent  ? 

And,  in  the  mean  time,  how  have  the  history  and  present  position  of 
Judaism  likewise  fulfilled  the  prophecies? 

How  may  some  endeavor  to  account  for  the  exclusive  nationality  oi'  the 
Jews  upon  natural  principles?  and  yet  why  does  not  this  destroy  the  mi- 
raculous evidence  it  affords  ? 


How  is  this  illiLstrareJ  by  tlie  fulfillment  of  prophecy  at  the  birth  of 
our  Saviour? 

(6.)  The  I'urthd  Fulfillment  of  tlie  Scripture  Prophecies  affords  reason- 
(ihle p)res}nnption  of  their  ultimate  complete  fidfill/ment. 

What  is  the  i)resuuiptioii  from  the  fulfilled  i)ro])hecies  as  to  those  still 
unfulfilled  ? 

How  are  the  predicted  restoration  of  the  Jews  and  establishment  of 
Christ's  universal  kingdom  suggested  and  rendered  probable  by  the  past 
history  of  Judaism  and  Christianity? 

W^at  are  the  qualifications  for  thoroughly  judging  of  this^  prophetical 
evideece?  and  to  what  conclusion  have  qualified  judges  come? 

REVIEW    ANJJ  ESTIMATE. 

What  are  the  several  acknowledged  facts,  corro  orative  of  Scripture, 
which  have  been  put  before  our  supposed  inquirer? 

What  obvious  appearances  sliould  he  add  to  them  ? 

What  will  be  the  proper  effect  of  the  whole  argument  upon  his  mind, 
■and  why  cannot  we  as  readily  appreciate  it? 

1.  The  Christian  Evidencks,  separately  estimated,  are  of  ac- 
knowledged PROBABILITY. 

What  is  required  in  order  fully  to  estimate  the  foregoing  evidences? 

What  matters  of  fact  have  been  stated  which  must  be  acknowledged 
even  by  unbelievers  ? 

If  they  object  to  the  historical  evidence  of  miracles  as  not  sufficient  to 
convince  them,  yet  what  cannot  they  deny? 

If  they  attribute  the  fulfillment  of  prophecies  to  accident,  yet  wdiat 
cannot  they  deny  ? 

If  they  call  the  collateral  evidences  adduced  mere  fanciful  coincides,  yet 
what  must  they  admit  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  such  evidence  and  its 
actual  effect  in  many  cases  1 

\\.  'I'he  (Christian  Evidences,  collectively  estimated,  afford  cu- 
mulative  PROBABILITY. 

How  are  serious  persons  recommended  to  estimate  these  evidences?  and 
what  will  be  the  result  of  such  an  estimate  ? 

Why  will  this  result  follow? 

III.  1'he  Christian  Evidences,  practically  estimated,  are  on  the 
side  of  our  best  interests. 

In  comparing  the  evidence  for  and  against  Christianity,  what  practical 
consideration  should  be  allowed  ? 

Should  such  a  consideration  influence  our  judgment  or  our  practiced 

Why  would  it  be  inadmissible  in  simple  questions  of  fact  ? 

But  in  questions  of  conduct  why  should  it  be  admitted  ? 


97 

IV.  The  Chuistiax    Kvidencks,   estimated    like    common  evidence?, 

WOULD    BE    CONCLUSIVE. 

How  are  the  truth  of  rcHgion  and  of  coiiniion  matters  to  be  ahke  esti- 
mated ? 

How  is  it  shown  that,  in  any  common  case,  such  collective  evidence  as 
that  for  Christianity  would  be  conclusive  ? 

V.  The    Christian    Evidences,  when    not    collectively  estimated, 

ARE  peculiarly  EXPOSED  TO  MERE  ARGUMENTATIVE  OBJECTORS. 

Why  do  assailants  of  these  evidences,  especially  in  conversation,  greatly 
have  the  advantage  ?  " 

YI.  The  Christian  Evidences,  even  if  lessened,  cannot  be  de- 
stroyed. 

What  has  been  shown  hitherto  in  regard  to  a  revelation  in  general  and 
the  Christian  religion  in  particular,  and  what  has  now  been  shown  in  re- 
gard to  the  positive  evidence  for  it  ? 


THE  OBJECTIONS  AGAINST  THE   ANALOGI- 
CAL ARGUMENT. 

(part  II.      CHAP.  VIII. ) 

Wh\'  is  it  needful  and  important  to  consider  the  objections  to  the  ana- 
logical argument  for  religion  ? 

What  are  the  five  objections  to  be  considered  ? 

To  what  are  these  plausible  objections  owing  ? 

How  will  different  clasges  be  affected  by  them,  and  by  the  proposed  an- 
swers to  them  ? 

1st  Objection.  That  this  Analogy  only  shifts  the  difficulties 
OF  Revealed  Religion  to  the  lower  plane  of  Natural  Reli- 
gion, without  destroying  them. 

1.  The  Objection  may  involve  an  ahsurd  requirement. 

What  is  required  in  this  objection,  and  to  what  may  this  i-equirement  be 
equivalent  ? 

2.  The  Objection  icoidd  hold  equally  against  all  inductive  reasoning  and 
common  experience. 

What  manner  of  arguing  has  always  been  allowed  to  be  just? 

Why  is  it  not  a  poor  thing  to  argue  thus  from  natural  religion  to  re- 
vealed ? 

How  far  would  the  same  objection  apply  to  common  life,  and  what  illus- 
tration is  given  ? 

3.  The  Objection  does  not  impair  the  logical  value  of  the  argument. 
( 1 . )  Mere  sophistries  are  exposed. 

What  unreasonable  course  is  often  pursued  by  objectors  to  revelation, 
and  why  is  it  important  to  expose  the  fallacy  ? 
(2. )  Real  objections  are  answered  or  mitigated. 


99 


On  what  admission  can  o])jections  to  revealed  relitiion  })e  tlius  an- 

swered ? 

Without  tliis  admission,  to  '^I'O  tlic  difficulties  in  the  system  and 

evidence  of  revealed  religion  anau 

Upon  what  assumption  alone  does  ariiument  for  both  natural 

and  revealed  reliij:ion  rest,  and  by  wIku.  .  -ilogy,  tlierefore,  is  Christianity 
chiefly  vindicated  ? 

II.  Objection.  TlIAT  THIS  ANALOGY  ONLY  ENCUMBERS  RELKJIOUS 
PRACTICE  WITH  THE  LIKE  DIFFICULTIES  OF  WORLDLY  PRACTICE. 

What  is  religion  practically  considered,  and  how  may  men  be  convinced 
of  this? 

1.  The  ohjection  is  of  no  iceighf  vitli  fair  minds. 

If  there  is  any  reason  for  seeking  our  temporal  interest,  what  would  pru- 
dence dictate  as  to  our  religious  intcro  st  ? 

What  makes  the  argument  stronger  for  our  religious  interest  than  for 
our  temporal  interest "? 

What  do  fair  minds  consider  in  this  question,  and  how  are  they  disposed 
to  act  ? 

2.  The  oJyection  j^rocceds  iqxm  a  groundless  assumption. 
What  is  the  thing  assumed  in  this  objection  ? 

What  is  the  general  argument  which  it  aftbrds  against  the  truth  of  re- 
ligion ? 

By  what  analogy  is  this  argument  answered  ? 

And  wdiy  is  this  a  sufficient  answer  ? 

By  wdiat  two  methods  can  this  answer  be  shown  to  be  just  and  conclu- 
sive ? 

III.  Ohjection.  That  this  Analogy  only  merges  the  mystery  of 
Providence  in  the  mystery  of  Nature,  without  vindicating  its 

WISDOM  and  justice. 

What  is  the  proper  subject  of  this  treatise  ?  from  wdiat  other  related 
subject  is  it  distinguishable  ?  and  in  which  of  the  two  are  we  most  con- 
cerned ? 

1.  Such  objections  have  been  answered  as  far  as  necessary. 

How  far  is  it  necessary  to  justify  Providence  against  such  objections  ? 
What  is  the  argument  by  which  such  objections  have  been  answered  ? 

2.  Such  objections  have  been  answered,  not  by  merely  imrrying  them,  but 
hy  exhibiting  the  things  objected  against  as  credible  matters  of  fact. 

What  has  been  tlie  mode  of  argument  by  which  such  objections  have 
been  removed  ? 

How  have  the  things  objected  against  been  shown  to  be  credible?  and 
what  example  is  recalled  ? 

3.  Such  objections,  even  if  not  answered,  would  be  utterly  inronchtsirr 
ugoAnst  these  established  facts  of  religion. 


100 

What  future  fact  of  religion  is  cited  as  having  been  established  in  spite 
of  all  such  objections,  and  bj'  wljat  argument  ? 

Whj'  are  necessitarian  objections  against  that  fact  inconclusive  ? 

4.  Such  objections,  though  they  may  concern  the  reasonableness  of  religion, 
do  not  enter  enter  into  the  question  of  its  credibility. 

Whj^  may  objections  against  the  credibility  of  religion  be  met  without 
inquiring  into  its  reasonableness? 

What  is  the  perfection  of  religion  as  defined  by  St-  John  ? 

What  part  of  religion,  however,  may  be  shown  to  be  reasonable  ?  and 
how  may  this  be  shown  ? 

5.  Such  objections,  though  not  ansicered  by  analogy,  may  yet  be  destroyed 
as  to  their  animus  or  intodion. 

To  what  objections  is  analogy  confessedly  no  immediate  answer? 
But  to  what  aim  or  intention  of  these  objections  is  it  an  immediate  an- 
swer 1 

IV.  Objection.  That  this  analogy  leaves  the  mind  in  an  unsat- 
isfied STATE. 

What  is  acknowledged  in  regard  to  this  treatise,  and  by  what  argument 
is  this  objection  to  be  met  ? 

1.  Satisfactory  Evidence  does  not  belong  to  the  condition  of  man. 
How  are  men  divided  in  their  opinions  concerning  life  ? 

Is  it  easy  to  settle  the  question  speculatively  ? 

How  is  it  settled  actually  to  our  hands  ? 

But  what  considerations  show  the  evidence  upon  which  it  is  thus  settled 
be  far  from  satisfactory  ? 

To  what  extent  is  that  evidence  unsatisfactory  ?  and  yet  how  do  men 
act  under  it  ? 

2.  Satisfactory  Evidence  does  not  belong  to  the  nature  of  vdigion. 
What  does  religion  presuppose  in  those  who  will  embrace  it  ? 
How  is  this  illustrated  ? 

What,  then,  is,  and  what  is  not,  the  question  as  to  the  evidence  of  re- 
ligion ? 

If  it  were  suffic'ent  for  mere  curiosity,  would  it  answer  as  well  for  the 
purposes  of  probation  ? 

3.  Satisfactory  Evidence  is  afforded  for  all  j)ractical 2>^(rposes. 

What  is,  and  what  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  the  practical  question  in 
common  matters? 

What  evidence  may  determine  an  action  to  be  prudent,  besides  the 
satisfaction  that  it  will  be  for  our  interest  or  happiness  ? 

V.  Objection.  That  this  Analogy  is  not  likely  to  be  influentla.l 
UPON  men's  belief  and  practice. 

What  two  considerations,  before  mentioned,  show  this  objection  to  be 
nothing  to  the  point  ? 


101 

1.  The  ohjfctioii  is  not  nlevant  to  tin  purpase  of  this  tiratisr. 
What  is,  and  what  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  treatise  ? 

Where  Hes  the  responsibility  for  the  littlt'  iiiHuence  of  tlie  evidence  of 
rehgion  upon  men. 

2.  The  ohjrcfion  does  not  affect  tlieeiuh  of  rrJif/ion  or  of  l^roridcnc.e. 
How  are  tlie  ends  of  relia:ion  still  aeejouipli.shed  ?     And,  tlu!  desi.i^ns  of 

Providence  ? 

3.  The  objection  allows  enough  to  justify  the  foregoing  argument. 
What  is  allowed  by  the  very  terms  of  the  objection  as  to  the  whole  ar- 
gument, and  why  therefore  should  it  be  laid  before  men  1 

General  Answer  to  the  whole  of  tfie  foregoing  objeci  ions. 
[Note.     What  distinction  does  Butler  make  between  arguing  upon  and 
arguing //-o;??.  the  i)rinci])les  of  others,  and  what  illustration  is  given?] 

1.  This  Analogy  is  only  objectionable  in  so  far  c(S  it  has  proceeded  njion 
the  principles  of  others. 

What  reason  does  Butler  give  for  having  argued  upon  the  piinciples  of 
others  rather  than  his  own  ? 

What  principle  of  others  has  been  hitherto  admitted,  and  what  princi- 
ple of  his  own  has  been  omitted  ? 

How  is  this  latter  principle  illustrated  as  applied  to  Go<l  ? 

What  shows  the  principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness  to  be  true  ? 

How  has  the  omission  of  them  affected  the  very  style  of  this  trea  ^f     ! 

2.  This  Analogy  is  tcholly  unobjectionable  considered  as  a  reasoning  ' 
facts  rather  than  fromx)rinciples. 

These  two  abstract  principles  being  omitted,  in  what  light  only  can  re- 
ligion be  considered  ? 

Why  are  Christianity  and  the  proof  of  it  both  matter  of  fact  ? 

Why  is  even  natural  religion  a  matter  of  fact  ? 

(1.)  3fatheniatical  illustration  of  this  distinction. 

What  illustration  is  used  to  explain  this  distinction  between  the  facts  of 
religion  and  its  abstract  principles  ? 

In  this  illustration,  which  is  the  more  credible,  the  flict  or  the  abstract 
truth,  and  why  must  the  worst  sceptics  admit  this  ? 

(2.)  Exemplification  of  this  distinction  in  Religion. 

In  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  government  of  the  world  what  is  the  ab- 
stract truth  asserted  ? 

If  this  abstract  truth  were  now  to  become  positive  matter  of  fact,  what 
questions  would  remain  as  perplexing  as  ever? 

In  that  case  what  w^ould  be  the  proof  of  God's  moral  Government  and 
how  would  that  proof  be  affected  by  such  abstract  questions  ? 

Upon  what  then  does  the  assertion  of  a  future  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment rest,  and  is  it  the  assertion  of  a  mere  abstract  truth  or  of  a  fact  ? 


102* 

In  the  proof  of  this  future  fact,  what  argument  has  been  pursued,  and 
what  are  its  itecuhar  strength  and  weaknes;^  ? 

3.  This  Analogy  is  therefore  at  once  an  vnansiceraUe  proof  of  the 
facts  of  religion  and  an  incidental  confirmation  of  its  principles. 

What  will  be  the  force  of  the  treatise  respectively  upon  those  who  ad- 
mit the  principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness  and  upon  those  who  do  not 
admit  them  ? 

What  will  be  its  force  upon  Christians  and  upon  Infidels? 

Whjit  is  it  in  religion  that  makes  the  analogical  argument  for  it  superior 
to  all  ridicule  ? 

And  what  class  ought  particularly  to  appreciate  tliis  argument? 
CONCLUSION. 

(part    II.) 

I.  Scope  of  the  Previous  Argument  :— 

1.  As  enforcing  the  Pecidiar  Evidences  of  Revealed  Religion. 

How  are  the  evidences  of  Natural  Religion  increased  in  Christian  coun- 
tries, and  why  is  scepticism  there  so  remarkable  ? 

What  is  the  value  of  abstruse  reasonings  respecting  the  truths  of  Natu- 
ral Religion  ?  and  how  are  they  intuitively  manifest  to  unprejudiced  minds? 

How  do  truths  of  Revealed  Religion  differ  from  those  of  Natural  Reli- 
gion in  this  respect? 

Why  does  inattention  to  the  former  imply  the  same  immoral  temper  as 
inattention  to  the  latter? 

What  is  the  nature  of  our  obligation  to  attend  to  revelation  ? 
"  How  do  its  evidence  and  manifest  appearance  enforce  this  obligation  ? 

How  does  its  miraculous  character  give  peculiar  force  to  this  obligation  1 

What,  therefore,  is  the  degree  of  this  obligation? 

2.  As  adapted,  to  all  classes  of  Sceptics. 

[|'<What  sort  of  men  may  be  supposed  to  have  met  this  obligation? 

On  what  principles  do  some  of  them  reject  all  religion  ?  and  to  what 
practical  extremes  do  they  carry  their  neglect  of  it? 

On  what  supposed  principles  do  others,  no^  chargeable  with  such  profli- 
gateness,  oppose  religion  ? 

How  do  they  estimate  its  evidence  comparatively? 

What  two  classes  of  objections  are  they  likely  to  bring  forward  ? 

What  peculiar  objections  do  they  bring  against  Christianity  ? 

How  do  they  fortify  themselves  against  its  evidence  ? 

Or  if  they  partially  admit  its  evidence,  how  do  they  behave  under  it? 

II.  Summary  of  the  Previous  Argument  : — 

1.    In  respect  to  the  System  of  Christianity. 

W  lat  has  been  proved  in  respect  to  religion  considered  as  revealed  and 
miraculous  ? 


103 


\ 


hat,  in  respect  to  the  relations  between  reason  and  revelation  ? 

^\  It  is  the  ariiiinicnt  for  the  wisdom  and  iroodnoss  of  the  Christian 
sj^stenv  ' 

How  has  it  been  shown  that  the  tardy  and  intricate  method  of  the 
Christian  system  is  no  objection  against  it  ? 

What  are  the  heads  of  analogical  i)roof  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of  a 
Mediator "? 

2.  In  respect  to  the  Evidence  of  Christianiti/. 

What  objections  against  the  Christian  Evidences  have  been  considered  ? 
and  how  have  those  objections  been  answered? 

What  positive  evidences  have  been  adduced  and  how  have  they  been 
analogically  supported  ? 

III.  Practical  Inferences  from  the  Previous  Argument. 

What  deductions,  and  what  principles  may  be  allowed,  in  practically 
applj'ing  the  previous  argument  1 

1.  That  linmorality  is  greatly  aggravated  m  x>ersons  acquainted  icith 
Christian  it  I/. 

Why  is  immorality  greatly  aggravated  in  any  who  knowingly  reject 
Christianity  ? 

2.  That  Scepticism  does' not  relax  the  claims  of  Christianity. 
What  middle  state  of  mind  may  exist  with  regard  to  Christianity  ? 
What  class  of  sceptics  are  sup^ '^'=^ed  to  be  in  this  state  of  mind? 
What  two  reasons  are  given  why  we  cannot  include  in  this  class  all  who 

have  ever  heard  of  Christianity  ? 

How  far  are  such  sceptics  under  the  obligation  of  Christianity  ? 

3.  That  Blasphemy  with  regard  to  Christianity  is  ahsolnteJy  icithout  ex-' 
ciise. 

What  is  the  only  temptation  to  such  blasphemy?  and  why  do  such 
temptations  afford  no  excuse  ? 

What  degree  of  obduracy  and  unbelief  does  it  argue  ? 


"^m 


